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Cognitive Constraints on Valuing Annuities 
 
It is difficult for the average person contemplating retirement to determine how to draw 
down his wealth. While formal economic models typically feature consumers willing to, and 
fully capable of, engaging in complex intertemporal optimization in the face of multiple sources 
of uncertainty, this approach is often adopted because of its analytical tractability rather than due 
to its realism as a portrayal of actual consumer behavior. Moreover, individuals can differ with 
regard to how they solve the complex problem of selecting wealth decumulation and 
consumption strategies to maximize lifetime utility. Economists have begun to document such 
differences in individual decision-making abilities. A key implication of this research is that 
there can be a gap between people’s actual decisions and the decisions that a normative model 
would prescribe (c.f., Choi, Kariv, Müller, and Silverman 2014). The size of such gaps may vary 
across individuals and across decision contexts (Campbell 2006; Guiso and Sodini 2013). The 
gap could reflect people’s inability to costlessly optimize, but, as suggested by Calvet, Campbell, 
and Sodini (2007) in the context of understanding household portfolio allocations, it could also 
arise when households take their limited abilities into account and effectively optimize subject to 
constraints on their cognitive abilities or knowledge.  
The present paper explores this idea in the important context of retirement income 
security, focusing on how cognitive abilities influence the valuations that individuals place on an 
annuitized income stream. We focus on whether people are internally consistent in their annuity 
valuations across a variety of different elicitation methods. Specifically, we present individuals 
with scenarios in which they are offered an opportunity to decrease their annuity holdings for a 
lump sum (what we call annuity “selling”), as well as scenarios in which the same individuals 
are offered an opportunity to exchange a lump sum for additional annuitized wealth (called 
annuity “buying”). Our central hypothesis is that people differ in their ability to meaningfully 
value a stream of life annuity income relative to a lump sum, and that this ability is associated 
with measures of cognitive ability including education, financial literacy, and numeracy.  
We study the lump-sum versus annuity choice, rather than other financial or economic 
decisions, for four reasons. First, the annuitization decision is important in its own right as an 
academic research topic. Indeed, there is a vast academic literature dating back a half-century on 
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the role that annuities should and do play in people’s portfolios in later life.1 Second, as we 
discuss below, it is also an important retirement policy concern in many developed nations. 
Third, the annuitization decision is a natural place to look for variation in consumers’ decision-
making abilities. Valuing an annuity versus a lump sum is cognitively challenging because it 
requires that one wrestle with multiple sources of uncertainty (e.g., mortality, returns, inflation), 
and it also requires that one make a near-term choice with far-distant consequences, which are 
characteristics known to render decision-making difficult (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 
2008). Fourth, because individuals are typically faced with annuitization decisions only once or 
twice in their lifetimes, these are not transactions that people learn about through repeated 
market interaction (Bernheim 2002). In such settings, behavior is known to be less likely to 
follow the predictions of costless optimization (Kling, Phaneuf, and Zhao 2012), which can drive 
a wedge between true versus revealed preferences (Beshears, Choi, Laibson, and Madrian 2008). 
We provide six pieces of evidence consistent with the hypothesis that individuals have 
difficulty valuing annuities, and that the degree of difficulty is correlated with cognitive abilities. 
First, we show that a non-trivial fraction of the population has implied annuity values that are 
difficult to reconcile with costless optimization under any plausible set of parameters. Second, 
we uncover a large divergence between the price at which individuals are willing to buy versus 
sell an annuity, a result that cannot be explained by liquidity constraints or endowment effects. 
Third, and even more striking, we find that people’s buy and sell valuations are negatively 
correlated. In other words, those who demand higher sell prices are also more likely to offer very 
low buy prices. Fourth, we show that the size of the sell-buy valuation discrepancy is strongly 
negatively correlated with cognitive ability as measured by education, financial literacy, and 
numeracy. This is consistent with less cognitively capable individuals having much greater 
difficulty valuing a stream of annuity payments. Fifth, we use additional experimental variation 
to show that the elicited valuations are sensitive to anchoring effects. Finally, we argue that it is 
difficult to explain observed cross-sectional variation in the measured annuity valuation amounts 
with theoretically attractive measures. In other words, the pattern of significant marginal 
valuation predictors is more consistent with individuals using relatively simple heuristics, rather 
than engaging in costless optimization to value the trade-offs. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Two useful reviews include Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011) and Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011). 
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Our evidence is drawn from a randomized experiment we conducted in the American 
Life Panel (ALP), where we present respondents with hypothetical scenarios involving choices 
with different lump sum amounts and levels of the Social Security annuity. By varying whether 
the questions elicited a compensating variation (CV) or an equivalent variation (EV) value, 
whether the individual was buying or selling the annuity, the size of the increments or decrement 
of the Social Security annuity, and the order of the questions, we directly examine the internal 
consistency of subjective valuations placed by respondents on their Social Security annuities. We 
collected a number of additional variables to control for potentially confounding factors such as 
heterogeneity in liquidity constraints and beliefs about political risk. 
Like most economists, we usually find evidence based on actual choices in natural 
settings more compelling than evidence based on hypothetical choices. We acknowledge 
important drawbacks of using hypothetical choices, such as the possibility that lower stakes 
could lead respondents to exert less effort and seek out fewer resources to assist them with their 
decisions. However, although these considerations may make hypothetical choice behavior 
noisy, it would be surprising if they led to systematic patterns in hypothetical choice behavior 
that would be completely absent in actual choices. 
Counterbalancing these drawbacks are three important benefits of using a hypothetical 
choice setting. First, it allows us to observe an individual’s annuitization choices for a wide 
range of annuity prices, from which we obtain individual-specific annuity valuations without 
having to rely on functional form assumptions. By contrast, in real-world settings, annuitization 
decisions are typically made at a single price (and if there is price variation, it is generally not 
exogenous). Second, in a hypothetical setting it is feasible to elicit both the price at which an 
individual is willing to buy and the price at which he is willing to sell the annuity. Such within-
person variation turns out to be extremely valuable in exploring cognitive constraints on 
consumers’ abilities to value annuities. Third, the hypothetical setting allows us to elicit 
annuitization choices for a broadly representative sample of the U.S. population. As discussed in 
the literature overview below, actual annuitization decisions in natural settings are typically only 
observed for rather select populations. 
In addition to advancing the academic understanding of consumer behavior in this area, 
our results also have considerable practical policy relevance. In March 2014, for example, the 
UK Chancellor announced the end of a requirement that savers annuitize a portion of their assets 
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upon retirement (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2014), a significant policy change that led to an 
immediate and substantial decline in annuity sales (Gray 2014). In contrast, the U.S. has been 
moving in the direction of encouraging annuities in defined contribution plans (US DOL 2010), 
with some analysts going so far as to suggest that people be automatically annuitized upon 
retirement (Gale, Iwry, John, and Walker 2008; Steverman 2012). Numerous other countries are 
also debating these issues.2 These discussions, in part, revolve around whether people can make 
optimal payout decisions using their accumulated retirement assets. Moreover, many countries 
are grappling with fiscally unsustainable pay-as-you-go public pension systems. The extent to 
which households are poorly equipped to value the annuities offered by their public pensions has 
implications for the political feasibility of reforms changing the benefit structure, particularly if 
retirees were to be offered a choice between a lump sum and future annuity payments. The same 
point applies to state and local public defined benefit plans (DB) in the U.S., which also face 
substantial underfunding problems (Novy-Marx and Rauh 2011). Indeed, some reformers have 
called for a reduction in DB annuities in exchange for lump-sum contributions to defined 
contribution (DC) accounts (e.g., Kilgour 2006).  
 In what follows, we first summarize key prior studies on the demand for annuities from 
both the neoclassical and the behavioral economics literatures. Next, we describe the American 
Life Panel (ALP) Internet survey, a broadly representative sample of the U.S. population, and we 
outline how we elicited lump-sum versus annuity preferences in this survey. We then present our 
key empirical results, followed by a number of robustness checks and further analyses for 
subgroups that vary according to financial capabilities. We conclude with a discussion of 
possible policy implications and future research questions.  
 
I.  Related Literature 
A. Annuity Demand 
 There is a very large economics literature focused on modeling the optimal level of 
annuitization for life-cycle consumers under various assumptions.3 That literature began with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Similar debates about the role of lifetime income in retirement plans are occurring in Europe, including 
the Netherlands (Brown and Nijman 2012), Italy (Guazzarotti and Tommasino 2008), and elsewhere 
(Fornero and Luciano 2004). 
3 Rather than providing a comprehensive review here, we instead highlight those studies most germane to 
the research that follows. Readers interested in the broader literature on life annuities may consult 
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Yaari’s (1965) paper in which he noted a set of conditions under which it would be optimal for 
an individual to annuitize all of his wealth.4 Extensions to the theory went on to show that full 
annuitization would be optimal under more general conditions,5 a puzzling prediction in light of 
very low annuitization rates in the real world (Mitchell, Piggott, and Takayama 2011). Extended 
life-cycle models have been constructed to measure consumer valuations of life annuities and to 
compute how optimal annuitization will vary with numerous other factors.6 Although these 
model extensions affect the level at which individuals value annuities, most models still imply 
that individuals have an internally consistent valuation of an annuity versus a lump sum.  
 Our paper focuses on how an individual’s annuity valuation varies depending on whether 
the transaction is structured as buying or selling the annuity. Unlike a “bid-ask spread” in 
financial markets, which is a wedge between the highest price a buyer is willing to pay for an 
asset and the lowest price for which a different seller is willing to sell it (e.g., due to counterparty 
risk), we document what amounts to a bid-ask spread for the same individual. There are two 
extensions of the standard model with costless optimization in which a within-individual bid-ask 
spread could arise: liquidity constraints and transaction costs. For liquidity-constrained 
individuals, the buying price is capped by their limited liquidity, but no such cap exists for their 
selling price. In our empirical work below, we show that liquidity constraints are not the primary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler (2011); Poterba, Venti, and Wise (2011); Brown (2008); Horneff, Maurer, 
Mitchell, and Dus (2008); and Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown (1999).  Note that we use the 
term “life annuity” because we are interested in products that guarantee income for life, as opposed to 
financial products such as “equity indexed annuities” that are mainly used as tax-advantaged wealth 
accumulation devices (and hence they are rarely converted into life-contingent income). 
4 The conditions include no bequest motives, time-separable utility, exponential discounting, and 
actuarially fair annuities (among others). 
5 Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond (2005) showed that full annuitization is optimal under complete markets 
with no bequest motives. Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2010; forthcoming) found that if agents 
saved optimally out of annuity income, full annuitization can be optimal even in the presence of liquidity 
needs and precautionary motives. They further found that full annuitization is suboptimal only if agents 
risk substantial liquidity shocks early after annuitization and do not have liquid wealth to cover these 
expenses. This result was robust to the presence of significant loads. 
6 Among the many factors modeled in research are pricing (Mitchell, Poterba, Warshawsky, and Brown 
1999); pre-existing annuitization (Brown 2001; Dushi and Webb 2006); risk-sharing within families 
(Kotlikoff and Spivak 1981; Brown and Poterba 2000); uncertain health expenses (Turra and Mitchell 
2008; Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker 2010, forthcoming); bequests (Brown 2001; Lockwood 2011); 
inflation (Brown, Mitchell, and Poterba 2001, 2002); the option value of learning about mortality 
(Milevsky and Young 2007); stochastic mortality processes (Reichling and Smetters 2015; Maurer, 
Mitchell, Rogalla, and Kartashov 2013); and broader portfolio issues including labor income and the 
types of assets on offer (Inkmann, Lopes, and Michaelides 2011; Koijen, Nijman, and Werker 2011; Chai, 
Horneff, Maurer, and Mitchell 2011; Horneff, Maurer, Mitchell, and Stamos 2009, 2010).   
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explanation of our findings. Although there may be transaction costs that could lead to a spread 
in a market setting, these transaction costs are not relevant in our experimental setup. 
Much of the annuity literature has focused on theory or simulation, largely owing to the 
small size of the voluntary life annuity market in most countries making empirical work difficult. 
The empirical literature that does exist often points to behavior suggestive of heterogeneity in 
decision-making abilities. For example, Brown (2001) used the 1992 wave of the U.S. Health 
and Retirement Study (HRS) to show that expected annuitization from DC plans was correlated 
with the annuity valuations predicted by a life-cycle model based on demographic 
characteristics, but only for persons with sufficiently long (1+ year) planning horizons. Hurd and 
Panis (2006) explored payouts from DB plans in the HRS and found that many people exhibited 
behavior consistent with status quo bias. Bütler and Teppa (2007) used Swiss administrative data 
to track choices made by employees in ten different pension plans and concluded that 
annuitization was higher in plans where an annuity was the default payout option. Chalmers and 
Reuter (2012) exploited exogenous variation in the price of annuities using Oregon public-sector 
workers; they (unexpectedly) found that worker demand for partial lump-sum payouts rose rather 
than fell as the value of the forgone life-annuity payments increased, leading them to conclude 
that the decisions were being made by unsophisticated individuals. Fitzpatrick (2015) examined 
a policy in which Illinois Public School employees could purchase additional annuitized pension 
benefits. Using the observed take up of this policy and how the take up varies with the annuity’s 
price, she estimated that the average employee is willing to pay only 20 percent of the actuarial 
value of the annuity. Previtero (2014) showed that annuity demand was negatively correlated 
with the prior year’s stock returns, consistent with consumers engaging in naïve trend-chasing. 
Shepard (2011) examined the implicit purchase of marginal annuities through the delay of 
claiming Social Security. Using perturbation arguments, he argued that standard explanations 
(such as lack of liquidity, risk of medical expenditure shocks, bequest motives, actuarially unfair 
pricing, and political risk) cannot explain the puzzle of why so few people delay claiming. He 
concluded that understanding the annuity puzzle likely rests on a behavioral explanation. 
Several experimental papers have also suggested that annuitization decisions are not well 
described by models of optimizing agents facing no cognitive constraints or decision-making 
costs. Agnew, Anderson, Gerlach, and Szykman (2008) showed that people can be steered 
toward or away from life annuities in an experimental setting, depending on whether the 
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products were described using positive or negative frames. Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, and 
Wrobel (2008) used an internet survey to show that perceptions of annuity value relative to 
alternative financial products were heavily influenced by whether the products were described 
using “consumption” or “investment” frames. Beshears, Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Zeldes 
(2014) also found evidence that framing affects annuity demand. Brown, Kapteyn, and Mitchell 
(2013) showed that Social Security claiming behavior (which is akin to making an annuitization 
decision) was influenced by framing changes. Accordingly, this small literature suggests that 
individuals behave at odds with models based on costless optimization. 
The two studies closest to ours in spirit are Cappelletti, Guazzarotti, and Tommasino 
(2013) and Liebman and Luttmer (2014), although both were more limited in focus. The first of 
these used a 2008 survey of Italian households to investigate whether people would give up half 
their monthly pension income (assumed to be €1000) in exchange for an immediate lump sum of 
€60,000. The study reported that the better educated and more financially literate were more 
likely to annuitize. The second paper conducted a 2008 survey on the perceived labor supply 
incentives in Social Security, which included a question asking for the equivalent variation of a 
$100/month increase in Social Security benefits. Because each of those papers used only a single 
elicitation method, neither addressed the hypotheses we test here across elicitation measures 
based on within-person differences in valuation.    
B. Variation in Decision-making Abilities 
Lusardi and Mitchell (2014) provide a comprehensive review of the large and growing 
literature relating financial literacy to behavior, including the robust finding that many 
households lack basic financial knowledge. Indeed, many households make a range of financial 
mistakes when managing their financial affairs (e.g., Calvet, Campbell, and Sodini 2007, 2009; 
Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson 2009), and households making such mistakes often lack 
day-to-day financial skills (Hilgert, Hogarth, and Beverly 2003). Relatedly, findings by Agarwal, 
Chomsisengphet, and Zhang (2015) indicate that financial literacy plays an important part in 
mortgage default behavior. The literature has also established that financial literacy is correlated 
with the propensity to participate in financial markets (Kimball and Shumway 2006; Christelis, 
Jappelli, and Padula 2010; van Rooij, Lusardi, and Alessie 2011; Almenberg and Dreber 2015; 
and Arrondel, Debbich, and Savignac 2013), and in pensions (Fornero and Monticone 2011). 
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Moreover, Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011) demonstrated that more financially knowledgeable 
individuals are more likely to engage in retirement planning and accumulate retirement wealth. 
A related literature has focused on the links between cognitive abilities and financial 
decision-making. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008) showed that cognitive functioning was a 
stronger predictor of Medigap purchase patterns than risk preferences. Agarwal and Mazumder 
(2013) reported that performance on cognitive tests helped explain the quality of financial 
decisions related to the use of credit. A subset of this literature has also focused more specifically 
on retirement preparedness among older individuals. For example, McArdle, Smith, and Willis 
(2011) and Banks, O’Dea, and Oldfield (2010) found that people with greater cognitive ability 
had accumulated more retirement wealth.  
Taken together, these and other studies suggest that people differ in their financial 
decision-making abilities, and these differences are important correlates of financial well-being 
later in life. Taking this literature a step further in establishing causality, Choi, Kariv, Müller, 
and Silverman (2014) conducted a large-scale experiment designed to directly test the extent to 
which individual decisions were consistent with the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference 
(GARP). They detected substantial heterogeneity and found that their measure of decision-
making quality was higher among younger and better-educated individuals. Additionally, they 
showed that individuals having better decision-making skills accumulated more wealth. 
Behrman, Mitchell, Soo, and Bravo (2012) also reported that the more financially literate saved 
more in their pensions, controlling for the possible endogeneity of financial knowledge. 
Our work below contributes to this literature in two ways. First, we focus on a decision 
important in its own right – annuitization – but we concentrate on an area where heterogeneity in 
decision-making quality has not yet been studied, namely Social Security annuities. Second, we 
explore an outcome novel to the study of decision-making ability by investigating a measure of 
low decision-making quality, namely the spread of individual responses across different 
approaches to eliciting stated valuations for life annuities. We show that this spread is strongly 
inversely related to various measures of cognition and financial literacy. 
 
II. Methodology and Data 
A.  The Experimental Context  
Rather than describing an unfamiliar hypothetical annuity product, our experiments use 
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Social Security benefits as the context. This approach has several advantages. First, most 
workers understand that Social Security pays benefits to retirees that last for as long as they live 
(Greenwald, Kapteyn, Mitchell, and Schneider 2010), which means that respondents are likely to 
understand the nature of our “offer” to trade off annuities and lump sums. Second, our context 
provides a simple way to control for possible concerns about the private annuity market that 
might otherwise influence results, such as the lack of inflation protection (our question makes it 
clear that Social Security is adjusted for inflation), or concerns about counterparty risk of the 
insurer providing the annuity.7 Third, our setting is highly policy relevant. For example, past 
discussions of possible pension reforms around the world, as well as at the U.S. state and local 
levels, have included proposals to partially “buy out” benefits by issuing government bonds to 
workers in exchange for a reduction in their annuitized benefits. Several U.S. corporations have 
also recently offered to buy back defined benefit pension annuities from retirees in exchange for 
lump sums (c.f., Wayland 2012). 
B. Our Experiments in the American Life Panel  
To test how people value their Social Security annuity streams, we fielded a survey 
between June and August of 2011 using the RAND American Life Panel, a panel of U.S. 
households that regularly take surveys over the Internet. RAND provided Internet access to 
household lacking such access.8 By not requiring Internet access at the recruiting stage, the ALP 
has an advantage over most other Internet panels when it comes to generating a representative 
sample.9 At the time of our survey, the American Life Panel included about 4,000 active panel 
members. The survey was conducted over two waves of the ALP. For the first wave, we selected 
2,954 respondents age 18 or older, of whom 2,478 completed the survey for a response rate of 
83.9%. Those who completed the first wave were invited to participate in a second survey at 
least two weeks later; of these, 2,355 respondents completed the second wave for a response rate 
of 95%. About 4% of participants indicated that they thought they would not be eligible to 
receive Social Security benefits (either on their own earnings records or on those of a current, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Below we examine whether concerns about the fiscal sustainability of Social Security influences 
people’s valuation of the Social Security annuity.  See Luttmer and Samwick (2015) for a detailed 
analysis of the effects of policy uncertainty on valuations of future Social Security benefits. 
8 Initially these households received a WebTV allowing them to access the Internet. Since 2008, 
households lacking Internet access have received a laptop and broadband Internet access. 
9 A more detailed explanation of the ALP is provided in Online Appendix A. Our survey instrument is 
included in Online Appendix B.  
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late, or former spouse). We showed these respondents the level of Social Security benefits equal 
to the average received by people with their age/education/sex characteristics, and asked them to 
assume for the purposes of the survey that they would receive this level of benefits. Our full 
sample included 2,112 complete responses for both waves 1 and 2.10 
Table 1 compares our sample characteristics with those of the same age group in the 
Current Population Survey (CPS).11 Our sample is, on average, five years older, more female, 
more non-Hispanic white, better educated, slightly better-paid, and has a somewhat smaller 
household size than the CPS; the regional distribution is close to that of the CPS. The fact that 
our sample is more highly educated means that, if anything, our respondents should be in a better 
position to provide meaningful responses to complex annuity valuation questions, compared to a 
national sample. Despite the differences between the ALP and the CPS, our ALP sample does 
include respondents from a wide variety of backgrounds, so in this sense, we think of the ALP as 
broadly representative of the U.S. population.  
[Table 1 here] 
C. Eliciting Lump-Sum versus Annuity Preferences 
To elicit preferences regarding annuitization, respondents were posed several questions 
of the following sort: 
In this question, we are going to ask you to make a choice between two money 
amounts. Please click on the option that you would prefer. Suppose Social 
Security gave you a choice between: 
(1) Receiving your expected Social Security benefit of $SSB per month.  
or 
(2) Receiving a Social Security benefit of $(SSB-X) per month and receiving a 
one-time payment of $LS at age Z.  
 
The variable SSB is an estimate of each respondent’s estimated monthly Social Security benefit; 
the variable LS refers to the lump-sum amount; and Z is an age that depends on whether the 
respondent currently receives Social Security benefits. For those not currently receiving benefits, 
the trade-off was posed as a reduction in future monthly Social Security benefits in exchange for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Of the 2,355 respondents who completed the second wave, we dropped 69 observations from the pilot 
version of wave 2 (where the questionnaire was slightly different). We further dropped 168 observations 
where the survey instrument was incorrectly administered due to a technical glitch and we dropped 6 
observations with missing information on basic demographics (age, education, or marital status). 
11 Summary statistics of other key variables from our survey such as annuity valuations (discussed below) 
are provided in Online Appendix Table A.1. 
11 
	  
	  
a lump sum to be received at that person’s expected claiming age. For those currently receiving 
Social Security benefits, the questions were modified to compare a change in monthly benefits to 
the receipt of a lump sum in one year. In both cases, the receipt of the lump sum was to take 
place in the future in order to avoid having present bias possibly confound our results. 
Before asking the annuity trade-off question, we explained that the question referred to 
real after-tax amounts (i.e., “you don’t owe any tax on any of the amounts we will show you;” 
and “please think of any dollar amount mentioned in this survey in terms of what a dollar buys 
you today because Social Security will adjust future dollar amounts for inflation”). In the trade-
off question, we told married respondents: “benefits paid to your spouse will stay the same for 
either choice.” Thus, individuals were asked to value a single-life inflation-indexed annuity.  
To probe the reliability of the valuations provided by respondents, we also varied the 
question in a systematic way along two dimensions. First, we elicited how large a lump sum 
would be required to induce an individual to accept a reduction of (i.e., to sell) a portion of his 
Social Security income; below we refer to this version of the question with the shorthand “sell.” 
We also elicited how large a lump sum the individual would be willing to pay in order to 
increase his Social Security annuity (the “buy” condition). 
Second, we varied our questions depending on whether we elicited a compensating 
variation (CV) – the annuity/lump-sum trade that would keep a respondent at his existing utility 
level – or an equivalent variation (EV) –the lump-sum amount that would be equivalent in utility 
terms to a given change in the monthly annuity amount. As we discuss in more detail below, an 
analysis of the CV versus EV distinction should allow us to distinguish our findings from a 
simple status quo bias or endowment effect because the status quo was not included in the EV 
choice set. All choices in the EV scenario either involved a change in Social Security benefits or 
the payment or receipt of a lump sum. Even though there is no status quo in the EV version, we 
continue to use “sell” to describe the version that includes the respondent receiving a lump sum 
as a choice and to use “buy” for the version that has the respondent paying a lump sum as a 
choice. We believe this description fits with the common notion of the meaning of buying and 
selling, but we acknowledge that this description implicitly assumes that selling and buying is 
perceived as relative to the choice where the respondent receives only Social Security income.  
In total, we elicited four measures and designate them for discussion purposes as CV-Sell 
(as in the example above), CV-Buy, EV-Sell, and EV-Buy. The chart below describes these four 
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scenarios. We define SSB as the monthly Social Security benefit the individual was currently 
receiving (if the individual was a current recipient), or was expected to receive in the future (if 
the individual was not a recipient); X is the increment (or decrement, if subtracted) to that 
monthly Social Security benefit. Finally, we set LS as the lump-sum amount offered in exchange 
for the change in monthly benefits. In essence, this paper is about how individuals trade off a 
monthly benefit of $X for a lump sum of $LS. 
 
Four Variants of the Annuity Valuation Tradeoff Question 
 “Sell” Version  “Buy” Version 
Choice A Choice B  Choice A Choice B 
Compensating 
Variation (CV) [SSB-X] + LS [SSB]  [SSB+X] – LS [SSB] 
Equivalent  
Variation (EV) [SSB] + LS [SSB+X]  [SSB] – LS [SSB-X] 
Note: SSB stands for current/expected monthly Social Security benefits, X is the amount by which 
monthly Social Security benefits would change and LS is a one-time, lump-sum amount. Positive amounts 
are received by the individual while negative amounts indicate a payment by the individuals. Amounts 
between square brackets are paid monthly for as long as the individual lives, whereas LS is a one-time 
payment or receipt. The individual is asked to elect Choice A or Choice B. 
 
The CV-Sell scenario presented respondents with a choice between their current (or 
expected) Social Security benefits (SSB) and an outcome in which their benefits are reduced by 
$X per month in exchange for receiving a lump sum of $LS. The EV-Sell scenario provided a 
choice between receiving a higher monthly benefit (SSB+X) or receiving $SSB plus a lump sum 
of $LS. Note that within the Sell scenario, one can obtain EV simply by adding $X to each side 
of the CV trade-off. Given that X=$100 per month in the baseline versions, the change in benefits 
is modest relative to total monthly income for most individuals. We would therefore expect CV 
and EV to be comparable, barring strong endowment effects that might be present in the CV 
formulation but not in the EV formulation (where the status quo was not an option). 
Switching to the Buy scenarios, the CV-Buy question provided a choice between SSB and 
a benefit increased by $X in exchange for paying $LS to Social Security. EV-Buy provided a 
choice between receiving a lower monthly benefit (SSB-X) and paying a lump sum to maintain 
the existing benefit. In these Buy scenarios, the respondent could obtain CV simply by adding $X 
to each of the EV scenarios. Again, no status quo option was available in the EV case. 
In order to elicit the subjective valuation resulting from any given measure above, the 
survey used a “branching” approach. For example, we started with a $100 increment to the 
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monthly annuity versus a $20,000 lump sum. If the individual rejected the lump sum, then 
$20,000 is the upper bound of the individual’s valuation of the annuity. Conversely, if the lump 
sum was chosen, $20,000 is a lower bound. Next, based on each individual’s response, we either 
increased or decreased the amount of the lump-sum payment offered. Each subsequent response 
tightens the range of lump-sum values between the upper and lower bound. By going through 
four or five rounds of this branching process, we identify a narrow range of lump-sum values 
that contains each respondent’s implied subjective valuation of the change in the annuity stream.  
We chose one of our four approaches as a benchmark on which to do additional 
sensitivity tests along other dimensions. While there is no theoretical basis for suggesting that 
one treatment would be preferred to the other three, we selected the CV-Sell option as the 
benchmark condition because it is most relevant to policy discussions. For example, offering 
retirees an opportunity to sell their annuities for a lump sum is a transaction observed in recent 
years (e.g., GM has offered retirees lump sums in lieu of their life annuities). The Sell measure is 
also less likely than the Buy measure to be bounded by people’s access to liquidity. Accordingly, 
all respondents were asked the CV-Sell question in one of the two waves, whereas the other three 
versions (CV-Buy, EV-Sell, and EV-Buy) were asked in a randomized order in the other wave. 
Placement of the CV-Sell question in the first or second wave was randomized across 
respondents. The two waves were administered approximately two weeks apart. Below, we test 
whether responses to CV-Sell differ across the first and second wave. 
D. Other Sources of Experimental Variation 
We also randomized along a number of other dimensions. The order of the options within 
a question was randomized to test whether respondents took the survey seriously (as opposed to, 
say, always choosing option A). We also tested for anchoring effects in our benchmark question 
(CV-Sell) as well as whether responses varied with the magnitude of the change in the benefit, to 
provide an additional assessment of the role of cognitive limitations. Finally we asked a version 
of the questions designed to control for political risk, to ensure that our results were not driven 
by concern over the system’s pending insolvency. Each of these factors is discussed in detail 
below, after we present our main results.  
 
III.  Evaluating Heterogeneity in Annuity Valuations 
 Figure 1 reports the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the responses to the CV-
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Sell and CV-Buy questions, while Figure 2 provides a similar plot for EV-Sell and EV-Buy. 
Given our branching approach in eliciting valuations (described in Section II.C), the two Figures 
plot both the upper and lower bounds for each respondent’s annuity valuation.12 In Figure 1, the 
midpoint of the upper and lower bounds for the CV-Sell question indicates a valuation of 
$13,750 for a $100-per-month change in Social Security benefits. The CV-Buy question 
midpoint valuation is only $3,000. In Figure 2, the comparable valuations are $12,500 for EV-
Sell and $3,000 for EV-Buy. By comparison, the median actuarial value of this annuity for 
respondents in our sample is $16,855 (computed using Social Security Trustees’ Report 
intermediate assumptions of a three percent interest rate and intermediate mortality).  
Figures 1 and 2 here 
 Four patterns are evident in these two figures. First, median valuations are all 
substantially below the actuarial value of $16,855. Second, substantial dispersion of valuations is 
generated by all four valuation approaches. Third, the distributions of EV and CV valuations 
appear similar, holding constant whether the Buy or Sell valuation was offered, although we will 
see below that the correlation is far from perfect. Fourth, there is a very large difference between 
the Sell and Buy valuations, regardless of whether this was elicited in a CV or an EV setting. 
After briefly discussing each of these issues, we will then delve more deeply by analyzing 
differences in valuations within and across individuals. 
A. Median Valuations 
 When we simply pool responses to our four valuation questions – CV-Sell, CV-Buy, EV-
Sell and EV-Buy – we find that 70% of the responses have an upper bound below the actuarially 
fair level and 64% of the responses have an upper bound at least $5,000 below the actuarially fair 
level.13 This finding is interesting, given the ongoing discussion in the literature about the 
“annuity puzzle” which notes that life-cycle optimizers should recognize annuities’ high utility 
value, while real-world consumers avoid purchasing them. Nevertheless, there are several 
reasons for why people might value an annuity below its actuarially fair level, including bequest 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 The CV-Sell figure plots valuations only for individuals who saw the $100 increment first (the other 
three annuity valuation questions are asked only for $100 increments). Other respondents saw higher 
annuity amounts first which, as discussed below, led to an anchoring effect that increased their valuation. 
13As in the figure, we limit the sample for the CV-Sell response to individuals who saw the $100 
increment first to avoid anchoring effects. If we double the weight on the remaining half of the CV-Sell 
responses (to compensate for the fact we dropped CV-Sell responses affected by anchoring), the 
percentages become 68% and 61%, respectively.	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motives and a desire for liquidity. Indeed, the current paper does not attempt to explain the 
annuity puzzle; rather, our goal is to test whether people’s valuations are internally consistent. 
The remainder of our results should be viewed in light of this important distinction. 
B. Valuation Dispersion  
 The cumulative distributions presented in Figures 1 and 2 reveal substantial heterogeneity 
in respondent valuations. For example, five percent of the sample reported upper-bound CV-Buy 
valuations of $1,500 or less. Such low amounts are difficult to explain if the respondent can 
optimize costlessly since the $100 monthly annuity payments would yield more than this in only 
16 months. The exception would be if some individual were virtually certain that he would die in 
that time span, but these outliers persist even after we control for respondents’ self-reported 
health status and expected survival probabilities. At the other extreme, 16 percent of the 
respondents gave lower-bound CV-Sell annuity values of $60,000 or higher – nearly four times 
the actuarial value of the annuity. Moreover, more than six percent of the respondents in the CV-
Sell approach said they would not accept a lump sum of less than $200,000. This is unexpected, 
since even if someone earned only a 60 basis-point (0.60%) annual return on the $200,000 lump 
sum, he could replace the $100 per month he was giving up with this return and still keep the 
lump sum of $200,000. As noted below, these findings are not explained by subjective life 
expectancy, concerns about political risk, or many other plausible explanations.14 In other words, 
many respondents appear to have difficulty providing economically meaningful values for the 
Social Security annuity, at least in the tails of the CDF.15 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 We control for political risk in two ways in this study. First, we asked individuals about their 
confidence that the Social Security system will be able to provide them with the level of future benefits 
they are supposed to get under current law. Including responses to this question as a control variable in 
various analyses does not substantially affect our findings. Second, we asked a version of our CV-Sell 
annuity valuation question in which we explicitly instructed individuals not to consider political risk by 
stating: “From now on, please assume that you are absolutely certain that Social Security will make 
payments as promised, and that there is no chance at all of any benefit changes in the future other than the 
trade-offs discussed in the question below.” Comparing the response to the no-political-risk question to 
the baseline CV-Sell question for those for whom the two questions were asked in different waves of the 
survey, we find that the response to the no-political-risk question is a statistically insignificant 10 percent 
lower than the response to the baseline CV-Sell question. Taken literally, this implies a negative risk 
premium, but we believe the more likely explanation is that our question may have had the unintended 
effect of making political risk more salient. Overall, our analysis suggests that the incorporation of 
political risk does not alter our main findings.   
15 Individuals in the tails of the annuity valuation distributions tend to be worse off economically and 
score lower on indicators of cognition. We return to the relation between cognition and annuity valuations 
in Section III.F below. However, these differences are not dramatic and there is substantial overlap in the 
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C. Comparing CV and EV 
 The EV-Sell options are obtained by adding $100 to both of the options in the CV-Sell 
questions. Given the small magnitude of the shift (relative to mean estimated monthly benefits of 
$1,395), we anticipated that a costlessly optimizing decision-maker would provide quite similar 
assessments across these two ways of eliciting value. Although the distributions of CV-Sell and 
EV-Sell look similar in Figures 1 and 2 (as do the distributions of CV-Buy and EV-Buy), 
individual responses are only moderately correlated. Table 2 reports the correlations across the 
four different measures.16 Column 1 shows that CV-Sell and EV-Sell are significantly positively 
correlated, but the correlation coefficient of +0.31 is far from one. Given that we asked the CV-
Sell and the EV-Sell questions in survey waves separated by at least two weeks, it is unlikely that 
the correlation was driven by anchoring or memory effects that could arise if the questions had 
been asked within the same questionnaire. The correlation of +0.72 between CV-Buy and EV-
Buy is substantially higher, but we cannot rule out that anchoring effects contributed to this 
higher correlation since CV-Buy and EV-Buy were asked in the same wave. 
Table 2 here 
D. Sell Prices Exceed Buy Prices 
 A key and very striking pattern emerging from Figures 1 and 2 is that the distributions of 
annuity valuations from the Buy solicitations are substantially below those of the Sell 
solicitations. Recall that the Sell question asked how much a person would have to be 
compensated to give up part of his Social Security annuity, whereas the Buy question asked how 
much he would be willing to pay to increase his Social Security annuity. In Figure 1, the median 
midpoint response drops from $13,750 for CV-Sell to only $3,000 for CV-Buy. 
 If we observed this result only in the CV case, one might argue that this could result from 
status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988) or an endowment effect (Kahneman, Knetsch, 
and Thaler 1991). Yet Figure 2 shows that an almost identical shift occurs when we use the EV-
Sell and EV-Buy responses, where the status quo is not an option because both the annuity and 
the lump sum are represented as deviations away from the initial endowment. Online Appendix 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
characteristics of those in the tails and those who are not. Online Appendix Table A.2 presents the mean 
characteristics of respondents in the tails of the annuity valuation distributions.  
16 To control for correlations induced by common experimental manipulations, we regress the log 
midpoint valuation on controls for the relevant manipulations and then correlate the residuals, which are 
reported in Table 2. Uncorrected correlations are similar and shown in Online Appendix Table A.3. 
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C shows that a kinked utility function, such as is typically used to explain endowment or status 
quo effects, cannot simultaneously explain our findings for EV choices and CV choices.17 
 To examine the possibility that answers might be driven by liquidity constraints, we 
asked respondents about their ability to come up with the money needed for the lump sum. The 
vast majority (91 percent) indicated that their choice was not due to liquidity constraints,18 and 
the clear divergence in valuations persists in the non-liquidity constrained sub-sample. Another 
possibility is that the difference between sell and buy prices arises because respondents had a 
differential understanding of these two questions. Although we have no way to empirically rule 
out this possibility, we note that we took great care to make the wording of the two questions as 
similar as possible and to balance the design in terms of when the questions were asked.  
Rather than status quo bias, endowment effects, differential question understanding, or 
liquidity constraints, we conjecture that this wedge is the outcome of valuation difficulties on the 
part of respondents. This conjecture has two testable implications. First, individuals who have 
difficulty valuing annuities may seek to protect themselves by agreeing to an annuity transaction 
only if the annuity is priced very attractively, which would lead them to demand a high price to 
sell, but offer a low price to buy. We refer to this as a “reluctance to exchange,” which would 
imply that buy valuations will be negatively correlated with sell valuations if there is 
heterogeneity across people in their degree of reluctance. Second, it implies that the size of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 While our results cannot be explained by endowment or status quo effects if respondents take the Social 
Security benefit amount they report to us as the reference point, we cannot rule out that respondents may 
have had a “fuzzy” reference point that shifted based on the version of the question asked. In particular, if 
they shifted their reference point up by $100 in the EV-Buy version (i.e., $100 above their actual or 
expected Social Security benefits) and down by $100 in the EV-Sell version (i.e., $100 below their actual 
or expected Social Security benefits), then the EV answers could be explained by endowment or status 
quo effects. To explore this explanation, we compared sell and buy valuations of individuals who are least 
likely to have a fuzzy reference point, namely those who are currently receiving Social Security benefits 
and were able to report their benefit amount to us. The difference between EV-Sell and EV-Buy prices is 
as large for this group as for the rest of the sample. 
18 Specifically, we asked whether each respondent could come up with $5,000 “if you had to” and, 
separately, whether he could come up with the lump sum needed to purchase the higher annuity. The time 
frame for accessing the money was the same time frame as in the annuity valuation question, namely one 
year from now or the respondent’s expected claim date, whichever was later. About two-thirds of the 
respondents answered that they were certain they could come up with $5,000, and over 90 percent 
responded that they could come up with the amount probably or certainly. About 82 percent of 
respondents indicated that they could come up with the lowest lump-sum amount that they declined to 
pay. Of the 18 percent that indicated they could not come up with this amount, half said that even if they 
had the money, they would decline to pay the lump sum. Thus, for 91 percent of the respondents, liquidity 
constraints were not the reason for the low reported annuity valuation in the CV-Buy trade-off question.  
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wedge between buy and sell valuations will be decreasing with cognitive abilities. 
E. Negative Buy-Sell Correlations 
Although Figures 1 and 2 reveal large differences in the distributions of responses 
between Sell and Buy valuations, they do not indicate whether within-person responses to these 
alternative valuation measures are correlated. Hence we cannot yet conclude that the entire 
distribution is shifted to the left, or whether the same individuals change their positions in the 
distribution depending on whether they see a Sell or Buy question. This is addressed in Table 2, 
which reports a negative correlation between Buy and Sell valuations. Specifically, the 
correlation between CV-Sell and CV-Buy is -0.11, whereas the correlation between EV-Sell and 
EV-Buy is -0.15; both are highly statistically significant. These negative correlations suggest that 
individuals who place above-average values on a $100/month annuity when asked to sell it tend 
to be willing to pay less than average to purchase a $100/month benefit. The negative correlation 
also implies substantial movement within the distributions, rather than a uniform downward shift 
when we move from a Sell to a Buy elicitation method. This pattern is consistent with 
individuals who have difficulty valuing annuities being reluctant to exchange annuities because 
they wish to ensure that they are not losers in a transaction they have difficulty evaluating. 
F. The Role of Cognition and the Sell-Buy Spread 
If the Sell-Buy differential is due to low-ability decision-makers being reluctant to 
engage in annuity transactions, then the size of this differential should be correlated with 
measures of cognition. To explore this, we construct a measure of the “Spread” that equals the 
absolute value of the difference between the log CV-Sell and the log CV-Buy valuation of a 
$100 change in monthly Social Security benefits. The spread is defined as an absolute value 
because a discrepancy between Sell and Buy valuations in either direction is indicative of a lack 
of internal consistency. In practice, the spread is dominated by the 80 percent of the sample who 
place a higher value on CV-Sell than CV-Buy. Because the spread is measured as the difference 
in log points, this variable reflects the relative value of Sell and Buy valuations. The mean of the 
Spread variable is 2.58 and its median is 2.30, indicating that the median individual reports Sell 
and Buy valuations that differ by a factor of 10. In the large majority that places a higher value 
on the Sell than the Buy valuation, the mean and median of the Spread variable are 2.63 and 2.35 
respectively. This implies that the median person in this sample demands a price to sell a 
$100/month annuity 10.5 times higher than the price he is willing to pay to buy the same annuity. 
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Figure 3 shows the bivariate relation between the CV Sell-Buy Spread and various 
measures of cognition. Panel A groups respondents according to an index of financial literacy, 
measured as the sum of correct answers to the three questions devised for the Health and 
Retirement Study to rate respondents’ financial literacy levels.19 We find that that the Sell-Buy 
Spread falls sharply with measured increases in financial literacy. In Panel B, we make use of a 
number scoring test, where respondents are shown six incomplete sequences of numbers and are 
asked to complete each sequence (e.g.: 7, 8, …, 10). Scores are assigned using a Rasch scoring 
algorithm (Linacre 1999). We find a sharp and monotonic decline in the Sell-Buy Spread across 
quintiles of this numeracy measure. In Panel C, we split the Spread measure by level of 
education and, once again, we find a sharply declining pattern. Panel D uses an overall cognition 
index, which is the first principal component of the three measures of cognition.20 Given the fact 
that the weight on each of the three factors is roughly equal, it is not surprising that we also find 
a strong, monotonic, negative relation between the Sell-Buy Spread and our cognition index.21 
Our conjecture that the Sell-Buy Spread stems from a reluctance to exchange when individuals 
have difficulty valuing annuities has the testable implication that the Sell-Buy Spread falls with 
cognitive ability. The findings from Figure 3 support this testable implication. 
Figure 3 here 
We repeat this analysis in a regression framework in Table 3, along with controls for 
other factors. Column 1 regresses the Spread on age dummies and controls for experimental 
variations (to be discussed in the next section). The coefficient on age 65+ is positive and 
significant: on average, older individuals have a 0.44 log point larger absolute difference 
between their Sell and Buy valuations than the reference age category (age 34 or younger). The 
difference remains economically large and statistically significant if we compare them to the age 
50-64 category. This finding is important for two reasons. First, it addresses the concern that our 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 The three questions test for an understanding of inflation, compound interest, and risk diversification 
(for a complete listing of the questions see Online Appendix B). 
20 Although we use principal components analysis to construct the weights in the cognition index, the 
contributions of each of the three components turn out to be very close to equal. We therefore obtain very 
similar results if we construct an index in which we give each of the three components equal weight. 
21 Online Appendix Figure A.1 shows that findings of Figure 3 (monotonically declining spreads in each 
of the three measures of cognition as well as in the index) also hold when the Sell-Buy spread is based on 
EV valuations rather than CV valuations. Online Appendix Figure A.2 shows that we obtain declining 
spreads (but not always monotonically so) when we use the spread between CV and EV valuations (both 
using the Sell condition). 
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findings could be driven by younger individuals who might lack interest in decisions related to 
retirement or be less familiar with Social Security. Yet we find the opposite: younger individuals 
have a smaller Sell-Buy Spread than do older individuals. Second, the increase in the Spread 
with age fits with results of Agarwal, Driscoll, Gabaix, and Laibson (2009), who showed that 
cognitive functioning declines at older ages and may contribute to a decline in the quality of 
financial decision-making. As we will see below, this relation persists after adding direct 
controls for cognition. To the extent that the increase in the Spread with age is due to a decline in 
cognitive functioning, this implies that it is driven by dimensions of cognitive functioning not 
captured by our measures of cognition.22  
Table 3 here  
In column 2, we add our three direct measures of cognition. All three– financial literacy, 
education, and numeracy – are significantly negatively correlated with the Sell-Buy Spread. Each 
additional correct answer on the financial literacy questions reduces the spread by 0.32 log 
points. Moving up one education category reduces the spread by 0.24 log points. A one standard 
deviation increase in the score on the number series questions reduces the spread by 0.31 log 
points. In column 3, we combine these measures into our cognition index, and here again, we 
find a strongly significant relation. A one standard deviation increase in cognition corresponds to 
a 0.59 log point reduction in the Sell-Buy Spread. Column 4 adds additional controls for 
demographics and preferences including sex, marital status, race and ethnicity, family income, 
home ownership, self-reported health, having children, risk aversion, return expectations, and 
political risk, among others.23 Even with this rich set of additional controls, the coefficient of  
-0.41 on the cognition index remains highly significant. The results of Table 3 are similar if we 
use the Sell-Buy Spread based on EV valuations rather than on CV valuations (see Online 
Appendix Table A.5). If we take the spread between CV-Sell and EV-Sell, which have similar 
values on average because they are both Sell measures, we continue to find significant negative 
effects of the cognition index on the spread, though the magnitude of the coefficient drops by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Our questions ask respondents to consider the choice between a change in Social Security and a lump 
sum paid/received at the Social Security claim age (or one year from now for those already claiming). 
Hence, for younger respondents the consequences occur further in the future. As a result, it is possible 
that younger respondents think of the choice as less consequential and hence exhibit less reluctance to 
exchange. This is an alternative explanation for the age gradient in the Sell-Buy Spread. 
23 Definitions and summary statistics of control variables are given in Online Appendix Table A.1. The 
coefficients on the control variables can be found in Column 1 of Online Appendix Table A.4. 
21 
	  
	  
half (see Online Appendix Table A.6). This indicates that individuals with higher values of the 
cognition index give more internally consistent answers even in settings where the “reluctance-
to-exchange” motive should not be prominent.24 
Thus far, we have shown that many people have implied annuity values that are difficult 
to reconcile with costless optimizing behavior under any plausible set of parameters. We have 
also documented a large divergence between the price at which individuals are willing to buy an 
annuity and the price at which they are willing to sell an annuity, and we showed that this cannot 
be explained by liquidity constraints or endowment effects. Moreover, buy and sell valuations 
are negatively correlated, and the size of the sell-buy disparity is highly correlated with cognitive 
ability, as measured by education, financial literacy, and numeracy. The next section extends our 
analysis in several additional directions.  
 
IV.  Robustness and Further Results  
A. Are the Responses Meaningful? 
In view of the implausible values in the tails of the distributions, the negative correlation 
across Sell and Buy valuations, and the large Sell-Buy Spread, one might surmise that a subset of 
respondents may not have taken the survey seriously (or perhaps did not understand it). 
Nevertheless, we have already shown that there is information contained in the elicited 
valuations: respondents provide reasonably consistent responses to similarly constructed offers 
(e.g., CV-Sell and EV-Sell) despite being asked in different waves two weeks apart. 
Additionally, our survey contained two sources of variation designed to test whether responses 
were meaningful. First, we randomized the order of the scenarios to which people were 
exposed.25 Second, we also randomized the order of the options within a question (i.e., whether 
the lump-sum amount was the first or the second option). If the order of the questions or the 
order of the options within the questions mattered, this would suggest that individuals had 
difficulty with the survey itself. We test for sensitivity to “asked in wave 1” and “lump-sum 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 In Online Appendix Figure A.3 and Table A.7, we show that the negative correlation between Sell and 
Buy valuations decreases in absolute value for those with higher levels of cognition. In addition, the 
positive correlation between CV and EV valuations tends to increase with cognition. Hence, cognition 
also has effects in the expected direction on our correlations. However, because correlations cannot be 
measured at the individual level (but only for subsamples), these results have less statistical precision.   
25 We first randomized at the individual level whether CV-Sell was asked in the first or second wave of 
our survey. Then CV-Buy, EV-Sell, and EV-Buy were asked in the other survey wave and their order was 
randomized at the individual level over each of the six possible orderings. 
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option shown first” in the sub-section below, when we also test for sensitivity to anchoring and 
starting values. As we shall see, our evidence is consistent with respondents reading and 
understanding the questions.  
B. Sensitivity to Anchoring and Starting Values 
 We also incorporated two sources of experimental variation designed to further test for 
the consistency of valuations with costless optimization. First, we varied the starting values of 
the size of the lump sum, randomizing across $10,000, $20,000 and $30,000; below, we refer to 
this as “log of starting value.” Second, in the CV-Sell case, we varied the order of size of the 
increment of the monthly benefit. Specifically, we presented the CV-Sell version multiple times 
to each respondent for X=$100, X=$500, X=$SSB (i.e., the entire amount of the respondent’s 
Social Security benefits), and for a random X that was a multiple of $100 (less than min($SSB-
100, 2000), and not equal to 100 or 500). We also randomized whether we asked CV-Sell with 
the X amounts arranged in increasing or decreasing order. We control for this randomization in 
the regressions (i.e., whether people were shown values from small-to-large or large-to-small). 
We refer to this in our tables as “asked after larger version.” These four randomizations (two 
used to test for meaningfulness of responses and two to test for consistency with costless 
optimization) were conducted independently.  
C. Results of these Extensions 
 If individuals have difficulty valuing annuities, then we would expect to find that people 
would be sensitive to irrelevant cues such as starting values and whether questions were asked 
after a larger version. Conversely, the order of the scenarios or the options would not matter for 
valuation decisions as long as the respondent tried to answer the questions. Our findings on these 
points are provided in the first column of Table 4, where we regress the log midpoint of our 
baseline CV-Sell variable (using a $100 variation in Social Security benefits) against the four 
variables capturing all sources of randomization.26 
Table 4 here  
 Several findings stand out. First, there is no evidence that respondents simply elected the 
first option shown (i.e., there is no effect of “Lump sum shown last”), giving some comfort that 
the respondents took care in answering the survey questions. Relatedly, it does not matter 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 We do this analysis on the CV-Sell version because only the CV-Sell version asks for different 
increment sizes of the Social Security amount. This means that we can randomize the order in which the 
increment sizes are shown only for the CV-Sell version. 
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whether the question was asked in the first or second wave (i.e., “Asked in wave 1” has a small 
and insignificant coefficient estimate). Second, there is bias with respect to both of the other 
measures, as would be expected if individuals had difficulty valuing annuities. Specifically, the 
starting value has a statistically significant coefficient of 0.37. Because both the annuity 
valuation and the starting value are measured in logs, this means that increasing the first lump-
sum amount shown by 10% raised respondents’ valuations by an average of 3.7%. Furthermore, 
when the CV-Sell question was shown after a CV-Sell question with a larger change in Social 
Security benefits (so the order was large-to-small), respondents reported a 0.7 log-point higher 
average valuation of the annuity than if the baseline CV-Sell question was seen first. 
 Next we re-run this regression on two respondent sub-samples: those in the top quintile of 
the cognition index (col. 2) and those in the bottom quintile (col. 3). We find the effect of the log 
of the starting value is insignificant for individuals with higher cognitive abilities, whereas it is 
substantially more important (the coefficient is 0.92) for those in the bottom quintile of 
cognition. This suggests that less cognitively capable people are more sensitive to anchoring 
effects. Interestingly, however, the effect of “asked after larger version” is significant and similar 
in magnitude across the cognition quintiles. Moreover, the “asked after larger version” effect is 
extremely persistent across any cut of the data by measures of cognition. Whether the lump-sum 
option was shown as the first or second option continues to be insignificant for all quintiles, 
although we do now find that whether the question was asked in wave 1 or wave 2 is significant 
in the lowest cognition quintile. That is, respondents in the bottom quintile appeared to provide a 
significantly higher valuation in the second wave, though why this is so is not evident. 
 In column 4, we return to the full sample and include interactions between the cognition 
index and each of the four survey manipulations. Results tell a similar story: people are sensitive 
to starting values and even more so if they have lower cognitive abilities. “Asked after larger 
version” is highly significant but not mitigated by cognition. “Asked in wave 1” and “lump-sum 
option shown last” continue to be statistically insignificant. 
D. Explaining Annuity Valuations 
 A key reason that life annuities play such an important role in life-cycle economic models 
is that they provide a cost-effective way to smooth consumption by insuring against longevity 
risk. Although numerous authors have calculated the welfare gains associated with annuitization, 
there is conflicting evidence on the extent to which real-world individuals actually value the 
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insurance. Brown (2001) showed that a utility-based measure of annuity valuation was correlated 
with a binary measure of intended annuitization of asset balances. Bütler and Teppa (2007) 
documented similar findings in the Swiss system. Nevertheless, such measures explain only a 
very small fraction of the variation in the annuitization decision. Brown, Kling, Mullainathan, 
and Wrobel (2008) suggested that the ubiquitous framing of retirement planning in terms of 
wealth accumulation has conditioned individuals to ignore the insurance aspects of annuities and 
view them through an investment lens, consistent with individuals resorting to simplified 
decision-making heuristics in the face of complexity (Benartzi, Previtero, and Thaler 2011). 
 To further explore the determinants of annuity valuations, we regress annuity valuations 
against various determinants of annuity demand in our data. Column 1 of Table 5 regresses the 
average of CV-Sell and CV-Buy valuations against the actuarial value of the annuity offer 
presented (which varied by cohort, age at annuitization, and sex; it also assumed a real interest 
rate of three percent).27 The actuarial value term has a coefficient of 1.02, suggesting that there is 
approximately a one-for-one correspondence between the annuity’s actuarial value and 
individuals’ subjective valuations of the annuity. Column 2 replaces the actuarial value with a 
theoretical utility-based measure. Following Brown (2001), this is derived from a parameterized 
life-cycle model with variation coming from age at annuitization, mortality differences by cohort 
and sex, marital status (which determines whether it is a single or joint optimization), risk 
aversion, current levels of non-annuitized wealth, current annuitized wealth, and interactions of 
these variables through the utility-maximizing model. We find that the coefficient on this 
theoretical, utility-based annuity value in column 2 is not significantly different from zero, 
though it is significantly different from one.28 In columns 3 and 4, we repeat this analysis using 
even more control variables, and we obtain very similar results.29 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 We use the CV versions because, unlike the EV versions, these were asked in different waves of the 
survey. We take the average of CV-Sell and CV-Buy because there is no a priori reason to consider one 
more credible than the other.	  
28 In results not detailed here, when we include both the actuarial value and the utility-based measure, we 
continue to find that the coefficient on the actuarial value is approximately one and that the utility-based 
measure is insignificant. 
29 In Online Appendix Table A.8, we repeat the regressions in columns 1 and 3 of Table 5, but now we 
use each of our four separate valuation measures (CV-Sell, CV-Buy, EV-Sell and EV-Buy).  In seven of 
the eight additional specifications, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the actuarial 
value is equal to one, but we can reject at the 10% level or better that it is equal to zero. In unreported 
results, we also find that the utility-based measure is not significant using these alternative dependent 
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Table 5 here 
Overall, we view these results as casting some doubt on the notion that individuals take 
consumption-smoothing and insurance considerations into account when valuing annuities, 
although we acknowledge that the lack of predictive power of the theoretical utility-based 
measure could be related to possible misspecification of the underlying model. One possible 
interpretation of our findings in Table 5 is that individuals use a simple financial decision rule 
(e.g., “How long will it take me to break even?”) to obtain a first guess of the annuity value, and 
then they adjust this value to reflect their reluctance to trade an asset that they have trouble 
valuing. The adjustment would be upwards for CV-Sell and downwards for CV-Buy. Because 
these adjustments go in opposite directions, we obtain valuations that on average appear to be 
following a simple decision rule. We note that R-squared values are very low, at around 0.05 to 
0.06. The low explanatory power is consistent with prior studies (e.g., Brown 2008), which also 
found it difficult to account for observed variation in annuitization decisions.  
 Table 6 reports coefficient estimates on the actuarial value separately by cognition index 
quintile. Though the coefficients differ non-monotonically across the cognition quintiles, they 
are never significantly different from 1.30 We do, however, find that the root MSE is 
monotonically declining with the level of cognition. Recalling that our dependent variable is in 
logs, these differences are economically meaningful. For example, the root mean squared 
distance from the regression line declines by 0.24 log-points when one moves from the bottom to 
the second cognition quintile, and by 0.60 log-points when one moves from the bottom to the top 
cognition quintile. In other words, decisions made by less cognitively capable individuals are 
substantially noisier than those made by the more cognitively able. 
Table 6 here 
E. Robustness to Outliers and to Age of the Sample 
 To verify that possible outliers have no important major effects on the results, we have 
replicated Figure 3 and Tables 2-6 using only annuity valuation measures winsorized at the 10th 
and 90th percentiles. Results are very similar (see Online Appendix Figure A.4 and Tables A.11-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
variables. Moreover, in Appendix Tables A.9 and A.10, we show that the results of Table 5 are robust to 
using either the CV-Sell or CV-Buy value (rather than their average) as the dependent variable. 
30 We also ran a single regression in which the cognition index was interacted with the actuarial value 
(including the same controls as in Table 6, the direct effect of the cognition index and the direct effect of 
actuarial value). The interaction term has a coefficient estimate of 0.001 (s.e.: 0.146), which confirms that 
the effect of the actuarial value on the annuity valuation does not differ significantly by cognition.	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15). We also examined the possibility that our results might be driven by a lack of interest in our 
questions by younger respondents, who may not have given retirement planning much thought. 
Accordingly, we replicated Figure 3 and Tables 2-6 using only respondents age 50+, and our 
results for this sample are similar (see Online Appendix Figure A.5 and Tables A.16-20). 
 
V.  Discussion and Conclusions 
  The goal of this study has been to investigate what drives cross-sectional variation in 
individuals’ abilities to value a stream of life annuity payments. We find that, on average, 
consumers tend to value annuities less when given the opportunity to buy more, but they value 
them more when given the opportunity to sell annuities in exchange for a lump sum. Because 
this finding holds even when no status quo option is available, this finding is not driven by 
standard status quo or endowment effects. Additionally, we show that liquidity constraints 
cannot explain this finding. Furthermore, there is considerable heterogeneity across individuals 
in the difference between the sell and buy valuations. 
  We conjecture that the discrepancy between sell and buy valuations arises because people 
are reluctant to enter into an annuity transaction if they have difficulty ascertaining its value. 
Such reluctance regarding difficult-to-value transactions will generally serve people well, 
because such transactions can come with a risk of being taken advantage of by a more 
sophisticated counterparty. One testable implication of our conjecture is that people who are less 
cognitively able and therefore have more difficulty valuing the annuity, will be more reluctant to 
trade, resulting in higher selling and lower buying prices. We show that the spread between sell 
and buy prices indeed falls with our index of cognition, which relies on measures of education, 
financial literacy, and numeracy. A second testable implication is that heterogeneity in cognition 
will lead to a negative correlation between selling and buying prices. We indeed observe this 
negative correlation. A further indication that people have trouble valuing annuities comes from 
our finding that people are sensitive to framing and starting values and that the sensitivity to 
starting values decreases in the cognition index. Moreover, the cross-sectional variation in 
subjective annuity valuations is correlated with the relatively simple-to-calculate actuarial value, 
but not with a more cognitively challenging utility-based value. Finally, decisions made by less 
cognitively adept individuals are substantially noisier than those of the more cognitively able. 
Our conjectured mechanism – heterogeneity in cognitive abilities combined with a reluctance to 
27 
	  
	  
exchange when one has trouble valuing an annuity – is consistent with all of our findings, and we 
have shown that many alternative explanations, such as transactions cost, endowment or status 
quo effects, or liquidity constraints, cannot explain all of our findings. Of course, we cannot rule 
out the existence of yet some other mechanism that might be consistent with the results. 
  Our findings raise questions about the extent to which consumers are able to make utility-
maximizing choices when confronted with a decision about whether to buy longevity protection. 
While our results do not speak directly to why average annuity values are so low (and thus do not 
illuminate the “annuity puzzle”), they do indicate that one should not necessarily infer from low 
annuity demand that individuals’ experienced utility is maximized at low levels of annuitization. 
For example, the fact that so few people annuitize their defined contribution pension balances 
when given the opportunity to do so should not be interpreted as conclusive revealed preference 
evidence that they do not value longevity protection. Of course, even if an individual places 
similar values on an annuity when buying and selling, this does not imply that he correctly 
assesses the value of the annuity to him; consistency in valuation across buying and selling is a 
necessary but not a sufficient condition for the correct valuation of annuities. 
In addition to advancing our intellectual understanding, our results have considerable 
policy relevance. For example, in 2014 the UK eliminated its mandatory annuitization 
requirement, thus leaving the decision of whether or not to annuitize retirement account balances 
in the hands of individual retirees (Donaldson and Hutton 2014). By contrast, the Singaporean 
government now requires retirees to purchase life annuities sufficient to cover subsistence needs 
(Fong, Mitchell, and Koh 2011). U.S. policymakers have expressed interest in encouraging 
annuitization in 401(k) and other defined contribution plans. There is also an emerging debate in 
the U.S. about whether to encourage or discourage a particular form of “de-risking” of corporate 
defined benefit pension plans, where retirees are offered a lump sum in lieu of lifelong pension 
benefits. In these and other instances, our results suggest that many individuals face cognitive 
constraints in making appropriate judgments about annuitization. Accordingly, policymakers 
would do well to recognize the substantial heterogeneity in people’s capabilities to make 
important financial decisions that are in their best interest. 
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Note: The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. The Sell-Buy Spread is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the log 
CV-Sell valuation and the log CV-Buy valuation of a $100 change in monthly Social Security benefits.  For the Financial Literacy measure, we 
grouped those with no correct answers with those with one correct answer because there are very few observations (4%) with no correct answers.
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Table 1: Characteristics of the ALP Sample
(1) (2) (3)
ALP Sample
Mean
CPS Mean
Difference
 ALP-CPS
Age 51.4 46.2       5.19***
  Age: 18-34 0.16 0.31      -0.15***
  Age: 35-49 0.25 0.27 -0.02
  Age: 50-64 0.41 0.25       0.16***
  Age: 65+ 0.18 0.17 0.01
Female 0.58 0.51       0.07***
Married 0.60 0.54       0.07***
Race/Ethnicity
  Non-Hispanic White 0.80 0.68       0.12***
  Non-Hispanic Black 0.08 0.12      -0.04***
  Hispanic 0.09 0.14      -0.05***
  Other Race/Ethnicity 0.03 0.07      -0.03***
Education
  High School Dropout 0.02 0.13      -0.11***
  High School 0.16 0.30      -0.14***
  Some College 0.37 0.28       0.09***
  Bachelor's Degree 0.25 0.18       0.07***
  Professional Degree 0.19 0.10       0.10***
Ln Family Income 10.89 10.77       0.13***
  Family Income: Below 25k 0.18 0.24      -0.07***
  Family Income: 25k-50k 0.27 0.24       0.04***
  Family Income: 50k-75k 0.21 0.18       0.03***
  Family Income: 75k-100k 0.13 0.12     0.01**
  Family Income: Above 100k 0.21 0.23  -0.02*
Household size 2.68 3.00      -0.33***
  Household size of one 0.22 0.14       0.08***
  Household size of two 0.36 0.33       0.03***
  Household size of three 0.15 0.19      -0.04***
  Household size of four + 0.27 0.33      -0.06***
Region
  Northeast 0.17 0.18  -0.02*
  Midwest 0.24 0.22     0.02**
  South 0.35 0.37 -0.01
  West 0.24 0.23 0.01
Observations 2,112 146,785
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. In both the ALP and the
CPS the sample is restricted to those aged 18 and older. The ALP sample was collected between
June and August of 2011. The CPS data are from March 2011 and use CPS person weights; the
ALP data are unweighted.  
Table 2: Correlations between Annuity Valuation Measures (All in Natural Logs)
Pairwise correlations
CV-Sell
EV-Sell
CV-Buy
EV-Buy
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each entry gives the pairwise correlation
between the variable listed in the column and in the row. All four variables are a measures of the valuation that an
individual places on $100 change in monthly Social Security benefits. See the text for exact definitions. All measures 
are expressed in logs of the midpoint between the upper and lower bounds. To correct for correlations induced by
common experimental manipulations (such as the starting value) across the four variables, we regress each variable on
the relevant experimental manipulations and take the residual. The correlations between the resulting residuals are
shown in the Table; uncorrected pairwise correlations are very similar and provided in Online Appendix Table A.3.
-0.11*** -0.15*** 0.72*** 1
-0.11*** -0.17*** 1
 0.31*** 1
1
CV-Sell EV-Sell CV-Buy EV-Buy
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 35 to 49 -0.10 0.08 0.09 0.22
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Age 50 to 64 0.05       0.33***       0.34***       0.42***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Age 65 and older       0.44***       0.66***       0.68***       0.66***
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.16)
Cognition index, standardized      -0.59***      -0.41***
(0.04) (0.05)
Financial literacy index, 0-3 scale      -0.32***
(0.06)
Education index, 1-5 scale      -0.24***
(0.04)
Number series score, standardized      -0.31***
(0.05)
Controls for demographics and preferences No No No Yes
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0279 0.1230 0.1233 0.1681
Number of observations 2065 2065 2065 2065
Mean of dependent variable 2.58 2.58 2.58 2.58
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.85 1.85 1.85 1.85
Table 3: Explaining the Sell-Buy Spread
Dependent Variable:  Absolute Value of Difference 
between Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each
column contains an OLS regression of the Sell-Buy Spread (absolute value of the difference between log CV-Sell and log CV-
Buy) on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. CV-Sell is the lump-sum amount given to the individual that would
exactly compensate the individual for a $100 decrease in monthly Social Security benefits. CV-Buy is the lump-sum amount
the individual is just willing to pay for a $100 increase in monthly Social Security benefits. All regressions also include
controls for missing values of explanatory variables and controls for experimental manipulations, namely: log of starting
value, asked after larger version, asked in wave 1, lump-sum option shown last. The financial literacy index is equal to the
number of correct answers to three financial literacy questions (mean: 2.12 s.d.: 0.80). The education index equals 1 for high
school dropouts, 2 for high school graduates, 3 for some college, 4 for bachelor's degree, and 5 for professional degree
(mean: 3.42 s.d.: 1.05). The number series score is a standardized measure of performance on a number of questions that
involve completing number series. The cognition index is the first principal component of the financial literacy index, the
education index, and the number series score. The coefficients on the demographic and preference variables of the regression
in column 4 are shown in Online Appendix Table A.4 column 1. 
 
Explanatory Variables
Log of starting value
Asked after larger version
Asked in wave 1
Lump-sum option shown last 
Log of starting value
   × Cognition index
Asked after larger version
   × Cognition index
Asked in wave 1
   × Cognition index
Lump-sum option shown last 
   × Cognition index
Cognition index
Adjusted R
2
N
Mean of dependent variable
Standard deviation of dependent variable
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each column
contains an OLS regression of the baseline CV-Sell measure on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. The baseline CV-
Sell measure is the lump-sum amount given to the individual that would exactly compensate the individual for a $100 decrease
in monthly Social Security benefits. CV-Sell is expressed in logs of the midpoint between the upper and lower bounds. The
starting value for the annuity valuation was randomized at $10,000, $20,000, or $30,000. "Asked after larger version" equals
one if the baseline CV-Sell measure was asked after a CV-Sell question in which Social Security benefits were varied by more
than $100. Whether this occured was randomized. "Asked in wave 1" is a dummy variable that equals one if the CV-Sell
question was asked in the first wave, and "Lump sum option shown last" is a dummy variable that equals one if the option
involving the lump-sum amount was shown after the alternative option. Both dummy variables were randomized. The
cognition index is the first principal component of the financial literacy index, the education index, and the number series
score. All variables interacted with the cognition index are demeaned so that the coefficient on the cognition index can be
interpreted as the effect of the cognition literacy index when the interaction variables are equal to their sample means.
10.02 9.82 10.27 10.02
1.56 1.19 1.96 1.56
0.0600 0.0832 0.0827 0.0737
2,090 385 412 2,090
(0.04)
     -0.17***
0.03
(0.07)
(0.07)
-0.03
-0.09
(0.07)
(0.08)
   -0.20**
0.09 0.01 -0.03 0.08
(0.07) (0.12) (0.19) (0.07)
(0.07) (0.12) (0.19) (0.07)
0.04 0.01     0.38** 0.05
      0.70***       0.70***       0.77***       0.69***
(0.07) (0.12) (0.19) (0.07)
(0.07) (0.13) (0.21) (0.07)
Entire sample
Top quintile of 
cognition index
Bottom quintile 
of cognition 
index
Entire sample
      0.37*** 0.17       0.92***       0.39***
Table 4: Effects of Randomizations and Interactions with the Cognition Index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Log CV-Sell
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log actuarial value       1.02***       0.84***
(0.25) (0.26)
Log theoretical utility-based annuity value 0.04 0.18
(0.04) (0.13)
Age      -0.05*** -0.02     -0.04** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age squared/100       0.06*** 0.02       0.04*** 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female -0.08 0.01 -0.03 0.01
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Married 0.05 0.04 0.08   0.13*
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Black 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Hispanic       0.34***       0.36***       0.32***       0.32***
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12)
Other -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.09
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.13)
Education index, 1-5 scale -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Log family income 0.03 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Owns an annuity -0.07 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Owns home   -0.16*     -0.16**
(0.08) (0.08)
Log financial wealth 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Ever had kids -0.03 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Risk aversion (standardized) 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Precaution (standardized)     -0.07**     -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03)
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a.   0.10*    0.10*
(0.06) (0.06)
Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale       0.12***       0.14***
(0.03) (0.03)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0543 0.0473 0.0649 0.0607
Number of observations 2065 2065 2065 2065
Mean of dependent variable 9.18 9.18 9.18 9.18
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.22 1.22 1.22 1.22
Table 5: Explaining Annuity Valuations
Dependent Variable: Mean of Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each column contains an OLS
regression of annuity valuation (mean of log CV-Sell and log CV-Buy) on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. CV-Sell is the lump-sum
amount given to the individual that would exactly compensate the individual for a $100 decrease in monthly Social Security benefits. CV-Buy is the
lump-sum amount the individual is just willing to pay for a $100 increase in monthly Social Security benefits. All regressions also include controls for
missing values of explanatory variables and controls for experimental variation, namely: log of starting value, asked after larger version, asked in wave
1, lump-sum option shown last. To calculate the theoretical utility-based annuity value, we solve the lifecycle dynamic programming problem for a
household that matches the respondent on age, gender, marital status, spousal age (if married), start date of the annuity, financial wealth, existing
annuity wealth, and coefficient of risk aversion, assuming a real discount rate of three percent per year. We solve this lifecycle dynamic programming
problem twice: once for the CV-Sell equivalent wealth and once for the CV-Buy equivalent wealth. We take the log of both amounts and average
them. The education index equals 1 for high school dropouts, 2 for high school graduates, 3 for some college, 4 for bachelor's degree, and 5 for
professional degree. Summary statistics and sources for the explanatory variables are provided in Online Appendix Table A.1.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient on log 
actuarial value
p-value on
 coefficient=1 Root MSE
Adjusted
 R
2
N
1. Bottom quintile 0.46 0.483 1.488 0.0922 404
(0.77)
2. Second quintile 0.76 0.686 1.246 0.0259 451
(0.59)
3. Third quintile     1.24** 0.618 1.163 0.0204 392
(0.49)
4. Fourth quintile 0.77 0.650 1.034 0.0498 433
(0.50)
5. Fifth quintile       1.49*** 0.340 0.889 0.0677 385
(0.51)
Table 6: Predictive Power of Actuarial Value by Quintile of the Cognition Index
Dependent Variable: 
Mean of Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Sample split by quintiles of the cognition index
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Here we estimate
specification 1 of Table 5 by subsample. Each row contains an OLS regression of the log annuity valuation (mean of CV-Sell and CV-
Buy) on the log actuarial value and additional controls. Additional controls are those in specification 1 of Table 5. The cognition index
is the first principal component of the financial literacy index, the education index, and the number series score.
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Figure A.1: EV Sell-Buy Spread by Measures of Decision-Making Ability 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure is identical to Figure 3 except that the Sell-Buy Spread is based on EV 
valuations rather than CV valuations. The EV Sell-Buy Spread is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the log EV-Sell 
valuation and the log EV-Buy valuation of a $100 change in monthly Social Security benefits. 
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Figure A.2: EV-CV Sell Spread by Measures of Decision-Making Ability 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure is identical to Figure 3 except that the graphs plot the EV-CV Sell Spread 
rather than the CV Sell-Buy Spread. The EV-CV Sell Spread is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the log EV-Sell valuation 
and the log CV-Sell valuation of a $100 change in monthly Social Security benefits. 
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Figure A.3: Correlations of Log Annuity Valuations by the Cognition Index 
Note: The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. Confidence intervals are based on exact percentiles in 10,000 bootstrap replications.  All annuity 
valuations are expressed in logs.  The Sell Valuation is the average of log CV-Sell and log EV-Sell. The Buy Valuation is the average of log CV-Buy and log 
EV-Buy.  The CV Valuation is the average of log CV-Sell and log CV-Buy.  The EV Valuation is the average of log EV-Sell and log EV-Buy. To correct for 
correlations induced by common experimental manipulations (such as the starting value) across the four valuation measures, we regress each valuation measure 
on the relevant experimental manipulations and take the residual. These regressions are run separately for each quintile of the cognition index. The correlations 
between the resulting residuals are shown in the figure. A-4
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Figure A.4: Winsorized Sell-Buy Spread by Measures of Decision-Making Ability 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure is identical to Figure 3 except that the Sell-Buy Spread was calculated based 
on annuity valuation measures that were winsorized at the 10th and 90th percentiles. The Sell-Buy Spread is measured as the absolute value of the 
difference between the winsorized log CV-Sell valuation and the winsorized log CV-Buy valuation of a $100 change in monthly Social Security 
benefits. 
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Figure A.5: Sell-Buy Spread by Measures of Decision-Making Ability for the Age 50+ Sample 
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The whiskers represent 95% confidence intervals. This figure is identical to Figure 3 except that the sample is restricted to respondents age 
50 and above. The Sell-Buy Spread is measured as the absolute value of the difference between the log EV-Sell valuation and the log EV-Buy 
valuation of a $100 change in monthly Social Security benefits. 
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Table A.1: Further Summary Statistics
(1) (2) (3)    (4)
Mean Std. Dev. N Source
Annuity Valuation Measures
CV-Sell (log of category midpoint) 10.02 1.56 2090 Q.2.3
CV-Sell if $100 increment is shown first 9.67 1.51 1046 Q.2.3
EV-Sell (log of category midpoint) 9.48 1.71 2089 Q.6.3
CV-Buy (log of category midpoint) 8.34 2.06 2086 Q.6.3
EV-Buy (log of category midpoint) 8.51 2.17 2082 Q.6.3
Average of CV-Sell and CV-Buy (in logs) 9.18 1.22 2065
CV Sell-Buy Spread (in logs) 2.58 1.85 2065
Log actuarial value 9.68 0.20 2112 See  note
Log theoretical utility-based annuity value 9.38 0.79 2112 See  note
Randomization Variables
Log of starting value 9.80 0.45 2112
Asked after larger version 0.50 0.50 2112
Asked in wave 1 0.47 0.50 2112
Lump-sum option shown last 0.52 0.50 2112
Control Variables Not Already Listed in Table 1
Financial literacy index 2.12 0.80 2112 Q.3.2.1 - Q.3.2.3
   Financial literacy index = 0 0.04 0.20 2112
   Financial literacy index = 1 0.14 0.34 2112
   Financial literacy index = 2 0.47 0.50 2112
   Financial literacy index = 3 0.35 0.48 2112
Education index, 1-5 scale 3.42 1.05 2112 Preloaded from ALP
Number series score (standardized) 0.00 1.00 2112 Preloaded from ALP
Log family income (annual) 10.89 0.93 2104 Preloaded from ALP
Owns an annuity 0.50 0.50 2110 Q.3.5.1, Q.3.5.3
Owns home 0.75 0.43 1885 Preloaded from ALP
Log financial wealth (if financial wealth ≥ $1000) 11.71 1.51 1468 Preloaded from ALP
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale 3.56 0.89 2109 Q.3.1
Ever had kids 0.73 0.45 2090 Preloaded from ALP
Risk aversion (standardized) 0.00 1.00 2098 Q.3.3.1 - Q3.3.6
Precaution (standardized) 0.00 1.00 2104 Q.3.3.7 - Q3.3.8
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a. 0.41 0.49 2103 Q.3.8.3
Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale 2.34 0.84 2109 Q.3.7
Notes: The upperbound of the top category is assumed to be $1 million. Log actuarial value is calculated by us based on cohort
mortality tables, age at annuitization, and sex, assuming a real interest rate of three percent per year. To calculate the theoretical utility-
based annuity value, we solve the lifecycle dynamic programming problem for a household that matches the respondent on age, gender,
marital status, spousal age (if married), start date of the annuity, financial wealth, existing annuity wealth, and coefficient of risk
aversion assuming a real discount rate of three percent per year. We solve this lifecycle dynamic programming problem twice: once for
the CV-Sell equivalent wealth and once for the CV-Buy equivalent wealth. We take the log of both amounts and average them. The
education index corresponds to the education categories in Table 1, with higher values corresponding to higher levels of eduction. The
number series score is based on six questions where a respondent was shown an incomplete sequence of numbers and asked to complete
the sequence. Missing values (14% of observations) are set equal to the mean and variable is standized. "Owns an annuity" equals one
for anyone who currently receives or in the future expects to receive annuity income other than from Social Security. Higher values of
the self-reported health index correspond to better health. Risk aversion is the standardized sum of Q.3.3.1 to Q.3.3.6 (with Q.3.3.3,
Q.3.3.5, and Q3.3.6 reverse coded). Precaution is the standardized sum of Q.3.3.7. and Q.3.3.8. Higher values of the variable
"confidence that Social Security will pay promised benefits" correspond to greater levels of confidence. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Entire Sample
Any Tail of CV-Sell 
or CV-Buy
Bottom Tail of 
CV-Sell Valuation
Top Tail of 
CV-Sell Valuation
Bottom Tail of 
CV-Buy Valuation
Top Tail of 
CV-Buy Valuation
Basic Demographics
  Age 51.4 51.9 50.6 53.3 52.6 48.9
  Female 0.58       0.65*** 0.63       0.70***       0.65***       0.66***
  Married 0.60       0.55*** 0.57 0.57       0.55***     0.53**
  Black 0.08       0.11***       0.14***       0.14***       0.11***       0.14***
  Hispanic 0.09       0.13*** 0.09       0.15***   0.11*       0.18***
  Other 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03
  Ever had kids 0.73       0.75*** 0.77 0.71   0.75* 0.75
Household Financial Characteristics
  Ln Family Income 10.89       10.68***    10.75**      10.60***      10.65***      10.62***
  Owns an annuity 0.50       0.45***     0.43**   0.44*     0.46**       0.37***
  Owns home 0.75       0.71*** 0.72 0.70     0.72**       0.62***
  Ln financial wealth 11.71       11.56*** 11.68 11.62      11.46*** 11.56 
  Financial wealth equals zero 0.07       0.10*** 0.07       0.12***       0.10***       0.12***
  Financial wealth negative 0.20       0.22*** 0.24 0.19 0.21       0.29***
  Fraction of retirement income from Social Security 0.76       0.78***     0.80** 0.79     0.78**     0.80**
Indicators of Cognition
  Cognition Index, standardized 0.00      -0.33***     -0.15**      -0.55***      -0.32***      -0.55***
  Financial literacy index, 0-3 scale 2.12       1.96*** 2.08       1.83***       1.96***       1.84***
  Education index, 1-5 scale 3.42       3.18*** 3.32       2.97***       3.17***       3.04***
  Number series score, standardized 0.00      -0.32***      -0.21***      -0.46***      -0.30***      -0.53***
  Gives 0% chance of dying between 75-85 years of age 0.32       0.43***      0.40**       0.49***       0.43***       0.44***
Preferences and Other Characteristics
  Risk aversion (standardized) 0.00      -0.18*** 0.02      -0.28***      -0.25***    -0.13**
  Precaution (standardized) 0.00       0.09***   0.13* 0.11       0.10*** 0.00
  Expects returns greater than 3% p.a. 0.41   0.39* 0.46     0.33**       0.35*** 0.44
  Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale 2.34       2.39*** 2.30       2.59***     2.39** 2.41
  Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale 3.56       3.45*** 3.48       3.28***       3.45***   3.46*
Observations 2112 1062 192 181 695 214
Table A.2: Characteristics of Individuals with Valuation Responses in the Tails of the Distribution
Means by Group
Notes: Significance stars indicate significance level of difference from first column. * significantly different from first column at 10%, ** significantly different from first column at 5%,
*** significantly different from first column at 1%. An individual is included in a tail if he/she is in the highest or lowest 10% of CV-Sell or CV-Buy valuations, or he/she gave the
highest or lowest possible valuation based on his/her randomly assigned starting value. Specifically, individuals in the Bottom Tail of the CV-Sell were willing to sell a $100 monthly
Social Security Annuity for $4000 or less, individuals in the Top Tail of CV-Sell were unwilling to sell a $100 monthly Social Security Annuity for $200,000, individuals in the Bottom
Tail of CV-Buy were unwilling to pay $2000 or more for a $100 monthly Social Security Annuity, and individuals in the Top Tail of CV-Buy were willing to pay $100,000 or more for a
$100 monthly Social Security Annuity. 
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Table A.3: Uncorrected Correlations between Annuity Valuation Measures (All in Natural Logs)
Pairwise correlations
CV-Sell
EV-Sell
CV-Buy
EV-Buy
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each entry gives the pairwise correlation between the
variable listed in the column and in the row. This table shows that the results in Table 2 are not sensitive to the corrections for
common experimental manipulations that were applied to the correlations in Table 2.  
-0.10*** -0.14*** 0.72*** 1
-0.10*** -0.16*** 1
0.32*** 1
1
CV-Sell EV-Sell CV-Buy EV-Buy
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Dependent Variable:
Absolute Value of 
Difference between 
Log CV-Sell 
and Log CV-Buy
Dependent Variable:
Absolute Value of 
Difference between 
Log EV-Sell 
and Log EV-Buy
Dependent Variable:
Winsorized 
CV Sell-Buy Spread
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3)
Age 35 to 49 0.22   0.29*   0.22*
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Age 50 to 64       0.42***       0.48***       0.41***
(0.13) (0.15) (0.12)
Age 65 and older       0.66***       0.56***       0.65***
(0.16) (0.19) (0.14)
Cognition index, standardized      -0.41***      -0.63***      -0.38***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Female       0.26***       0.30***       0.20***
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Married 0.08 -0.03 0.00
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08)
Black       0.49***   0.36*       0.33**
(0.17) (0.19) (0.15)
Hispanic   0.27*       0.54***    0.21*
(0.15) (0.18) (0.13)
Other       0.69*** 0.29      0.46**
(0.23) (0.28) (0.19)
Log family income -0.05 -0.02 -0.04
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05)
Owns an annuity -0.03 -0.07 -0.02
(0.08) (0.10) (0.07)
Owns home -0.06    -0.28** -0.07
(0.11) (0.13) (0.10)
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale    -0.10** 0.07    -0.07*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Ever had kids -0.15 -0.11 -0.08
(0.09) (0.11) (0.08)
Risk aversion (standardized)      -0.21***      -0.13***      -0.20***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Precaution (standardized) 0.01 0.00 0.01
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a.  -0.15*    -0.18**     -0.15**
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07)
Confident SS will pay promised benefits,       0.17***       0.17***       0.14***
1-4 scale (0.05) (0.06) (0.04)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.1681 0.1580 0.1730
Number of observations 2065 2067 2065
Mean of dependent variable 2.58 2.27 2.49
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.85 2.10 1.63
Table A.4: Full Regressions Explaining the Sell-Buy Spread
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each column
contains an OLS regression of the Sell-Buy Spread listed in the column heading on the explanatory variables listed in the rows.
Column 1 shows all the coefficients of the regression in Table 3 column 4. Column 2 shows all the coefficients of the regression in
Online Appendix Table A.5 column 4. Column 3 shows all the coefficients of the regression in Online Appendix Table A.12 column
4.
A-10
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 35 to 49 -0.20 0.03 0.05   0.29*
(0.15) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Age 50 to 64 -0.14   0.22*   0.25*       0.48***
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.15)
Age 65 and older 0.03      0.32**       0.35**       0.56***
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.19)
Cognition index, standardized      -0.76***      -0.63***
(0.05) (0.05)
Financial literacy index, 0-3 scale      -0.38***
(0.06)
Education index, 1-5 scale      -0.30***
(0.05)
Number series score, standardized      -0.43***
(0.06)
Controls for demographics and preferences No No No Yes
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0039 0.1327 0.1318 0.1580
Number of observations 2067 2067 2067 2067
Mean of dependent variable 2.27 2.27 2.27 2.27
Standard deviation of dependent variable 2.10 2.10 2.10 2.10
Table A.5: Explaining the Sell-Buy Spread within EV Valuations
Dependent Variable:  Absolute Value of Difference 
between Log EV-Sell and Log EV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This
table is identical to Table 3, except that this table is based on EV valuations whereas Table 3 was based on CV valuations.
Each column contains an OLS regression of the Sell-Buy Spread (absolute value of the difference between log EV-Sell and
log EV-Buy) on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. EV-Sell is the lump-sum amount equivalent to a $100 increase
in monthly Social Security benefits. EV-Buy is the lump-sum amount the individual is just willing to pay in lieu of a $100
decrease in monthly Social Security benefits. For further details, see the note to Table 3. The coefficients on the demographic
and preference variables of the regression in column 4 are shown in Online Appendix Table A.4 column 2. 
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Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 35 to 49 -0.02 0.06 0.07 0.13
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Age 50 to 64 0.06      0.19**      0.19**       0.28***
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.11)
Age 65 and older 0.14      0.24**      0.25**      0.33**
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.13)
Cognition index, standardized      -0.27***      -0.22***
(0.03) (0.04)
Financial literacy index, 0-3 scale      -0.14***
(0.05)
Education index, 1-5 scale      -0.13***
(0.03)
Number series score, standardized      -0.13***
(0.03)
Controls for demographics and preferences No No No Yes
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0189 0.0537 0.0546 0.0592
Number of observations 2068 2068 2068 2068
Mean of dependent variable 1.42 2.49 2.49 2.49
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.39 1.63 1.63 1.63
Table A.6: Explaining the Spread Between CV-Sell and EV-Sell
Dependent Variable:  Absolute Value of Difference 
between Log CV-Sell and Log EV-Sell
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This
table is identical to Table 3, except that this table examines the spread between CV and EV sell valuations whereas Table 3
examined the CV Sell-Buy Spread. Each column contains an OLS regression of the absolute value of the difference between
log CV-Sell and log EV-Sell on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. CV-Sell is the lump-sum amount given to the
individual that would exactly compensate the individual for a $100 decrease in monthly Social Security benefits. EV-Sell is
the lump-sum amount equivalent to a $100 increase in monthly Social Security benefits. For further details, see the note to
Table 3.
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Dependent 
Variable: 
CV-Buy
Dependent 
Variable: 
Average of CV-Buy 
and EV-Buy
Dependent 
Variable: 
EV-Sell
Dependent Variable: 
Average of EV-Sell 
and EV-Buy
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
CV-Sell      -0.13***      0.35***
(0.03) (0.03)
CV-Sell × Cognition Index, standardized 0.06 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Average of CV-Sell and EV-Sell      -0.23***
(0.03)
Average of CV-Sell and EV-Sell      0.18***
         × Cognition Index, standardized (0.03)
Average of CV-Sell and CV-Buy      0.55***
(0.02)
Average of CV-Sell and CV-Buy      0.10***
         × Cognition Index, standardized (0.02)
Cognition index, standardized -0.06      -0.14***     -0.10**      -0.10***
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R2 0.0320 0.0731 0.1109 0.2800
Number of observations 2065 2105 2068 2028
Mean of dependent variable 8.33 8.43 9.47 8.98
Standard deviation of dependent variable 2.05 1.97 1.71 1.28
Table A.7: Cognition Index and Correlations Between Valuations
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each column contains
an OLS regression of the variable listed in the column heading on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. All annuity valuation
measures are in logs. All regressions include controls for experimental variation, namely: log of starting value, asked after larger version,
asked in wave 1, lump-sum option shown last. All variables interacted with the cognition index are demeaned so that the coefficient on the
cognition index can be interpreted as the effect of the cognition literacy index when the interaction variables are equal to their sample
means. Columns 1 and 2 show that the negative correlation between buy and sell valuations decreases in size for higher values of the
Cognition Index, though only significantly so in column 2. Columns 3 and 4 show that the positive correlation between CV and EV
valuations increases in size for higher values of the Cognition Index, though only significantly so in column 4. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent Variable
Coefficient on log 
actuarial value
p-value on 
coefficient =1 Controls
Root 
MSE
Adjusted
 R2 N
1.       1.02*** 0.940 Basic 1.187 0.0543 2065
(0.25)
2. CV-Sell       1.05*** 0.883 Basic 1.496 0.0816 2090
(0.34)
3. CV-Buy      0.98** 0.955 Basic 2.026 0.0315 2086
(0.44)
4. EV-Sell      0.74** 0.492 Basic 1.692 0.0190 2089
(0.37)
5. EV-Buy   0.84* 0.734 Basic 2.140 0.0269 2082
(0.48)
6.       0.84*** 0.536 Extensive 1.180 0.0649 2065
(0.26)
7. CV-Sell   0.63* 0.281 Extensive 1.478 0.1034 2090
(0.34)
8. CV-Buy      1.03** 0.945 Extensive 2.012 0.0455 2086
(0.45)
9. EV-Sell  0.36 0.095 Extensive 1.680 0.0330 2089
(0.38)
10. EV-Buy   0.96* 0.930 Extensive 2.129 0.0370 2082
(0.49)
Table A.8: Robustness of Predictive Power of Actuarial Value
Mean of CV-Sell 
and CV-Buy
Mean of CV-Sell 
and CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each
row contains an OLS regression of the log annuity valuation measure listed in column 1 on the log actuarial value
and additional controls. The annuity valuation measures CV-Sell, CV-Buy, EV-Sell, and EV-Buy are defined in the
text. All valuations are expressed in logs of the midpoint between the upper and lower bounds. Additional controls
in rows 1-5 are those in specification 1 of Table 5, whereas the additional controls in rows 6-10 are those in
specification 3 of Table 5. Rows 1 and 6 replicate columns 1 and 3 of Table 5, respectively.
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Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log actuarial value       1.05***   0.63*
(0.34) (0.34)
Log theoretical utility-based annuity value 0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.16)
Age   -0.03* 0.00 -0.01 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Age squared/100       0.06*** 0.01 0.02 0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female 0.03   0.12* 0.04 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Married -0.03 -0.04 0.06 0.06
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09)
Black 0.03 0.04 -0.06 -0.06
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Hispanic       0.42***       0.43***   0.27*   0.26*
(0.14) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15)
Other   0.01* 0.01 0.02 0.02
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Education index, 1-5 scale   -0.07*     -0.07**
(0.04) (0.04)
Log family income 0.01 0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Owns an annuity -0.04 -0.03
(0.07) (0.07)
Owns home -0.04 -0.05
(0.10) (0.10)
Log financial wealth -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale -0.06 -0.06
(0.04) (0.04)
Ever had kids   -0.15*   -0.16*
(0.08) (0.08)
Risk aversion (standardized)      -0.10***      -0.11***
(0.04) (0.04)
Precaution (standardized) -0.01 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a. -0.09 -0.09
(0.07) (0.07)
Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale       0.16***       0.17***
(0.04) (0.04)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0816 0.0767 0.1034 0.1017
Number of observations 2090 2090 2090 2090
Mean of dependent variable 10.02 10.02 10.02 10.02
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56
Table A.9: Robustness of Table 5 to Using Log CV-Sell as the Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable: Log CV-Sell
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each column contains an OLS
regression of annuity valuation (log CV-Sell) on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. This Table is identical to Table 5 except that the dependent
variable is log CV-Sell instead of the average of log CV-Sell and log CV-Buy.  For the remaining notes, see the note to Table 5.
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Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log actuarial value       0.98**       1.03**
(0.44) (0.45)
Log theoretical utility-based annuity value 0.09 0.33
(0.06) (0.22)
Age     -0.06**   -0.03*     -0.07** -0.03
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Age squared/100       0.06** 0.02       0.06** 0.02
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Female   -0.19* -0.11 -0.11 -0.07
(0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Married 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.18
(0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13)
Black 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.21
(0.21) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Hispanic 0.32   0.36*       0.44**       0.43**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Other -0.16 -0.17 -0.18 -0.19
(0.24) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23)
Education index, 1-5 scale -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.05)
Log family income 0.04 0.04
(0.07) (0.07)
Owns an annuity -0.12 -0.08
(0.10) (0.10)
Owns home -0.23   -0.24*
(0.15) (0.15)
Log financial wealth 0.06 0.02
(0.04) (0.05)
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale -0.01 -0.01
(0.05) (0.06)
Ever had kids 0.05 0.05
(0.11) (0.10)
Risk aversion (standardized)       0.15***       0.15***
(0.05) (0.05)
Precaution (standardized)      -0.14***      -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05)
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a.       0.28***       0.28***
(0.09) (0.09)
Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale 0.07 0.09
(0.06) (0.06)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0315 0.0301 0.0455 0.0438
Number of observations 2086 2086 2086 2086
Mean of dependent variable 8.34 8.34 8.34 8.34
Standard deviation of dependent variable 2.06 2.06 2.06 2.06
Table A.10: Robustness of Table 5 to Using Log CV-Buy as the Dependent Variable
Dependent Variable: Log CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. Each column contains an OLS regression
of annuity valuation (log CV-Buy) on the explanatory variables listed in the rows. This Table is identical to Table 5 except that the dependent variable is log
CV-Buy instead of the average of log CV-Sell and log CV-Buy.  For the remaining notes, see the note to Table 5.
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Table A.11: Correlations Between Winsorized Annuity Valuation Measures (All in Natural Logs)
Pairwise correlations
CV-Sell
EV-Sell
CV-Buy
EV-Buy
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This table is identical to Table 2 except that all annuity
valuation measures are winsorized at the 10th and 90th percentiles. For further details, see the note to Table 2.
-0.09*** -0.12*** 0.72*** 1
-0.10*** -0.14*** 1
0.32*** 1
1
CV-Sell EV-Sell CV-Buy EV-Buy
A-17
Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 35 to 49 -0.05 0.11 0.11   0.22*
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Age 50 to 64 0.09       0.34***       0.35***       0.41***
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.12)
Age 65 and older       0.48***       0.68***       0.69***       0.65***
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Cognition index, standardized      -0.53***      -0.38***
(0.04) (0.04)
Financial literacy index, 0-3 scale      -0.29***
(0.05)
Education index, 1-5 scale      -0.22***
(0.03)
Number series score, standardized      -0.28***
(0.04)
Controls for demographics and preferences No No No Yes
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0354 0.1349 0.1351 0.1730
Number of observations 2065 2065 2065 2065
Mean of dependent variable 2.49 2.49 2.49 2.49
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.63 1.63 1.63 1.63
Table A.12: Explaining the Winsorized Sell-Buy Spread
Dependent Variable:  Absolute Value of Difference 
between Log CV-Sell (winsorized) and Log CV-Buy 
(winsorized)
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This table
is identical to Table 3 except that the Sell-Buy spead was calculated based on annuity valuation measures that were winsorized
at the 10th and 90th percentiles. For further details, see the note to Table 3. The coefficients on the demographic and preference
variables of the regression in column 4 are shown in Online Appendix Table A.4 column 3.
A-18
 
Explanatory Variables
Log of starting value       0.30***   0.19*       0.70***       0.31***
(0.06) (0.11) (0.14) (0.05)
Asked after larger version       0.62***       0.68***       0.62***       0.61***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05)
Asked in wave 1 0.05 0.04   0.24* 0.05
(0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05)
Lump-sum option shown last 0.07 0.04 0.01 0.06
(0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.05)
Log of starting value      -0.11**
   × Cognition index (0.06)
Asked after larger version -0.03
   × Cognition index (0.05)
Asked in wave 1 0.00
   × Cognition index (0.05)
Lump-sum option shown last 0.04
   × Cognition index (0.05)
Cognition index       -0.15***
(0.03)
Adjusted R
2
0.0783 0.1089 0.0991 0.0933
N 2090 385 412 2090
Mean of dependent variable 10.01 9.82 10.27 10.01
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.20 1.19 1.96 1.20
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This table is
identical to Table 4 except that the dependent variable is winsorized at the 10th and 90th percentiles. For further details, see
the note to Table 4. 
Table A.13: Effects of Randomizations for Winsorized CV-Sell Annuity Valuation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Winsorized Log CV-Sell
Entire sample
Top quintile of 
cognition 
index
Bottom quintile 
of cognition 
index
Entire sample
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Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log actuarial value       0.93***       0.79***
(0.23) (0.24)
Log theoretical utility-based annuity value 0.04 0.17
(0.03) (0.12)
Age      -0.05***   -0.02*      -0.04*** -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Age squared/100       0.06*** 0.02       0.04*** 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01)
Female -0.08 -0.01 -0.04 0.00
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Married 0.06 0.05 0.08   0.13*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07)
Black 0.09 0.12 0.09 0.09
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Hispanic       0.32***       0.35***       0.33***       0.33***
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Other -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.03
(0.12) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Education index, 1-5 scale -0.02 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Log family income 0.02 0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Owns an annuity -0.06 -0.03
(0.06) (0.06)
Owns home   -0.15**   -0.16**
(0.08) (0.08)
Log financial wealth 0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.03)
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale -0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03)
Ever had kids -0.03 -0.04
(0.06) (0.06)
Risk aversion (standardized) 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03)
Precaution (standardized)     -0.07**     -0.07**
(0.03) (0.03)
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a.      0.12**      0.12**
(0.05) (0.05)
Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale       0.11***       0.12***
(0.03) (0.03)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0529 0.0463 0.0633 0.0590
Number of observations 2065 2065 2065 2065
Mean of dependent variable 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.13 1.13 1.13 1.13
Table A.14: Explaining Winsorized Annuity Valuations
Dependent Variable: 
Mean of Winsorized Log CV-Sell and Winsorized Log CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. This table is identical to Table 5 except that the dependent variable was calculated based
on annuity valuation measures that were winsorized at the 10th and 90th percentiles. For further details, see
the note to Table 5.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient on 
log actuarial 
value
p-value on 
coefficient =1 Root MSE
Adjusted
 R
2
N
1. Bottom quintile 0.44 0.431 1.373 0.0847 404
(0.71)
2. Second quintile 0.45 0.309 1.135 0.0186 451
(0.54)
3. Third quintile       1.27*** 0.559 1.085 0.0194 392
(0.45)
4. Fourth quintile   0.83* 0.720 0.973 0.0520 433
(0.46)
5. Fifth quintile       1.32*** 0.492 0.847 0.0703 385
(0.47)
Table A.15: Predictive Power of Actuarial Value by the Cognition Index for Winsorized Outcomes
Dependent Variable: 
Mean of Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Sample split by quintiles of cognition index
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This table is
identical to Table 6 except that the dependent variable was calculated based on annuity valuation measures that were winsorized at the
10th and 90th percentiles. For further details, see the note to Table 6.
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Table A.16: Correlations between Annuity Valuation Measures for the Age 50+ Sample (All in Natural Logs)
Pairwise 
correlations
CV-Sell
EV-Sell
CV-Buy
EV-Buy
Notes: * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This table is identical to Table 2 except that the sample is restricted to
respondents age 50 and above. For further details, see the note to Table 2.
-0.11*** -0.17*** 0.72*** 1
-0.11*** -0.17*** 1
0.29*** 1
1
CV-Sell EV-Sell CV-Buy EV-Buy
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Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Age 65 and older       0.39***       0.33***       0.34***   0.20*
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Cognition index, standardized      -0.58***      -0.40***
(0.05) (0.06)
Financial literacy index, 0-3 scale      -0.25***
(0.08)
Education index, 1-5 scale      -0.23***
(0.05)
Number series score, standardized      -0.36***
(0.06)
Controls for demographics and preferences No No No Yes
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0468 0.1374 0.1358 0.1807
Number of observations 1223 1223 1223 1223
Mean of dependent variable 2.68 2.68 2.68 2.68
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.82 1.82 1.82 1.82
Table A.17: Explaining the Sell-Buy Spread for the Age 50+ Sample
Dependent Variable:  Absolute Value of Difference 
between Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This
table is identical to Table 3 except that the sample is restricted to respondents age 50 and above. For further details, see the
note to Table 3. 
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Explanatory Variables
Log of starting value       0.36*** 0.20       0.92***       0.40***
(0.10) (0.15) (0.29) (0.10)
Asked after larger version       0.78***       0.92***       0.88***       0.75***
(0.08) (0.14) (0.27) (0.09)
Asked in wave 1 0.02 0.04   0.44* 0.03
(0.08) (0.14) (0.26) (0.09)
Lump-sum option shown last 0.00 0.00 -0.27 -0.03
(0.08) (0.14) (0.27) (0.09)
Log of starting value -0.16
   × Cognition index (0.10)
Asked after larger version -0.04
   × Cognition index (0.09)
Asked in wave 1 -0.08
   × Cognition index (0.09)
Lump-sum option shown last 0.13
   × Cognition index (0.09)
Cognition index       -0.20***
(0.05)
Adjusted R
2
0.0729 0.1384 0.0881 0.0900
N 1236 262 200 1236
Mean of dependent variable 10.12 9.89 10.55 10.12
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.53 1.20 1.94 1.53
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at
1%. This table is identical to Table 4 except that the sample is restricted to respondents age 50 and above.
For further details, see the note to Table 4.
Table A.18: Effects of Randomizations for the Age 50+ Sample
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent Variable: Log CV-Sell
Entire sample
Top quintile 
of cognition 
index
Bottom 
quintile of 
cognition 
index Entire sample
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Explanatory Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log actuarial value       1.61***       1.61***
(0.49) (0.50)
Log theoretical utility-based annuity value     0.10**     0.33**
(0.05) (0.16)
Age  -0.17* 0.07   -0.18** 0.04
(0.09) (0.05) (0.09) (0.05)
Age squared/100     0.16** -0.05     0.17** -0.02
(0.08) (0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Female -0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.05
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07)
Married 0.05 0.06 0.06   0.17*
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
Black 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.11
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17) (0.17)
Hispanic 0.13 0.21 0.10 0.13
(0.20) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21)
Other -0.30 -0.26 -0.28 -0.26
(0.22) (0.21) (0.22) (0.22)
Education index, 1-5 scale 0.01 0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
Log family income 0.05 0.06
(0.05) (0.05)
Owns an annuity -0.03 0.00
(0.08) (0.08)
Owns home  -0.21*  -0.19*
(0.11) (0.11)
Log financial wealth 0.02 -0.03
(0.03) (0.04)
Self-reported health index, 1-5 scale -0.01 -0.02
(0.04) (0.04)
Ever had kids -0.09 -0.09
(0.08) (0.08)
Risk aversion (standardized) -0.02 -0.03
(0.04) (0.04)
Precaution (standardized)  -0.07*  -0.07*
(0.04) (0.04)
Expects returns greater than 3% p.a. 0.10 0.09
(0.07) (0.07)
Confident SS will pay promised benefits, 1-4 scale       0.12***       0.13***
(0.04) (0.04)
Controls for experimental variation Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R
2
0.0584 0.0534 0.0710 0.0661
Number of observations 1223 1223 1223 1223
Mean of dependent variable 9.17 9.17 9.17 9.17
Standard deviation of dependent variable 1.19 1.19 1.19 1.19
Table A.19: Explaining Annuity Valuations for the Age 50+ Sample
Dependent Variable: 
Mean of Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, ***
significant at 1%. This table is identical to Table 5 except that the sample is restricted to respondents age
50 and above. For further details, see the note to Table 5.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Coefficient on 
log actuarial 
value
p-value on 
coefficient =1 Root MSE
Adjusted
 R
2
N
1. Bottom quintile   2.52* 0.297 1.429 0.1055 196
(1.45)
2. Second quintile       3.55*** 0.035 1.196 0.0530 256
(1.20)
3. Third quintile 1.16 0.889 1.198 0.0211 239
(1.17)
4. Fourth quintile 0.74 0.757 1.017 0.0999 270
(0.84)
5. Fifth quintile 0.22 0.364 0.899 0.0531 262
(0.86)
Table A.20: Predictive Power of Actuarial Value by the Cognition Index for the Age 50+ Sample
Dependent Variable: 
Mean of Log CV-Sell and Log CV-Buy
Sample split by quintiles of the cognition index
Notes: Robust standard errors between parentheses. * significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%. This table is identical
to Table 6 except that the sample is restricted to respondents age 50 and above. For further details, see the note to Table 6.
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Online Appendix A: The Rand American Life Panel 
Sample Construction 
Our survey was conducted in the RAND American Life Panel (ALP). The ALP consists 
of a panel of U.S. households that regularly takes surveys over the Internet. An advantage over 
most other Internet panels is that the respondents to the ALP need not have Internet when they 
get recruited (as described in more detail below) and thus can be based on a probability sample 
of the U.S. population.1 This is in contrast with so-called convenience Internet samples, where 
respondents are volunteers who already have Internet and, for example, respond to banners 
placed on frequently visited web-sites, in which they are invited to complete surveys and earn 
money by doing so. The problem with convenience Internet samples is that their statistical 
properties are unknown. There is fairly extensive literature comparing probability Internet 
samples like the ALP to convenience Internet samples, as well as literature seeking to establish if 
convenience samples can somehow be made population-representative by reweighting.  
For instance, Chang and Krosnick (2009) simultaneously administered the same 
questionnaire (on politics) to an RDD (random digit dialing) telephone sample, an Internet 
probability sample, and a non-probability sample of volunteers who do Internet surveys for 
money. They found that the telephone sample had the most random measurement error, while the 
non-probability sample had the least. At the same time, the latter sample exhibited the most bias 
(also after reweighting), producing the most accurate self-reports from the most biased sample. 
The probability Internet sample exhibited more random measurement error than the non-
probability sample (but less than the telephone sample) and less bias than the non-probability 
Internet sample. On balance, the probability Internet sample produced the most accurate results. 
Yeager et al. (2009) conducted a follow-up study comparing one probability Internet sample, one 
RDD telephone sample, and seven non-probability Internet samples and a wider array of 
outcomes. Their conclusions were the same: both the telephone sample and the probability 
Internet sample showed the least bias; reweighting the non-probability samples did not help (for 
some outcomes, the bias got worse; for others, better). They also found that response rates do not 
appear critical for bias. Even with relatively low response rates, the probability samples yielded 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Other probability Internet surveys include the Knowledge Networks panel in the U.S. 
(http://www.knowledgenetworks.com/knpanel/index.html), and the CentERpanel and LISS panel in the Netherlands 
(http://www.centerdata.nl/en/centerpanel and http://www.centerdata.nl/en/MESS ). Of these panels, the 
CentERpanel is the oldest (founded in 1991). 
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unbiased estimates. It is not clear a priori why non-probability samples do so much worse. As 
the authors note, it appears that there are some fundamental differences between Internet users 
and non-Internet users that cannot be redressed by reweighting. Indeed, Couper et al. (2007) and 
Schonlau et al. (2009) show that weighting and matching do not eliminate differences between 
estimates based on samples of respondents with and without Internet access. Several other 
studies point at equally mixed results, including Vehovar et al. (1999); Duffy et al. (2005); 
Malhotra and Krosnick (2007); Taylor (2000); and Loosveldt and Sonck (2008). 
ALP respondents have been recruited in one of four ways. Most were recruited from 
respondents ages 18+ to the Monthly Survey (MS) of the University of Michigan’s Survey 
Research Center (SRC). The MS is the leading consumer sentiment survey that incorporates the 
long-standing Survey of Consumer Attitudes and produces, among others, the widely used Index 
of Consumer Expectations. Each month, the MS interviews approximately 500 households, 300 
of which are a random-digit-dial (RDD) sample and 200 of which are re-interviewed from the 
RDD sample surveyed six months previously. Until August 2008, SRC screened MS respondents 
by asking them if they would be willing to participate in a long-term research project (with 
approximate response categories “no, certainly not,” “probably not,” “maybe,” “probably,” “yes, 
definitely”). If the response category is not “no, certainly not,” respondents were told that the 
University of Michigan is undertaking a joint project with RAND. They were asked if they 
would object to SRC sharing information about them with RAND so that they could be contacted 
later and asked if they would be willing to actually participate in an Internet survey. Respondents 
who did not have Internet were told that RAND would provide them with free Internet. Many 
MS respondents were interviewed twice. At the end of the second interview, an attempt was 
made to convert respondents who refused in the first round. This attempt included mentioning 
the fact that participation in follow-up research carries a reward of $20 for each half-hour 
interview. Respondents from the Michigan monthly survey without Internet were provided with 
so-called WebTVs (http://www.webtv.com/pc/), which allowed them to access the Internet using 
their television and a telephone line. The technology enabled respondents who lacked Internet 
access to participate in the panel and, further, use the WebTVs for browsing the Internet or 
email. The ALP has also recruited respondents through a snowball sample (respondents 
suggesting friends or acquaintances who might also want to participate), but we do not use any 
respondents recruited through the snowball sample in our paper. A new group of respondents 
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(approximately 500) has been recruited after participating in the National Survey Project created 
at Stanford University with SRBI. This sample was recruited in person, and at the end of their 
one-year participation, respondents were asked whether they were interested in joining the 
RAND American Life Panel. Most of these respondents were given a laptop and broadband 
Internet access.  Recently, the American Life Panel has begun recruiting based on a random mail 
and telephone sample using the Dillman et al. method (2008), with a goal of achieving 5,000 
active panel members, including a 1,000-person Spanish language subsample. If these new 
participants do not yet have Internet access, they are also provided with a laptop and broadband 
Internet access.  
Calculation of Social Security Benefits 
For most ALP respondents, we have previously estimated monthly Social Security 
benefits (described in Brown et al., 2013). To do so, we took respondents through a fairly 
detailed set of questions asking about years in which they had labor earnings and an 
approximation of earnings in those years. We then fed these earnings through a benefit calculator 
provided by SSA to calculate individuals’ “Primary Insurance Amount” (PIA), which is 
equivalent to the benefit the individual would receive if he were to retire at his normal retirement 
age. Next, we applied SSA’s actuarial adjustment for earlier or later claiming. We also asked 
respondents if the estimated benefit amount seemed reasonable to them, and we gave them an 
opportunity to change this estimate if they believed it was not a good approximation. All 
subsequent lump-sum and annuity questions then pivot off this estimated monthly Social 
Security benefit amount. 
For the few respondents who indicated they did not expect to receive benefits (nor expect 
one from a living or deceased spouse), we imputed “standard monthly benefit amounts” based on 
age, sex, and educational level. We then asked these respondents to assume, for the purposes of 
the questions to follow, that they would receive this benefit, as follows: 
Even though we understand that you are not eligible to receive Social Security benefits, 
we would like to ask you to complete this survey assuming you would be eligible.  In 
other words, please answer in this survey what you would have done or chosen if you 
would be eligible for Social Security benefits. 
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Online	  Appendix	  B	  –	  Survey	  Instrument	  	  
	  
Introduction	  for	  users	  of	  this	  survey	  instrument	  
• The	  survey	  instrument	  was	  fielded	  as	  well-­‐being	  modules	  179	  and	  180	  on	  the	  RAND	  American	  Life	  Panel	  
(ALP)	  
• Items	  which	  are	  bolded	  are	  instructions	  to	  programmer	  or	  comments	  to	  the	  reader.	  
• Items	  which	  are	  non-­‐bolded	  are	  asked	  of	  respondents.	  	  
• Items	  shown	  on	  the	  screen	  in	  bold	  are	  marked	  by	  <b>	  for	  the	  start	  of	  the	  bolded	  text	  and	  by	  </b>	  at	  the	  
end	  of	  the	  bolded	  text.	  
• We	  changed	  the	  names	  of	  the	  four	  elicitation	  methods	  in	  the	  written	  up	  version	  of	  the	  paper	  compared	  
to	  the	  names	  used	  in	  this	  survey	  instrument.	  	  CV-­‐minus	  corresponds	  to	  CV-­‐Buy,	  EV-­‐minus	  to	  EV-­‐Buy,	  
CV-­‐plus	  to	  CV-­‐Sell,	  and	  EV-­‐plus	  to	  EV-­‐Sell.	  
	  
A.	  Randomizations	  
We	  independently	  randomize	  the	  following	  variables:	  
1. VERSION_A	  [0,	  1]:	  whether	  we	  ask	  CV-­‐plus	  in	  wave	  1	  or	  wave	  2	  	  
1	  if	  we	  ask	  CV-­‐Plus	  in	  wave	  1	  of	  the	  survey	  (survey	  version	  A)	  
0	  otherwise	  
2. VAR_ORDER	  [1,	  6]:	  Order	  of	  CV-­‐minus	  
1. Order:	  CV-­‐minus,	  EV-­‐plus,	  EV-­‐minus	  
2. Order:	  CV-­‐minus,	  EV-­‐minus,	  EV-­‐plus	  
3. Order:	  EV-­‐plus,	  CV-­‐minus,	  EV-­‐minus	  
4. Order:	  EV-­‐plus,	  EV-­‐minus,	  CV-­‐minus	  
5. Order:	  EV-­‐minus,	  CV-­‐minus,	  EV-­‐plus	  
6. Order:	  EV-­‐minus,	  EV-­‐plus,	  CV-­‐minus	  
3. LS_FIRST	  [0,	  1]:	  whether	  we	  ask	  the	  option	  that	  mentions	  the	  lumpsum	  amount	  first	  	  
1	  if	  we	  ask	  the	  option	  with	  the	  lumpsum	  amount	  first	  
0	  otherwise	  
4. SMALLTOLARGE	  [0,	  1]:	  the	  order	  in	  which	  we	  present	  the	  changes	  in	  SS	  
1	  if	  we	  show	  the	  ΔSS	  from	  smallest	  to	  largest	  	  
0	  otherwise	  
5. LS_STARTVALUE	  	  [1,	  3]:	  Size	  of	  the	  first	  lumpsum	  amount	  shown	  
1. low	  starting	  value	  ($10,000)	  
2. medium	  starting	  value	  ($20,000)	  
3. high	  starting	  value	  ($30,000)	  
6. ORDER_STOCK	  [1,2]:	  Order	  of	  choices	  in	  Q.3.2.3	  
1. List	  “single	  company	  stock”	  first	  
2. List	  “stock	  mutual	  fund”	  first	  
	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=1	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=2,	  we	  set	  CVM_ORDER	  =	  1	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=3	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=5,	  we	  set	  CVM_ORDER	  =	  2	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=4	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=6,	  we	  set	  CVM_ORDER	  =	  3	  
	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=3	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=4,	  we	  set	  EVP_ORDER	  =	  1	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=1	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=6,	  we	  set	  EVP_ORDER	  =	  2	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=2	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=5,	  we	  set	  EVP_ORDER	  =	  3	  
	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=5	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=6,	  we	  set	  EVM_ORDER	  =	  1	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=2	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=4,	  we	  set	  EVM_ORDER	  =	  2	  
If	  VAR_ORDER=1	  OR	  VAR_ORDER=3,	  we	  set	  EVM_ORDER	  =	  3	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B.	  Survey	  waves	  and	  versions	  A	  and	  B	  
We	  fielded	  the	  survey	  in	  two	  waves.	  We	  have	  two	  versions,	  version	  A	  and	  version	  B.	  	  The	  only	  difference	  
between	  these	  versions	  is	  that	  in	  version	  B	  the	  order	  of	  sections	  2	  and	  6	  is	  switched	  (compared	  to	  version	  A).	  	  
The	  survey	  instrument	  below	  is	  for	  version	  A.	  	  	  The	  following	  table	  specifies	  the	  order	  for	  the	  sections	  for	  
versions	  A	  and	  B.	  
	  
	   Version	  A	   Version	  B	  
Wave	  1	   Section	  1	  (“Intro	  wave	  1”)	   Section	  1	  (“Intro	  wave	  1”)	  
Section	  2	  (“CVPlus”)	   Section	  6	  (“Other	  tradeoffs”)	  
Section	  3	  (“Background”)	   Section	  3	  (“Background”)	  
Section	  4	  (“Close	  wave	  1”)	   Section	  4	  (“Close	  wave	  1”)	  
	  
Wave	  2	   Section	  5	  (“Intro	  wave	  2”)	   Section	  5	  (“Intro	  wave	  2”)	  
Section	  6	  (“Other	  tradeoffs”)	   Section	  2	  (“CVPlus”)	  
Section	  7	  (“No	  Political	  Risk”)	   Section	  7	  (“No	  Political	  Risk”)	  
Section	  8	  (“Close	  wave	  2”)	   Section	  8	  (“Close	  wave	  2”)	  
	  
Respondents	  with	  the	  VERSION_A=1	  are	  given	  version	  A	  and	  respondents	  with	  VERSION_A=0	  are	  given	  version	  
B.	  	  
	  
	  
C.	  Syntax	  
	  
Note:	  
• The	  number	  between	  parentheses	  before	  a	  choice	  box	  was	  not	  displayed	  on	  the	  screen.	  	  It	  only	  
indicates	  how	  that	  choice	  should	  be	  coded.	  
• Comments	  between	  square	  brackets	  are	  programming	  notes.	  
• Variable	  names	  between	  square	  brackets	  were	  replaced	  by	  the	  contents	  of	  the	  variable.	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D.	  Lookup	  tables	  (matrices)	  for	  Lumpsum	  amounts	  and	  BEN_DEFAULT	  
	  
The	  following	  tables	  show	  lumpsum	  (one-­‐time	  Social	  Security	  payment)	  amounts	  for	  three	  different	  starting	  
values:	  low,	  medium	  and	  high,	  which	  are	  randomized	  as	  mentioned	  above.	  	  
	  
10,000 4,000 2,000 1,000 500 Row 1 
    
1,500 Row 2 
   
3,000 2,500 Row 3 
    
3,500 Row 4 
  
7,000 5,500 4,750 Row 5 
    
6,250 Row 6 
   
8,500 7,750 Row 7 
    
9,250 Row 8 
 
30,000 20,000 15,000 12,500 Row 9 
    
17,500 Row 10 
   
25,000 22,500 Row 11 
    
27,500 Row 12 
  
60,000 40,000 35,000 Row 13 
    
50,000 Row 14 
   
100,000 80,000 Row 15 
    
200,000 Row 16 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 
 
Table1: Lumpsum amounts for LOW starting value 
	  
We	  put	  the	  values	  of	  the	  table	  1	  in	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_LOW.	  The	  ith	  row	  and	  jth	  column	  of	  this	  matrix	  is	  denoted	  
by	  LS_LOW[i,j]	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20,000 4,000 2,000 1,000 500 Row 1 
    
1,500 Row 2 
   
3,000 2,500 Row 3 
    
3,500 Row 4 
  
10,000 7,000 5,500 Row 5 
    
8,500 Row 6 
   
15,000 12,500 Row 7 
    
17,500 Row 8 
 
60,000 30,000 25,000 22,500 Row 9 
    
27,500 Row 10 
   
40,000 35,000 Row 11 
    
50,000 Row 12 
  
100,000 80,000 70,000 Row 13 
    
90,000 Row 14 
   
200,000 150,000 Row 15 
    
500,000 Row 16 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 
 
Table2: Lumpsum amounts for MEDIUM starting value 
	  
We	  put	  the	  values	  of	  the	  table	  2	  in	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_MED.	  The	  ith	  row	  and	  jth	  column	  of	  this	  matrix	  is	  denoted	  
by	  LS_MED[i,j]	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30,000 10,000 4,000 2,000 1,000 Row 1 
    
3,000 Row 2 
   
7,000 5,500 Row 3 
    
8,500 Row 4 
  
20,000 15,000 12,500 Row 5 
    
17,500 Row 6 
   
25,000 22,500 Row 7 
    
27,500 Row 8 
 
60,000 40,000 35,000 32,500 Row 9 
    
37,500 Row 10 
   
50,000 45,000 Row 11 
    
55,000 Row 12 
  
100,000 80,000 70,000 Row 13 
    
90,000 Row 14 
   
200,000 150,000 Row 15 
    
500,000 Row 16 
Col. 1 Col. 2 Col. 3 Col. 4 Col. 5 
 
Table3: Lumpsum amounts for HIGH starting value 
	  
We	  put	  the	  values	  of	  the	  table	  3	  in	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_HIGH.	  The	  ith	  row	  and	  jth	  column	  of	  this	  matrix	  is	  denoted	  
by	  LS_HIGH[i,j]	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The	  following	  code	  was	  used	  for	  the	  BEN_DEFAULT	  value	  table:	  	  
EDUCATION	   1	  =	  less	  than	  high	  school	  (<	  12	  years)	  
	   	   2=	  high	  school	  degree	  (12	  years),	  
	   	   3=some	  college	  (>12	  and	  <	  16	  years)	  
	   	   4	  =	  college	  degree	  (=	  16	  years)	  
	   	   5	  =	  more	  than	  college	  (>16	  years)	  
	  
	  
	  
The	  variable	  BEN_DEFAULT	  was	  created	  and	  set	  to	  the	  following	  values:	  
Education Gender Marital	  status BEN_DEFAULT 
1	  (<12	  years)	   Female	   Married	  	   660 
2	  (12	  years)	   Female	   Married	  	   790 
3	  (>	  12	  years	  and	  <16	  years)	   Female	   Married	  	   850 
4	  (16	  years)	   Female	   Married	  	   830 
5	  (>16	  years)	   Female	   Married	  	   850 
1	  (<12	  years)	   Male	   Married	  	   1070 
2	  (12	  years)	   Male	   Married	  	   1280 
3	  (>	  12	  years	  and	  <16	  years)	   Male	   Married	  	   1270 
4	  (16	  years)	   Male	   Married	  	   1330 
5	  (>16	  years)	   Male	   Married	  	   1360 
1	  (<12	  years)	   Female	   Not	  Married	   920 
2	  (12	  years)	   Female	   Not	  Married	   1080 
3	  (>	  12	  years	  and	  <16	  years)	   Female	   Not	  Married	   1120 
4	  (16	  years)	   Female	   Not	  Married	   1230 
5	  (>16	  years)	   Female	   Not	  Married	   1160 
1	  (<12	  years)	   Male	   Not	  Married	   1040 
2	  (12	  years)	   Male	   Not	  Married	   1190 
3	  (>	  12	  years	  and	  <16	  years)	   Male	   Not	  Married	   1130 
4	  (16	  years)	   Male	   Not	  Married	   1350 
5	  (>16	  years)	   Male	   Not	  Married	   1380 
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INITIALIZATIONS:	  BEGINNING	  OF	  SURVEY	  	  
_________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  IS	  THE	  BEGINNING	  OF	  THE	  SURVEY.]	  
	  
Preloaded	  variables	  from	  previous	  waves	  that	  are	  used	  in	  skip	  patterns	  are:	  
GENDER	  	  	  	   	   	  1	  =	  	  male;	  2	  =	  female	  
AGE	   	   	  	   	  The	  respondent’s	  current	  age	  in	  years	  
HIGHESTEDUCATION	   	  1	  Less	  than	  1st	  grade	  
2	  1st,	  2nd,	  3rd,	  or	  4th	  grade	  
	  3	  5th	  or	  6th	  grade	  
	  4	  7th	  or	  8th	  grade	  
	  5	  9th	  grade	  
	  6	  10th	  grade	  
	  7	  11th	  grade	  
	  8	  12th	  grade	  NO	  DIPLOMA	  
	  9	  HIGH	  SCHOOL	  GRADUATE	  high	  school	  DIPLOMA	  	  or	  the	  equivalent	  (For	  example:	  GED)	  
	  10	  Some	  college	  but	  no	  degree	  
	  11	  Associate	  degree	  in	  college	  Occupational/vocational	  program	  
	  12	  Associate	  degree	  in	  college	  Academic	  program	  
	  13	  Bachelor's	  degree	  (For	  example:	  BA,AB,BS)	  
	  14	  Master's	  degree	  (For	  example:	  MA,MS,MEng,MEd,MSW,MBA)	  
	  15	  Professional	  School	  Degree	  (For	  example:	  MD,DDS,DVM,LLB,JD)	  
	  16	  Doctorate	  degree	  (For	  example:	  PhD,EdD)	  
	  	  
	  
For	  missing	  values/	  answers	  for	  variables	  mentioned	  above,	  the	  questions	  were	  asked	  again	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  wave	  1.	  	  
The	  variable	  “MARRIED”	  was	  collected	  regardless	  of	  whether	  data	  was	  available.	  The	  following	  question	  was	  asked	  to	  all	  
respondents	  in	  the	  beginning	  of	  wave	  1.	  	  
[MARRIED]	  Married	  	  
Are	  you	  currently	  married?	  	  
(0)	  	  Not	  Currently	  Married	  
(1)	  	  	  Currently	  married	  	  
	  
Other	  preloaded	  questions	  include:	  
PIA_EST	   	   Estimated	  PIA	  (Social	  Security	  Primary	  Insurance	  Amount)	  based	  on	  previous	  questions	  asked	  about	  	  
earnings	  history.	  	  So	  this	  is	  the	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  one	  would	  get	  if	  one	  claimed	  at	  full	  retirement	  age.	  
	  
WORK_FOR_PAY	   1	  YES;	  	  2	  NO.	  	  This	  is	  a	  standard	  variable	  that	  records	  whether	  the	  respondent	  has	  ever	  worked	  for	  pay.	  
If	  this	  variable	  was	  missing	  for	  any	  respondent	  then	  they	  were	  asked	  the	  following	  question:	  
	  
[WORK_FOR_PAY]	  Work	  For	  Pay	  	  
Did	  you	  work	  for	  pay	  more	  than	  10	  years?	  
(1)	  	  Yes	  	  
(2)	  	  	  No	  	  
	  
A	  new	  data-­‐only	  variable	  SPOUSE	  was	  created:	  
Set	  SPOUSE	  =	  “husband”	  if	  GENDER==“female”	  
Set	  SPOUSE	  =	  “wife”	  if	  GENDER==“male”	  
	  
A	  new	  data	  only	  variable	  FLAGHYPO	  was	  created	  and	  set	  FLAGHYPO=0.	  
A	  new	  data	  only	  variable	  USE_DEFAULT	  was	  created	  and	  set	  USE_DEFAULT=0.	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SECTION	  1:	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  WAVE	  1	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  SECTION	  FINDS	  THE	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  STATUS,	  ELIGIBILITY,	  AND	  CLAIM	  AGE	  OF	  RESPONDENTS.	  IT	  ESTIMATES	  
THE	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  BENEFIT	  AMOUNT	  OF	  RESPONDENTS	  BASED	  ON	  THEIR	  AGE,	  EARNINGS	  HISTORY,	  AND	  YEARS	  IN	  THE	  
WORK	  FORCE	  AND	  PROVIDES	  RESPONDENTS	  AN	  OPPORTUNITY	  TO	  CORRECT	  THE	  ESTIMATE.	  THIS	  SECTION	  WAS	  ASKED	  OF	  
ALL	  RESPONDENTS.]	  	  	  
	  
	  
[WAIT_WARNING]	  	  Wait	  Warning	  
The	  page	  after	  this	  may	  take	  several	  seconds	  to	  load.	  Please	  click	  the	  next	  button	  now,	  and	  do	  not	  click	  your	  browser's	  back	  
button	  while	  the	  page	  is	  loading.	  Thank	  you.	  
	  
Q.1.1:	  [INTRODUCTION	  TO	  SECTION	  1]	  
We	  are	  interested	  in	  understanding	  how	  and	  when	  people	  would	  like	  to	  receive	  their	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
	  
In	  this	  survey,	  we	  sometimes	  ask	  questions	  that	  are	  difficult	  to	  answer	  exactly.	  Please	  take	  time	  to	  consider	  the	  questions	  and	  
give	  us	  your	  best	  guess	  even	  if	  you	  do	  not	  know	  the	  exact	  answer.	  	  Having	  your	  best	  guess	  will	  be	  very	  helpful	  to	  us.	  
	  
Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  participation!	  
	  	  
	  
Q.1.2:	  [SS_STATUS]	  Social	  Security	  Status	  
In	  this	  survey,	  we	  mean	  by	  “Social	  Security	  benefits”	  any	  benefits	  that	  you	  yourself	  receive	  or	  will	  receive	  from	  the	  Social	  
Security	  program,	  including	  retiree,	  disability,	  spouse,	  or	  survivor	  benefits.	  
	  
Which	  of	  the	  following	  statements	  best	  describes	  you?	  
(1)	  !	  I	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  now.	  
(2)	  !	  I	  don’t	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  now	  but,	  under	  current	  law,	  I	  will	  be	  eligible	  to	  receive	  them	  in	  the	  
future.	  	  
(3)	  !	  I	  will	  never	  be	  eligible	  under	  current	  law	  to	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
	  
[Create	  new	  variable	  SS_STATUS_ORIG,	  and	  set	  SS_STATUS_ORIG=SS_STATUS]	  
[ASK	  IF	  SS_STATUS=3]	  
Q.1.3:	  [SS_ELIG]	  Social	  Security	  Eligibility	  
Why	  do	  you	  think	  you	  will	  never	  be	  eligible	  to	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits?	  
(1)	  !	  My	  main	  job	  was/is	  not	  covered	  by	  Social	  Security.	  
(2)	  !	  I	  don’t	  have	  or	  will	  not	  have	  a	  sufficient	  work	  history	  to	  become	  eligible	  for	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  
(3)	  !	  I	  do	  not	  think	  Social	  Security	  will	  be	  around	  by	  the	  time	  I	  would	  start	  claiming	  benefits	  
(4)	  !	  Other:	  ________________	  [Give	  open-­‐ended	  text	  box]	  
	  
[SHOW	  IF	  SS_ELIG=3]	  
Q.1.4:	  [SS_AROUND]	  Assume	  Social	  Security	  will	  still	  be	  around	  
	  
Please	  answer	  the	  questions	  in	  this	  survey	  assuming	  that	  current	  Social	  Security	  rules	  still	  apply	  when	  you	  first	  claim	  
Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  Thank	  you.	  
	  
[IF	  SS_ELIG=3,	  SET	  SS_STATUS=2]	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  SS_STATUS=3]	  
Q.1.5:	  [SSEL_SPOUSE]	  Eligible	  For	  Social	  Security	  Based	  on	  Spouse	  
People	  who	  are	  not	  eligible	  to	  receive	  Social	  Security	  based	  on	  their	  own	  work	  history	  may	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  
based	  on	  the	  earnings	  history	  of	  their	  spouse,	  late	  spouse,	  or	  ex-­‐spouse.	  
	  
Do	  you	  think	  you	  may	  be	  eligible	  to	  receive	  benefits	  based	  on	  the	  past	  or	  future	  earnings	  of	  your	  [SPOUSE],	  late	  
[SPOUSE],	  ex-­‐[SPOUSE],	  or	  perhaps	  a	  future	  [SPOUSE]?	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(1)	  !	  Yes	  
(2)	  !	  No	  
	  
[IF	  SSEL_SPOUSE==1	  AND	  SS_STATUS==3:	  SET	  SS_STATUS=2]	  
[IF	  (SSEL_SPOUSE==2	  OR	  SSEL_SPOUSE=MISSING)	  AND	  SS_STATUS==3:	  SET	  FLAGHYPO=1]	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  FLAGHYPO=1]	  	  	  
[If	  FLAGHYPO=1	  AND	  AGE>=62,	  SET	  SS_STATUS=1]	  /*	  if	  eligible,	  they	  would	  be	  claiming	  */	  
[If	  FLAGHYPO=1	  AND	  AGE<62,	  SET	  SS_STATUS=2]	  	  /*	  if	  eligible,	  they	  would	  not	  yet	  have	  claimed	  */	  
[If	  FLAGHYPO=1,	  SET	  CLAIM_AGE=62]	  
[If	  FLAGHYPO=1,	  SET	  BEN_EST=BEN_DEFAULT]	  
Q.1.6:	  [HYPOELIGIBLE]	  Hypothetically	  Eligible	  
	  
Even	  though	  we	  understand	  that	  you	  are	  not	  eligible	  to	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  complete	  
this	  survey	  assuming	  you	  would	  be	  eligible.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  please	  answer	  in	  this	  survey	  what	  you	  would	  have	  done	  or	  chosen	  
if	  you	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
	  
The	  typical	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  for	  [If	  MARRIED=1,	  insert	  “a	  married”;	  if	  MARRIED=0,	  insert	  “an	  unmarried”]	  [If	  
GENDER=“male”	  insert	  “man”;	  if	  GENDER=“female”	  insert	  “woman”]	  with	  [insert	  the	  respondent’s	  educational	  attainment	  
based	  on	  the	  categories	  in	  EDUCATION]	  is	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month.	  
	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  survey,	  let's	  assume	  that	  you	  [If	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “are	  supposed	  to”]	  get	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  
of	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month,	  and	  that	  you	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “started	  receiving”;	  If	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “would	  
start	  receiving”]	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  at	  age	  62.	  
	  
[If	  FLAGHYPO=1,	  GO	  TO	  SECTION	  2]	  
	  
Q.1.7.1:	  [CLAIM_AGE]	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  claim	  age	  
	  [ASK	  IF	  SS_STATUS==1	  (RECEIVING	  BENEFITS):]	  
At	  what	  age	  did	  you	  start	  receiving	  Social	  Security	  benefits?	  
At	  age:	  _________	  
	  
Q.1.7.2:	  [CHECKCLAIM_AGE1	  ]	  CHECK	  CLAIM	  AGE	  	  
[ASK	  IF	  SS_STATUS==1	  AND	  CLAIMING	  AGE	  >	  CALCULATED	  AGE]	  
	  	  
You	  told	  us	  earlier	  that	  you	  are	  already	  receiving	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  Therefore,	  the	  age	  at	  which	  you	  started	  receiving	  
Social	  Security	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  higher	  than	  your	  current	  age.	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  revise	  your	  answer.	  
	   	  
Q.1.7.3:	  [CLAIM_AGE]	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  claim	  age	  
[ASK	  IF	  SS_STATUS==2	  (NOT	  RECEIVING	  BENEFITS	  YET)]:	  
At	  what	  age	  do	  you	  plan	  to	  start	  receiving	  Social	  Security	  benefits?	  
At	  age:	  __________	  
	  
Q.1.7.4:	  [CHECKCLAIM_AGE1	  ]	  Check	  Claim	  Age	  
[ASK	  IF	  SS_STATUS==2	  (NOT	  RECEIVING	  BENEFITS	  YET)	  AND	  CLAIMING AGE < CALCULATED	  AGE]:	  
You	  told	  us	  earlier	  that	  you	  are	  not	  currently	  receiving	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  Therefore,	  the	  age	  at	  which	  you	  plan	  to	  start	  
receiving	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  lower	  than	  your	  current	  age.	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  revise	  your	  answer.	  
	  
[ALWAYS:	  (THE	  CODE	  BELOW	  ENSURES	  CLAIM_AGE	  WILL	  NEVER	  BE	  MISSING)]	  
[SET	  CLAIM_AGE_ORIG=CLAIM_AGE]	  
[SET	  CLAIM_AGE=MAX(AGE+1,	  62)	  IF	  CLAIM_AGE=MISSING	  AND	  SS_STATUS==2]	  
[SET	  CLAIM_AGE=MIN(AGE,	  62)	  IF	  CLAIM_AGE=MISSING	  AND	  SS_STATUS==1]	  
 
[NOTE: THE SERIES OF QUESTIONS 1.8.1-1.8.6 BELOW WERE ONLY ASKED IF THE VARIABLE PIA_EST WAS MISSING (AND 
THEREFORE COULD NOT BE PRELOADED).  THE VARIABLE PIA_EST CONTAINS THE ESTIMATED SOCIAL SECURITY MONTHLY 
BENEFITS IF THE PERSON CLAIMS BENEFITS AT THE FULL RETIREMENT AGE, AND IS BASED ON A SERIES OF QUESTIONS ASKED 
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PREVIOUSLY IN THE AMERICAN LIFE PANEL ABOUT THE PERSON’S WORK HISTORY.  THE SERIES OF QUESTIONS AND THE SKIP 
LOGIC BELOW IS IDENTICAL TO THE EARLIER SERIES OF QUESTIONS ASKED TO ESTIMATE PIA_EST.] 
 
 
[IF	  WORK_FOR_PAY	  ≠ 	  “YES”	  OR	  PIA_EST	  ≠ 	  missing,	  Skip	  Q1.8.1	  through	  Q.1.8.6]	  
	  
Q.1.8.1:	  [YEAR_START_WORK]	  Year	  Start	  Work	  For	  Pay	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  In	  what	  year	  did	  you	  first	  start	  to	  work	  for	  pay?	  	  
[Note	  to	  programmer:	  Insert	  “a	  drop	  down	  box	  from	  1900	  to	  2011”]	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  YEAR_	  START_WORK	  <	  YEAR_OF_BIRTH	  +	  14]	  
Q.1.8.2:	  [WORKED_TO_EARLY]	  Start	  Working	  Before	  14	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  You	  said	  you	  started	  working	  before	  you	  were	  14	  years	  old.	  	  You	  indicated	  that	  you	  started	  working	  before	  you	  were	  
14	  years	  old.	  For	  what	  follows,	  we	  will	  just	  assume	  that	  pay	  from	  age	  14	  on	  counts.	  	  If	  you	  believe	  you	  made	  an	  error	  
in	  entering	  the	  date	  you	  began	  working,	  you	  may	  go	  back	  and	  change	  it.	  
	  
Q.1.8.3:	  [INCOME_INTRO]	  Income	  Introduction	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  We	  would	  now	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  some	  more	  information	  about	  the	  period	  when	  you	  started	  working	  for	  pay	  (in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[YEAR_START_WORK])	  up	  to	  now.	  
	  
[Note	  to	  Programmer:	  LOOP	  FROM	  1	  TO	  [number	  of	  questions	  INCOME_CAT]	  DO:	  	  	  /*	  number	  of	  periods	  loop	  */	  
Q.1.8.4:	  [INCOME_NOT_WORK]	  Income	  Not	  Work	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Insert	  “[income	  cat	  start	  year	  fill]	  -­‐	  [income	  cat	  end	  year	  fill]”]	  Was	  there	  ever	  a	  time	  when	  you	  did	  not	  work	  
in	  the	  “[income	  cat	  start	  year	  fill]	  -­‐	  [income	  cat	  end	  year	  fill]”	  period?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  !	  Yes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  !	  No	  	  	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  INCOME_NOT_WORK=YES]	  
	  	  Q.1.8.5:	  [INCOME_NOT_WORK_HOW_LONG]	  Income	  Not	  Work	  Months	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Insert	  “[income	  cat	  start	  year	  fill]	  -­‐	  [income	  cat	  end	  year	  fill]”]	  How	  many	  months	  in	  total	  do	  you	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
estimate	  not	  working	  for	  pay	  in	  the	  “[income	  cat	  start	  year	  fill]	  -­‐	  [income	  cat	  end	  year	  fill]”	  period?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  !	  ________________	  [Give	  open-­‐ended	  text	  box	  allowing	  only	  integers]	  	  	  
	  
[ASK IF INCOME_CAT fill amount 1 = and INCOME_CAT fill amount 2 = and INCOME_CAT fill amount 3]	  
Q.1.8.6:	  [INCOME_CAT]	  Income	  categories	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [Insert	  “[income	  cat	  start	  year	  fill]	  -­‐	  [income	  cat	  end	  year	  fill]”]	  Could	  you	  please	  give	  us	  an	  estimate	  of	  how	  
much	  you	  were	  making	  on	  average	  per	  year	  in	  the	  “[income	  cat	  start	  year	  fill]	  -­‐	  [income	  cat	  end	  year	  fill]”	  
period	  “[fill	  for	  income	  cat	  question]?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (1)	  !	  More	  than	  $[INCOME_CAT	  fill	  amount	  1]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (2)	  !	  Between	  $[INCOME_CAT	  fill	  amount	  2]	  and	  $[INCOME_CAT	  fill	  amount	  1]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (3)	  !	  Between	  $[INCOME_CAT	  fill	  amount	  3]	  and	  $[INCOME_CAT	  fill	  amount	  2]	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (4)	  !	  Less	  than	  $[INCOME_CAT	  fill	  amount	  3]	  
	  
End	  Do	  	  /*	  End	  of	  number	  of	  periods	  loop	  */	  
	  
[Note	   to	   programmers:	   based	   on	   the	   responses	   to	   Q1.8.1	   through	   Q1.8.6,	   calculate	   PIA_EST	   using	   the	   same	  
algorithm	  as	  used	  in	  the	  earlier	  ALP	  module]	  
 
 
[NOTE TO PROGRAMMERS: PLEASE USE THE VARIABLE PIA_EST (PRELOADED OR CALCULATED FROM Q.1.8.1-Q.1.8.6) AND 
THE VARIABLE CLAIM_AGE ASKED ABOVE TO COMPUTE THE ESTIMATED MONTHLY SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FOR EACH 
RESPONDENT IF THEY START CLAIMING AT CLAIM_AGE.  PLEASE USE THE SOCIAL SECURITY AGE ADJUSTMENT RULES 
A-40
	  
	  
APPROPRIATE FOR THE BIRTH COHORT THAT THE RESPONDENT BELONGS TO IN THIS CALCULATION.  PLEASE NAME THE 
RESULTING VARIABLE BEN_EST_ORIG1.] 
 
IF BEN_EST_ORIG1 ≥ 200, THEN SET BEN_EST_ORIG=BEN_EST_ORIG1. 
IF BEN_EST_ORIG1 < 200, THEN SET BEN_EST_ORIG=200 
IF BEN_EST_ORIG1 = MISSING, THEN SET BEN_EST_ORIG=MISSING. 
 
 
[SHOW IF SS_STATUS==1 (CURRENTLY RECEIVING BENEFITS) AND (AGE ≥ 60 OR BEN_EST_ORIG=MISSING)] 
Q.1.9:	  [BEN_LEVEL]	  Social	  Security	  Benefits	  Level	  
	  
Approximately	  how	  much	  are	  your	  monthly	  Social	  Security	  benefits?	  
	  
Even	  if	  you	  do	  not	  know	  exactly,	  please	  give	  your	  best	  guess.	  	  
	  
(As	  before,	  please	  report	  any	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  paid	  to	  you	  yourself	  (by	  check	  or	  direct	  deposit),	  not	  benefits	  paid	  to	  any	  
other	  member	  in	  your	  household).	  
	  
$________	  [NUMBER	  BOX	  WITH	  RANGE	  0-­‐3500]	  per	  month.	  
	  
[Note	  to	  programmers:	  please	  record	  the	  first	  answer	  to	  this	  question	  in	  BEN_LEVEL1.	  	  
	  
[Display	  If	  BEN_LEVEL1	  (social	  security	  benefits	  level)	  >	  3500]	  
[checkBEN_LEVEL3500]	  Social	  Security	  Benefits	  Level	  Check	  >	  3500	  
	  
Due	  to	  how	  Social	  Security	  calculates	  your	  benefits,	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  your	  monthly	  benefit	  will	  be	  this	  high.	  
Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  your	  answer	  to	  something	  between	  $0	  and	  $3500	  per	  month.	  
	  
[Display	  If	  BEN_LEVEL1	  (social	  security	  benefits	  level)	  <	  0]	  
[checkBEN_LEVEL0]	  Social	  Security	  Benefits	  Level	  Check	  <0	  
	  
Monthly	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  negative.	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  your	  answer	  to	  something	  between	  
$0	  and	  $3500	  per	  month.	  	  
	  
The	  final	  response	  for	  all	  respondents	  should	  be	  recorded	  in	  the	  variable	  BEN_LEVEL.]	  
	  
[SET	  BEN_EST=BEN_LEVEL]	  
[GO	  TO	  Q.1.13,	  “USE_DEFAULT”]	  
	  
[Ask	  if	  BEN_EST_ORIG	  ≠ 	  missing:]	  
Q.1.10:	  [BEN_OVERRIDE,	  BEN_NEW]	  ESTIMATED	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  BENEFITS	  	  
	  
Based	  on	  the	  information	  you	  have	  provided	  to	  us	  about	  your	  own	  earnings	  history,	  we	  estimate	  that,	  under	  current	  Social	  
Security	  Law,	  you	  are	  supposed	  to	  get	  a	  Social	  Security	  retirement	  benefit	  of	  approximately	  $[BEN_EST_ORIG]	  per	  month	  if	  you	  
claim	  benefits	  at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE].	  	  
	  
Think	  of	  any	  dollar	  amount	  mentioned	  in	  this	  survey	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  Social	  Security	  will	  
adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  inflation).	  
	  
Our	  estimate	  does	  not	  take	  into	  account	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  you	  may	  receive	  based	  on	  the	  earnings	  of	  a	  past	  or	  current	  
spouse.	  
	  
Do	  you	  think	  our	  estimate	  is	  about	  right	  for	  benefits	  you	  yourself	  are	  supposed	  to	  get	  from	  the	  Social	  Security	  program	  whether	  
these	  benefits	  are	  retiree,	  disability,	  spouse,	  or	  survivor	  benefits?	  
(1)	  !	  Yes,	  I	  believe	  the	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  get	  are	  roughly	  $[BEN_EST_ORIG]	  per	  month.	  	  
(2)	  !	  No,	  I	  believe	  the	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  get	  are	  roughly	  $________	  [NUMBER	  BOX	  WITH	  
RANGE	  0-­‐6000,	  variable	  name:	  BEN_NEW]	  per	  month.	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The	  instrument	  made	  sure	  that	  those	  who	  check	  option	  2	  fill	  in	  the	  number	  box;	  and	  they	  were	  reminded	  once	  if	  they	  left	  it	  
blank.	  The	  first	  answer	  to	  their	  question	  was	  recorded	  in	  BEN_NEW1.	  	  	  
	  
	  
[DISPLAY	  IF	  BEN_NEW1	  (benefits	  new)	  >	  6000]	  
[checkBEN_NEW6000]	  	  Benefits	  New	  Check	  >	  6000	  
	  
Due	  to	  how	  Social	  Security	  calculates	  your	  benefits,	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  your	  monthly	  benefit	  will	  be	  this	  high.	  
Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  your	  answer	  to	  something	  between	  $0	  and	  $6000	  per	  month.	  	  
	  
	  
[DISPLAY	  If	  BEN_NEW1	  (benefits	  new)	  <	  0	  ]	  	  
[checkBEN_NEW0]	  	  Benefits	  New	  Check	  <	  0	  
	  
Monthly	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  negative.	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  your	  answer	  to	  something	  between	  
$0	  and	  $6000	  per	  month.	  
	  
	  
[DISPLAY	  	  IF	  BEN_OVERRIDE==2	  and	  BEN_NEW	  ==	  missing]	  
[checkBEN_NEWempty]	  	  Benefits	  New	  Check	  Value	  Empty	  
	  
You	  selected	  the	  second	  option	  but	  did	  not	  fill	  in	  a	  value.	  Your	  answers	  are	  important	  to	  us.	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  fill	  in	  a	  
value.	  
	  
The	  final	  response	  for	  the	  number	  box	  for	  each	  respondent	  was	  recorded	  in	  the	  variable	  BEN_NEW.]	  
	  
IF	  BEN_OVERRIDE==1,	  SET	  BEN_EST=BEN_EST_ORIG	  
IF	  BEN_OVERRIDE==2,	  SET	  BEN_EST=BEN_NEW	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  BEN_OVERRIDE==2]	  
Q.1.11	  [OVERRIDE_WHY]	  Reason	  why	  R	  changed	  our	  estimate	  
	  
Thank	  you	  for	  correcting	  our	  estimate	  of	  your	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  knowing	  what	  this	  correction	  was	  
based	  on.	  	  Please	  check	  all	  boxes	  that	  apply.	  
	  
(1)	  !	  I	  know	  the	  amount	  of	  Social	  Security	  that	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  get	  from	  my	  annual	  Social	  Security	  mailing	  
(2)	  !	  I	  included	  Social	  Security	  survivor	  benefits	  that	  you	  did	  not	  include	  in	  your	  estimate	  
(3)	  !	  I	  included	  Social	  Security	  spousal	  benefits	  that	  you	  did	  not	  include	  in	  your	  estimate	  
(4)	  !	  I	  included	  Social	  Security	  disability	  benefits	  that	  you	  did	  not	  include	  in	  your	  estimate	  
(5)	  !	  Your	  estimate	  simply	  didn’t	  appear	  right	  to	  me	  
(6)	  !	  Other	  _______________________	  [Give	  open-­‐ended	  text	  box]	  
	  
[Note	  to	  programmer:	  Respondent	  is	  allowed	  to	  select	  multiple	  options]	  
	  
[Ask	  if	  BEN_EST_ORIG=missing:]	  
Q.1.12:	  [BEN_EST_OWN]	  	  
	  
In	  this	  question,	  we	  would	  like	  get	  your	  estimate	  of	  the	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  you	  are	  supposed	  to	  get	  under	  current	  law	  if	  
you	  claim	  benefits	  at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE].	  
	  
As	  a	  point	  of	  reference,	  the	  typical	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  for	  [If	  MARRIED=1,	  insert	  “a	  married”;	  if	  MARRIED=0,	  insert	  “an	  
unmarried”]	  [If	  GENDER=“male”	  insert	  “man”;	  if	  GENDER=“female”	  insert	  “woman”]	  with	  [insert	  the	  respondent’s	  
educational	  attainment	  based	  on	  the	  categories	  in	  EDUCATION]	  is	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month.	  	  
	  
Please	  give	  your	  answer	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  Social	  Security	  will	  adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  
inflation).	  Please	  report	  benefits	  you	  yourself	  are	  supposed	  to	  get	  from	  the	  Social	  Security	  program	  whether	  these	  benefits	  are	  
retiree,	  disability,	  spouse,	  or	  survivor	  benefits?	  
	  
A-42
	  
	  
Even	  if	  you	  do	  not	  know	  exactly,	  please	  give	  your	  best	  guess.	  	  
	  
I	  believe	  the	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  I	  am	  supposed	  to	  get	  are	  roughly	  $________	  [NUMBER	  BOX	  WITH	  RANGE	  0-­‐6000,	  variable	  
name:	  BEN_EST_OWN]	  per	  month	  if	  I	  claim	  benefits	  at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE].	  
 
	  
[DISPLAY	  IF	  BEN_EST_OWN1	  (benefits	  estimate	  own)	  >	  6000]	  
[checkBEN_EST_OWN6000]	  	  Benefits	  Estimate	  Own	  Check	  >	  6000	  
	  
Due	  to	  how	  Social	  Security	  calculates	  your	  benefits,	  it	  is	  very	  unlikely	  that	  your	  monthly	  benefit	  will	  be	  this	  high.	  Please	  go	  back	  
and	  change	  your	  answer	  to	  something	  between	  $0	  and	  $6000	  per	  month.	  
	  
	  
[DISPLAY IF	  BEN_EST_OWN1	  (benefits	  estimate	  own)	  <0]	  
[checkBEN_EST_OWN0	  	  benefits	  estimate	  own	  check	  <	  0]	  
	  
Monthly	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  negative.	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  your	  answer	  to	  something	  between	  $0	  and	  
$6000	  per	  month.	  
	  
The	  final	  response	  for	  the	  number	  box	  for	  all	  respondents	  were	  recorded	  in	  the	  variable	  BEN_EST_OWN.]	  
	  
[Set	  BEN_EST=BEN_EST_OWN]	  
	  
[Ask	  if	  BEN_EST=missing]	  	  	  
Q.1.13	  [USE_DEFAULT,	  BEN_EST_RAW]:	  Tell	  respondent	  that	  we	  are	  using	  a	  default	  amount	  for	  his/her	  SS	  benefits	  
	  
The	  typical	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  for	  [If	  MARRIED=1,	  insert	  “a	  married”;	  if	  MARRIED=0,	  insert	  “an	  unmarried”]	  [If	  
GENDER=“male”	  insert	  “man”;	  if	  GENDER=“female”	  insert	  “woman”]	  with	  [insert	  the	  respondent’s	  educational	  attainment	  
based	  on	  the	  categories	  in	  EDUCATION]	  is	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  survey,	  let's	  assume	  that	  you	  [If	  
SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “are	  supposed	  to”]	  get	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month.	  
	  
[Ask	  if	  BEN_EST<200]	  	  	  
Q.1.14	  [USE_DEFAULT,	  BEN_EST_RAW]:	  Tell	  respondent	  that	  we	  are	  using	  a	  default	  amount	  for	  his/her	  SS	  benefits	  
	  
Thank	  you	  for	  providing	  us	  with	  your	  estimated	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  of	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month.	  Some	  of	  the	  questions	  
that	  follow	  only	  apply	  for	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  of	  at	  least	  $200	  per	  month.	  For	  purposes	  of	  answering	  the	  remaining	  
questions	  in	  this	  survey,	  we	  would	  therefore	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  please	  assume	  that	  your	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  would	  be	  $200	  
per	  month.	  
	  
[Set	  BEN_EST_RAW=BEN_EST]	  
[Set	  BEN_EST=BEN_DEFAULT]	  
[Set	  USE_DEFAULT=1]	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SECTION	  2:	  	  CV-­‐PLUS	  ANNUITY	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  QUESTIONS	  
	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
[NOTE:	  	  A	  COMPENSATING	  VARIATION	  (CV-­‐PLUS)	  MEASURE	  IS	  ELICITED	  IN	  THIS	  SECTION.	  HERE	  RESPONDENTS	  ARE	  ASKED	  TO	  
MAKE	  A	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  CHOICE	  BETWEEN	  REPONDENTS’	  EXISITING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTHLY	  BENEFIT	  LEVEL	  AND	  THEIR	  
EXISTING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTLY	  BENENIT	  AMOUNT	  MINUS	  A	  VARYING	  AMOUNT	  (SS_VARAMT)	  AND	  AN	  ADDITION	  OF	  A	  
ONE-­‐TIME	  PAYMENT	  /LUMPSUM	  AMOUNT	  (LS_AMT).]	  
	  
Q.2.1.	  [TRADEOFF	  –	  INTRO].	  	  Introduction	  to	  annuity	  tradeoff	  questions	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  few	  questions,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  a	  number	  of	  choices	  about	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
	  
Please	  assume	  that	  all	  amounts	  shown	  are	  after	  tax	  (i.e.,	  you	  don’t	  owe	  any	  tax	  on	  any	  of	  the	  amounts	  we	  will	  show	  
you).	  
	  
Think	  of	  any	  dollar	  amount	  mentioned	  in	  this	  survey	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  Social	  Security	  
will	  adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  inflation).	  
	  
[WAIT_WARNING]	  	  Wait	  Warning	  
The	  page	  after	  this	  may	  take	  several	  seconds	  to	  load.	  Please	  click	  the	  next	  button	  now,	  and	  do	  not	  click	  your	  browser's	  back	  
button	  while	  the	  page	  is	  loading.	  Thank	  you.	  
	  
[Notes	  to	  programmers:	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  nested	  loops	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
1. The	  outer	  loop	  has	  2,	  3	  or	  4	  iterations	  and	  loops	  over	  the	  change	  in	  the	  Social	  Security	  amount:	  SS_VARAMT.	  	  The	  
outerloop	  is	  indexed	  by	  the	  variable	  i.	  	  	  	  (The	  number	  of	  iterations	  depends	  on	  the	  respondent’s	  estimated	  Social	  
Security	  benefits.	  	  For	  most	  respondents	  there	  are	  four	  iterations,	  but	  the	  number	  is	  lower	  for	  a	  few	  respondents	  
with	  very	  low	  benefit	  amounts).	  	  
	  
2. The	  inner	  loop	  has	  4	  or	  5	  iterations	  and	  loops	  over	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment	  offered: LS.	  	  The	  inner	  
loop	  is	  indexed	  by	  the	  variable	  j.	  	  (The	  number	  if	  iterations	  is	  generally	  4.	  It	  is	  only	  5	  when	  we	  set	  SS_VARAMT=100)	  
	  
	  
Let	  the	  variable	  SS_VARAMT	  be	  a	  vector	  of	  length	  N_VARAMT.	  	  Let	  SS_VARAMT[i]	  denote	  the	  ith	  element	  of	  SS_VARAMT.	  
	  
	  
Initialization	  of	  SS_VARAMT	  
	  
If	  BEN_EST	  <	  300	  
	   Set	  N_VARAMT=2	  
	   SS_VARAMT={100,	  BEN_EST}	  
Endif	  
	  
If	  BEN_EST	  ≥	  300	  AND	  BEN_EST<600	  
	   Set	  N_VARAMT=3	  
	   Create	  the	  vector	  AMT={200,	  300,	  400}	  
	   Delete	  elements	  of	  AMT	  that	  are	  greater	  than	  (BEN_EST-­‐100)	  
	   Pick	  at	  random	  one	  element	  of	  AMT,	  call	  this	  element	  AMTRND	  
	   Set	  SS_VARAMT={100,	  BEN_EST,	  AMTRND}	  
Endif	  
	  
If	  BEN_EST	  ≥	  600	  
	   Set	  N_VARAMT=4	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   Create	  the	  vector	  AMT={200,	  300,	  400,	  600,	  700,	  800,	  900,	  1000,	  1100,	  1200,	  1300,	  1400,	  1500,	  1600,	  1700,	  1800,	  
1900,	  2000}	  	  	  	  /*	  Note	  that	  the	  amount	  500	  is	  missing	  from	  this	  list	  on	  purpose	  */	  
	   Delete	  elements	  of	  AMT	  that	  are	  greater	  than	  (BEN_EST-­‐100)	  
	   Pick	  at	  random	  one	  element	  of	  AMT,	  call	  this	  element	  AMTRND	  
	   Set	  SS_VARAMT={100,	  500,	  BEN_EST,	  AMTRND}	  
Endif	  
	  
	  
If	  SMALLTOLARGE==1	  
	   Sort	  the	  elements	  if	  SS_VARAMT	  from	  smallest	  to	  largest	  (i.e.	  such	  that	  SS_VARAMT[i]	  <	  SS_VARAMT[i+1]	  for	  all	  i)	  
Else	  
	   Sort	  the	  elements	  if	  SS_VARAMT	  from	  largest	  to	  smallest	  (i.e.	  such	  that	  SS_VARAMT[i]	  >	  SS_VARAMT[i+1]	  for	  all	  i)	  
Endif	  
	  
	  
Initialization	  of	  LS_AMT	  
If	  LS_STARTVALUE	  ==1	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_LOW	  
Elseif	  LS_STARTVALUE	  ==3	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_HIGH	  
Else	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_MED	  
Endif	  
	  
	  
	  
Start	  of	  the	  nested	  loops	  that	  ask	  CV-­‐PLUS	  
	  
	  
For	  i=1	  to	  N_VARAMT	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  START	  OF	  THE	  OUTER	  LOOP	  FOR	  CVPLUS	  */	  
	  
If	  SS_VARAMT=100	  
	   Set	  N_LS=5	  
Else	  
	   Set	  N_LS=4	  
Endif	  
	  
	  
	  
[Show	  if	  i>1]	  
Q.2.2:[CV-­‐Plus	  Roadmap]	  Roadmap	  to	  new	  series	  of	  CV-­‐plus	  tradeoff	  question.	  
	  
Now	  we	  would	  like	  to	  show	  a	  similar	  series	  of	  questions	  about	  choices	  between	  two	  money	  amounts,	  but	  the	  amount	  of	  
the	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  in	  one	  of	  the	  options	  is	  different	  from	  before.	  
	  
As	  before,	  please	  assume	  that	  all	  amounts	  shown	  are	  after	  tax	  (i.e.,	  you	  don’t	  owe	  any	  tax	  on	  any	  of	  the	  amounts	  we	  will	  
show	  you).	  
	  
As	  before,	  please	  think	  of	  any	  dollar	  amount	  mentioned	  in	  this	  survey	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  
Social	  Security	  will	  adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  inflation).	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Q.2.3:	  [CVPLUS]:	  	  CV-­‐PLUS	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  QUESTION	  
Set	  ROW=1	  
For	  j=1	  to	  N_LS	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  START	  OF	  THE	  INNER	  LOOP	  FOR	  CVPLUS*/	  
[If	  j	  =	  1,	  Display:	  ]	  
In	  this	  question,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  two	  money	  amounts.	  	  
[Else,	  Display:]	  
Now	  we	  ask	  you	  the	  same	  question	  but	  with	  a	  different	  amount	  for	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment.	  
[Endif]	  
	  
Please	  click	  on	  the	  option	  that	  you	  would	  prefer.	  
[SHOW	  IF	  MARRIED==1:]	  Benefits	  paid	  to	  your	  [SPOUSE]	  will	  stay	  the	  same	  for	  either	  choice.	  
	  
Suppose	  Social	  Security	  gave	  you	  a	  choice	  between:	  
	  
[If	  LS_FIRST=0,	  Display:	  ]	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  Security	  
benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month.	  	  
or	  	  
[If	  BEN_EST	  ≤ 	  SS_VARAMT,	  Display:	  ]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  no	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  but	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE]”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  -­‐	  SS_VARAMT[i]]	  per	  month	  and	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐
time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE]”;	  else	  
insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  	  
[Endif]	  
	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
	  
[If	  BEN_EST	  ≤ 	  SS_VARAMT,	  Display:	  ]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  no	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  but	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE]”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  -­‐	  SS_VARAMT[i]]	  per	  month	  and	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐
time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE]”;	  else	  
insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  	  	  
[Endif]	  
or	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  Security	  
benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month.	  	  
	  
[Endif]	  
	  
	  
[If	  Respondent	  selects	  option	  1	  (so	  NOT	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment)]	  
[Set	  ROW=ROW+2^(4-­‐j)]	  	  	  /*	  Note:	  this	  will	  increase	  the	  offered	  one-­‐time	  payment	  in	  the	  next	  iteration	  */	  
[Endif]	  
	  
[If	  the	  respondent	  does	  not	  check	  either	  option,	  prompt	  once	  using	  the	  standard	  ALP	  language	  in	  situations	  like	  
these	  (something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “Are	  just	  sure	  you	  do	  not	  want	  to	  choose	  between	  these	  two	  options.”).	  	  If	  the	  
respondent	  still	  does	  not	  answer,	  set	  j=5	  so	  that	  we	  skip	  out	  of	  the	  inner	  loop	  to	  the	  next	  iteration	  of	  the	  outer	  
loop]	  
	  
j=j+1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  END	  OF	  THE	  INNERLOOP	  FOR	  CV	  PLUS	  */	  	  
EndFor	  	  
i=i+1	  
EndFor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  END	  OF	  THE	  OUTERLOOP	  FOR	  CV	  PLUS	  */	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SECTION	  3:	  BACKGROUND	  QUESTIONS	  
	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  SECTION	  ASKS	  QUESITONS	  IN	  ORDER	  TO	  COLLECT	  CONTROL	  VARIABLES	  SUCH	  AS	  SUBJECTIVE	  HEALTH,	  
FINANCIAL	  LITERACY,	  RISK	  AVERSION,	  ANNUITY	  HOLDINGS,	  MORTALITY	  EXPECTATIONS,	  PERCEPTION	  OF	  POLITICAL	  RISK,	  
AND	  LIQUIDITY	  CONSTRAINTS.	  ]	  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
Q.3.1:	  [HEALTH]	  Subjective	  Health	  	  	  [ms1_C901]	  
Would	  you	  say	  your	  health	  is	  .	  .	  .?	  	  	  
(1)	  Excellent	  
(2)	  Very	  good	  
(3)	  Good	  
(4)	  Fair	  
(5)	  Poor	  
	  
	  
Financial	  Literacy	  
	  
Q	  3.2.1	  [INT_RATE_LITERACY]	  Interest	  rate	  literacy	  [ms5_L001]	  	  	  	  	  	  
Suppose	  you	  had	  $100	  in	  a	  savings	  account	  and	  the	  interest	  rate	  was	  2%	  per	  year.	  After	  5	  years,	  how	  much	  do	  you	  think	  you	  
would	  have	  in	  the	  account	  if	  you	  left	  the	  money	  to	  grow?	  
(1) 	  More	  than	  $102	  	  
(2) 	  Exactly	  $102	  	  
(3) 	  Less	  than	  $102	  	  
(4) 	  Don’t	  Know	  
	  
Q	  3.2.2	  [INFLATION]	  Inflation	  Literacy	  (ms5_L003)	  	  	  	  	  	  
Imagine	  that	  the	  interest	  rate	  on	  your	  savings	  account	  was	  1%	  per	  year	  and	  inflation	  was	  2%	  per	  year.	  After	  1	  year,	  would	  you	  
be	  able	  to	  buy	  more	  than,	  exactly	  the	  same	  as,	  or	  less	  than	  today	  with	  the	  money	  in	  this	  account?	  	  
	  
(1) More	  than	  today	  	  
(2) Exactly	  the	  same	  as	  today	  	  
(3) Less	  than	  today	  	  
(4) Don’t	  Know	  
	  
Q	  3.2.3	  [SAFER]	  Stock	  literacy	  [ms5_P002]	  	  	  
Please	  tell	  us	  whether	  this	  statement	  is	  true	  or	  false?	  Buying	  a	  [If	  ORDER_STOCK=1,	  insert	  “single	  company	  stock”;	  else	  insert	  
“stock	  mutual	  fund”]	  usually	  provides	  a	  safer	  return	  than	  a	  [If	  ORDER_STOCK=1,	  insert	  “stock	  mutual	  fund”;	  else	  insert	  “single	  
company	  stock”].	  
(1) 	  True	  	  
(2) 	  False	  	  
(3) 	  Don't	  know	  
	  
Q	  3.2.4	  [FINKNOWL]	  Self-­‐rated	  Financial	  Knowledge	  [ms33_FINKNOWL]	  	  	  	  	  
How	  would	  you	  rate	  your	  knowledge	  about	  financial	  matters?	  	  
(1) Very	  High	  	  
(2) High	  
(3) Moderate	  	  
(4) Low	  
(5) Very	  Low	  
	  
Q	  3.2.5	  [HS_FIN_EDUC_PROGRAM]	  High	  school	  financial	  education	  programs	  [ms5_B003]	  	  	  	  
Did	  your	  high	  school	  offer	  financial	  education	  programs?	  
(1) Yes	  
(2) No	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Q	  3.2.6	  	  [EMP_FIN_EDUC_PROGRAM]	  Employer’s	  financial	  education	  program	  [ms5_Z001]	  	  	  	  	  	  
Did	  any	  of	  the	  employers	  you	  work	  for	  or	  worked	  for	  offer	  financial	  education	  programs	  (for	  example	  retirement	  seminars)?	  
(1) Yes	  
(2) No	  
(3) Don’t	  know	  	  
	  
Q	  3.2.7	  [RET_SAV_PLAN]	  Retirement	  savings	  plan	  [JV357	  in	  HRS]	  
Have	  you	  developed	  a	  plan	  for	  retirement	  saving?	  
(1) Yes	  	  
(2) More	  or	  less	  
(3) No	  	  
	  
[IF	  RET_SAV_PLAN	  =	  1	  	  skip	  to	  Q3.2.8,	  IF	  RET_SAV_PLAN	  =	  2	  	  skip	  to	  Q3.2.8,	  IF	  RET_SAV_PLAN	  =	  3	  	  skip	  to	  Q3.3.1]	  
	  
Q	  3.2.8	  [RET_SAV_PLAN_1]	  Able	  to	  stick	  to	  retirement	  saving	  plan	  	  	  	  [JV358	  in	  HRS]	  	  	  	  
How	  often	  have	  you	  stuck	  to	  this	  plan:	  would	  you	  say	  always,	  mostly,	  rarely,	  or	  never?	  
(1) Always	  
(2) Mostly	  
(3) Rarely	  
(4) Never	  
	  
	  
	  
Questions	  on	  Risk	  Aversion	  and	  Precautionary	  Savings	  Motives	  
	  
[NOTE:	  Options	  from	  1	  to	  7	  are	  included	  for	  the	  following	  questions	  where	  1	  indicates	  “completely	  agree”	  and	  7	  indicates	  
“completely	  disagree”.]	  
	  
[RISKAVERSION_INTRO]:	  The	  following	  statements	  concern	  saving	  and	  taking	  risks.	  Please	  indicate	  for	  each	  statement	  to	  what	  
extent	  you	  agree	  or	  disagree,	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  1	  to	  7.	  Here	  1	  indicates	  you	  “completely	  agree”	  and	  7	  indicates	  you	  “completely	  
disagree.”	  
	  	  
Q	  3.3.1	  [SPAAR1]	  Safe	  investments	  1	  
I	  think	  it	  is	  more	  important	  to	  have	  safe	  investments	  and	  guaranteed	  returns,	  than	  to	  take	  a	  risk	  to	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  get	  the	  
highest	  possible	  returns.	  	  
	  
Q	  3.3.2	  [SPAAR2]	  Safe	  investments	  2	  
I	  would	  never	  consider	  investing	  in	  the	  stock	  market	  because	  I	  find	  it	  too	  risky.	  	  
	  
Q	  3.3.3	  [SPAAR3]	  Safe	  investments	  3	  
If	  I	  think	  an	  investment	  will	  be	  profitable,	  I	  am	  prepared	  to	  borrow	  money	  to	  make	  this	  investment.	  	  
	  
Q	  3.3.4	  [SPAAR4]	  Safe	  investments	  4	  
I	  want	  to	  be	  certain	  that	  my	  investments	  are	  safe.	  	  
	  
Q	  3.3.5	  [SPAAR5]	  Safe	  investments	  5	  
I	  think	  I	  should	  take	  greater	  financial	  risks	  to	  improve	  my	  financial	  position.	  	  
	  
Q	  3.3.6	  [RISKREWARD]	  Risk	  Reward	  
I	  am	  prepared	  to	  take	  the	  risk	  to	  lose	  money,	  when	  there	  is	  also	  a	  chance	  to	  gain	  money.	  
	  
Q	  3.3.7	  [PRE_MOTIVES1]	  Precautionary	  motives	  1	  	  
I	  save	  to	  have	  some	  money	  to	  cover	  unforeseen	  expenses	  
	  
Q	  3.3.8	  [PRE_MOTIVES2]	  Precautionary	  motives	  2	  	  
I	  save	  to	  have	  enough	  money	  in	  my	  bank	  account	  to	  be	  sure	  I	  will	  be	  able	  to	  meet	  my	  financial	  liabilities	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Planning	  Horizon	  	  
	  
Q	  3.4	  [FIN_PLAN]	  Financial	  planning	  methods	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  [MS16_FD004]	  	  	  	  	  
In	  deciding	  how	  much	  of	  their	  income	  to	  spend	  or	  save,	  people	  are	  likely	  to	  think	  about	  different	  financial	  planning	  periods.	  In	  
planning	  your	  household	  saving	  and	  spending,	  which	  time	  period	  is	  most	  important	  to	  you?	  	  
(1) Next	  few	  months	  
(2) Next	  year	  
(3) Next	  few	  years	  
(4) Next	  5-­‐10	  years	  
(5) Longer	  than	  10	  years	  
(6) I	  don’t	  plan	  
	  
Annuity	  Holdings	  
	  
Q	  3.5.1	  [ANNUITY_NOW]	  Any	  receipt	  of	  pension	  or	  annuity	  benefits	  now	  
Not	  including	  Social	  Security	  benefits,	  do	  you	  [If	  MARRIED=1,	  insert	  “	  and	  your	  [SPOUSE]”]	  currently	  receive	  any	  monthly	  
pension	  or	  benefits	  that	  will	  continue	  for	  as	  long	  as	  you	  live?	  
(7) Yes	  
(8) No	  
(9) Other	  _____________	  
	  
[IF	  ANNUITY_NOW	  =	  1,	  skip	  to	  3.5.2,	  IF	  ANNUITY_NOW	  =	  2,	  skip	  to	  3.5.3,	  IF	  ANNUITY_NOW	  =	  3,	  skip	  to	  3.5.3]	  
	  
	  
Q	  3.5.2	  [ANNUITY_NOW1]	  Current	  monthly	  pension	  or	  annuity	  benefits	  
If	  you	  add	  it	  all	  up,	  about	  how	  much	  is	  the	  total	  amount	  per	  month?	  $	  ________________	  
	  
	  
Q	  3.5.3	  [ANNUITY_LATER]	  Monthly	  pension	  or	  annuity	  benefits	  later	  	  
Not	  including	  Social	  Security	  benefits,	  do	  you	  [If	  MARRIED=1,	  insert	  “	  and	  your	  [SPOUSE]”]	  anticipate	  receiving	  in	  the	  future	  
any	  monthly	  pension	  or	  payments	  that	  will	  continue	  for	  as	  long	  as	  you	  live?	  
(1) Yes	  
(2) No	  
(3) Other	  _____________	  
[IF	  ANNUITY_LATER	  =	  1	  skip	  to	  3.5.4,	  IF	  ANNUITY_LATER	  =	  2	  skip	  to	  3.6.1,	  IF	  ANNUITY_LATER	  =	  3	  skip	  to	  3.6.1]	  
	  
Q	  3.5.4	  [ANNUITY_LATER1]	  Monthly	  pension	  or	  annuity	  benefits	  1	  	  
Adding	  it	  all	  up,	  about	  how	  much	  will	  the	  total	  amount	  be	  per	  month?	  $	  ________________	  
	  
Mortality	  Expectations	  
	  
[Note	  to	  Programmer:	  ASK	  Q3.6.1	  IF	  AGE	  <	  65,	  ELSE	  GO	  TO	  Q3.6.2]	  
	  
Q	  3.6.1	  [MORT_EXP1]	  Mortality	  expectations	  1	  	  [HRS	  LP028	  ]	  
What	  is	  the	  percent	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  live	  to	  be	  75	  or	  more?	  	  Please	  move	  the	  slider	  below	  to	  indicate	  what	  you	  think	  
will	  be	  the	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  live	  to	  be	  75	  or	  more	  where	  0	  means	  “absolutely	  no	  chance”	  and	  100	  means	  “absolutely	  
certain”.	  
	  
	  
[Note	  to	  Programmer:	  Slider	  is	  inserted	  as	  shown	  below:]	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  00-­‐-­‐-­‐10-­‐-­‐-­‐20-­‐-­‐-­‐30-­‐-­‐-­‐40-­‐-­‐-­‐50-­‐-­‐-­‐60-­‐-­‐-­‐70-­‐-­‐-­‐80-­‐-­‐-­‐90-­‐-­‐-­‐100	  
Absolutely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Absolutely	  	  
No	  chance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Certain	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[ASK	  Q3.6.2	  IF	  AGE	  <	  90,	  ELSE	  GO	  TO	  Q3.7]	  
Q	  3.6.2	  [MORT_EXP2]	  Mortality	  expectations	  2	  	  	  	  	  [HRS	  LP029]	  
[Note	  to	  Programmer:	  
	  Fill	  values	  assigned	  as	  follows	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  (IF	  AGE	  IS	  LESS	  THAN	  65)	  	  	  /*	  note:	  this	  non-­‐monotonic	  pattern	  follows	  the	  HRS	  version	  of	  this	  question	  */	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  80	  (IF	  AGE	  IS	  65-­‐69)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  85	  (IF	  AGE	  IS	  70-­‐74)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  90	  (IF	  AGE	  IS	  75-­‐79)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  95	  (IF	  AGE	  IS	  80-­‐84)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  (IF	  AGE	  IS	  85+)]	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  percent	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  live	  to	  be	  [FILLVALUE]	  or	  more?	  Please	  move	  the	  slider	  below	  to	  indicate	  what	  
you	  think	  will	  be	  the	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  live	  to	  be	  [FILLVALUE]	  or	  more,	  where	  0	  means	  “absolutely	  no	  chance”	  and	  100	  
means	  “absolutely	  certain”.	  	  
	  
[Note	  to	  Programmer:	  Slider	  inserted	  as	  shown	  below:]	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  |-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐-­‐|	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  00-­‐-­‐-­‐10-­‐-­‐-­‐20-­‐-­‐-­‐30-­‐-­‐-­‐40-­‐-­‐-­‐50-­‐-­‐-­‐60-­‐-­‐-­‐70-­‐-­‐-­‐80-­‐-­‐-­‐90-­‐-­‐-­‐100	  
Absolutely	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Absolutely	  	  
No	  chance	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Certain	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  
Q.3.7:	  	  [PLCTCL_TRST]	  Perception	  of	  political	  risk	  	  [Greenwald	  language]	  
How	  confident	   are	   you	   that	   the	   Social	   Security	   system	  will	   be	   able	   to	   provide	   you	  with	   the	   level	   of	   future	  benefits	   you	   are	  
supposed	  to	  get	  under	  current	  law?	  
(1) Very	  confident	  
(2) Somewhat	  confident	  
(3) Not	  too	  confident	  
(4) Not	  at	  all	  confident	  
	  
Expected	  Returns	  
[The	  following	  questions	  are	  displayed	  as	  a	  table]	  
Q	  3.8.1	  [SAV_PLAN_1]	  Saving	  Plan	  1	  
Suppose	  you	  received	  an	  additional	  $10,000	  this	  year.	  	  Thinking	  about	  your	  household	  financial	  situation,	  how	  do	  you	  think	  you	  
would	  use	  it?	  	  	  
	  
Please	  type	  how	  much	  of	  the	  $10,000	  you	  would	  use	  for	  each	  action	  in	  the	  boxes	  below.	  	  You	  can	  put	  the	  money	  in	  as	  many	  or	  
as	  few	  categories	  as	  you	  wish.	  
	  
About	  how	  much	  of	  it	  do	  you	  think	  you	  would	  use	  to:	  
(1) 	  spend	  	  	   	   	   $_____	  	  
(2) 	  pay	  off	  credit	  cards	  	   	   $_____	  	  
(3) 	  pay	  off	  other	  debt	  	   	   $_____	  
(4) 	  save	   	   	   $_____	  
(5) 	  other	   	   	   $_____	  	  
	  
Respondents	  are	  prompted	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  amounts	  add	  to	  $10,000	  
[	  DISPLAY	  IF	  total	  <>	  10000	  ]	  
[checkSAV_PLAN_1total]	  	  check	  total	  
Your	  total	  adds	  up	  to	  $[].	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  table	  so	  they	  add	  up	  to	  $10,000	  or	  choose	  next	  to	  
continue.	  
	  
	  
	  
[The	  following	  questions	  are	  displayed	  as	  a	  table]	  
Q	  3.8.2	  [SAV_PLAN_2]	  Saving	  Plan	  2	  
Now	  assume	  that	  you	  cannot	  spend	  the	  $10,000,	  but	  have	  to	  save	  it	  for	  the	  future.	  How	  would	  you	  do	  that?	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Please	  type	  how	  much	  of	  the	  $10,000	  you	  would	  use	  for	  each	  action	  in	  the	  boxes	  below.	  	  You	  can	  put	  the	  money	  in	  as	  many	  or	  
as	  few	  categories	  as	  you	  wish.	  Please	  do	  not	  use	  commas,	  dollar	  signs	  or	  decimal	  points.	  	  
	  
(1) Put	  some	  in	  the	  bank	  	   	   $_____	  
(2) Invest	  some	  in	  bonds	   	  	   $_____	  
(3) Invest	  some	  in	  CDs	  	   	   $_____	  
(4) Invest	  some	  in	  stocks	   	   $_____	  
(5) Buy	  property/real	  estate	   $_____	  
(6) Other	  	   	   	   $_____	  
	  
[NOTE:	  Respondents	  are	  prompted	  to	  make	  sure	  the	  amounts	  add	  to	  $10,000.]	  
[	  DISPLAY	  IF	  total	  <>	  10000	  ]	  
[checkSAV_PLAN_2total]	  	  check	  total	  
Your	  total	  adds	  up	  to	  $[]	  Please	  go	  back	  and	  change	  the	  numbers	  in	  the	  table	  so	  they	  add	  up	  to	  $10,000	  or	  choose	  next	  to	  
continue.]	  
	  	  
Q	  3.8.3	  [SAV_PLAN_3]	  Saving	  Plan	  3	  	  
Of	  the	  $10,000	  that	  you	  had	  to	  save,	  about	  how	  much	  do	  you	  think	  you	  might	  earn	  on	  it	  per	  year,	  on	  average?	  	  
(1) Less	  than	  or	  equal	  to	  0%,	  	  
(2) 1-­‐3%,	  	  
(3) 4-­‐6%,	  	  
(4) 7-­‐9%	  
(5) 10-­‐12%	  
(6) 13%	  or	  more	  
	   	   	   	  	  
	  
	  
Liquidity	  Constraints	  	  
	  
Q	  3.9.1	  [ComeUp5000]	  Come	  up	  with	  $5000	  	  
If	  you	  had	  to,	  could	  you	  come	  up	  with	  $5,000	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “by	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “within	  one	  year	  
from	  now”]?	  	  
(1) Yes,	  I	  am	  certain	  I	  could	  
(2) I	  probably	  could	  	  
(3) I	  probably	  could	  not	  
(4) No,	  I	  definitely	  could	  not	  
	  
	  
[Ask	  if	  ComeUp5000=1	  or	  ComeUp5000=2]	  
Q	  3.9.2	  [FromWhere5000_MC,	  FromWhere_Box]	  How	  would	  you	  get	  the	  $5000	  
How	  would	  you	  come	  up	  with	  this	  $5000?	  
Choose	  all	  that	  apply:	  
(1) I	  would	  use	  my	  current	  savings	  or	  investments	  
(2) I	  would	  save	  the	  money	  out	  of	  my	  income	  between	  now	  and	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  
else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]?	  	  
(3) I	  would	  borrow	  it	  from	  family	  or	  friends	  
(4) I	  would	  use	  one	  or	  more	  credit	  cards	  
(5) I	  would	  use	  a	  home	  equity	  loan	  or	  home	  mortgage	  
(6) I	  would	  take	  out	  a	  payday	  loan	  or	  use	  a	  pawnshop	  
(7) I	  would	  sell	  something	  that	  I	  own,	  not	  including	  my	  home	  
(8) I	  would	  work	  additional	  hours,	  now	  or	  in	  the	  future	  
(9) Other:	  ______________	  	  [provide	  open-­‐ended	  text	  box]	  
________________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
A-51
	  
	  
	  
SECTION	  4:	  	  CLOSING	  OF	  WAVE	  1	  
	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  IS	  ASKED	  OF	  ALL	  RESPONDENTS	  AT	  THE	  END	  OF	  WAVE	  1.]	  
	  
Q	  4.1.1:	  [CS_001]	  HOW	  PLEASANT	  INTERVIEW	  
Could	  you	  tell	  us	  how	  interesting	  or	  uninteresting	  you	  found	  the	  questions	  in	  this	  interview?	  
	  
(1) Very	  interesting	  
(2) Interesting	  
(3) Neither	  interesting	  nor	  uninteresting	  
(4) Uninteresting	  
(5) Very	  uninteresting	  
	  
	  
Q	  4.1.2:	  [CS_003]	  	  Comments	  
Do	  you	  have	  any	  other	  comments	  on	  the	  interview?	  Please	  type	  these	  in	  the	  box	  below.	  
[Insert	  Open	  box]	  
______________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
SECTION	  5:	  	  INTRODUCTION	  TO	  WAVE	  2	  
	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  SECTION	  ASKS	  THE	  EITHER	  THE	  CV-­‐PLUS	  VERSION	  (VERSION	  B)	  OR	  THE	  OTHER	  VARIATIONS	  WHICH	  CONSISTS	  OF	  
CV-­‐MINUS,	  EV-­‐PLUS	  AND	  EV-­‐MINUS	  (VERSION	  A)	  DEPENDING	  ON	  THE	  RANDOMIZATION.	  IT	  ALSO	  ASKS	  THE	  “NO	  POLITICAL	  
RISK	  VERSION”	  OF	  CV-­‐PLUS	  TO	  ALL	  RESPONDENTS.]	  
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
[WAIT_WARNING]	  	  Wait	  Warning	  
	  
The	  page	  after	  this	  may	  take	  several	  seconds	  to	  load.	  Please	  click	  the	  next	  button	  now,	  and	  do	  not	  click	  your	  browser's	  back	  
button	  while	  the	  page	  is	  loading.	  Thank	  you.	  
	  
Q.5.1.	  [WAVE2_INTRO]	  	  Introduction	  to	  wave	  2	  
Recently,	  we	  asked	  you	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  about	  when	  and	  how	  you	  would	  like	  to	  receive	  your	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  	  
	  
We	  very	  much	  appreciate	  your	  help.	  Today,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  ask	  you	  some	  more	  questions	  about	  this.	  	  
	  
Once	  again,	  please	  take	  time	  to	  consider	  the	  questions	  and	  give	  us	  your	  best	  guess	  even	  if	  you	  do	  not	  know	  the	  exact	  answer.	  	  
Having	  your	  best	  guess	  will	  be	  very	  helpful	  to	  us.	  
	  
Thank	  you	  very	  much	  for	  your	  participation!	  
	  
	  
[If	  SS_STATUS==2	  and	  	  FLAGHYPO=0	  (not	  currently	  receiving	  SS	  and	  not	  hypothetical	  benefits),	  show:]	  
Q5.2.	  [BENEFIT_REMINDER]	  Reminding	  the	  respondent	  about	  his/her	  benefits	  
	  
We	  would	  like	  to	  remind	  you	  that	  in	  the	  prior	  survey	  we	  used	  $[BEN_EST]	  as	  the	  monthly	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  that	  your	  are	  
supposed	  to	  get	  under	  current	  law	  if	  you	  claim	  benefits	  at	  age	  [CLAIM_AGE].	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As	  before,	  we	  mean	  by	  “Social	  Security	  benefits”	  any	  benefits	  that	  you	  yourself	  receive	  or	  will	  receive	  from	  the	  Social	  Security	  
program,	  including	  retiree,	  disability,	  spouse,	  or	  survivor	  benefits.	  
	  
[IF	  SS_ELIG=3,	  DISPLAY:]	  /*	  So	  to	  those	  who	  said	  in	  wave	  1	  that	  they	  thought	  SS	  would	  no	  longer	  be	  around	  */	  
Please	  answer	  the	  questions	  in	  this	  survey	  assuming	  that	  current	  Social	  Security	  rules	  still	  apply	  when	  you	  first	  claim	  
Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  Thank	  you.	  
[ENDIF]	  
	  
	  
[If	  FLAGHYPO=1,	  Show]	  
Q.5.3:	  [ReminderHypoEligible]	  Reminder	  for	  those	  ineligble,	  but	  who	  answer	  questions	  hypothetically	  
	  
Even	  though	  you	  told	  us	  in	  the	  prior	  survey	  that	  you	  are	  not	  eligible	  to	  receive	  Social	  Security	  benefits,	  we	  would	  like	  to	  again	  
ask	  you	  to	  complete	  our	  survey	  assuming	  you	  would	  be	  eligible.	  In	  other	  words,	  please	  answer	  in	  this	  survey	  what	  you	  would	  
have	  done	  or	  chosen	  if	  you	  would	  be	  eligible	  for	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
	  
The	  typical	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  for	  [If	  MARRIED=1,	  insert	  “a	  married”;	  if	  MARRIED=0,	  insert	  “an	  unmarried”]	  [If	  
GENDER=“male”	  insert	  “man”;	  if	  GENDER=“female”	  insert	  “woman”]	  with	  [insert	  the	  respondent’s	  educational	  attainment	  
based	  on	  the	  categories	  in	  EDUCATION]	  is	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month.	  
	  
For	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  survey,	  let's	  assume	  that	  you	  [If	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “are	  supposed	  to”]	  get	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  
of	  $[BEN_DEFAULT]	  per	  month,	  and	  that	  you	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “started	  receiving”;	  If	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “would	  
start	  receiving”]	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  at	  age	  62.	  
	  
	  
	  
SECTION	  6:	  	  CV-­‐MINUS	  AND	  EV	  ANNUITY	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  QUESTIONS	  
	  
	  
[NOTE:	  COMPENSATING	  VARIATION	  (CV-­‐MINUS	  )	  AND	  EQUILVALENT	  VARIATION	  (EV-­‐PLUS/EV-­‐MINUS)	  MEASURES	  ARE	  
ELICITED	  IN	  THIS	  SECTION.	  SPECIFICALLY,	  RESPONDENTS	  ARE	  ASKED	  TO	  MAKE	  A	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  CHOICE	  BETWEEN:	  
	  
1)	  CV-­‐MINUS:	  	  REPONDENTS’	  EXISITING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTHLY	  BENEFIT	  LEVEL	  AND	  THEIR	  EXISTING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  
MONTLY	  BENENIT	  AMOUNT	  WITH	  AN	  INCREMENT	  OF	  A	  VARYING	  AMOUNT	  (SS_VARAMT)	  MINUS	  	  A	  ONE-­‐TIME	  PAYMENT	  
/LUMPSUM	  AMOUNT	  (LS_AMT).	  	  
	  
2)	  EV-­‐PLUS:	  	  REPONDENTS’	  EXISITING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTHLY	  	  BENEFIT	  LEVEL	  WITH	  A	  ONE-­‐TIME	  PAYMENT/LUMPSUM	  
AMOUNT	  (LS_AMT)	  AND	  REPONDENTS’	  EXISITING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTHLY	  	  BENEFIT	  LEVEL	  WITH	  AN	  INCREMENT	  OF	  A	  
VARYING	  AMOUNT	  (SS_VARAMT)	  	  
	  
3)	  EV-­‐MINUS:	  REPONDENTS’	  EXISITING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTHLY	  BENEFIT	  LEVEL	  MINUS	  A	  ONE-­‐TIME	  
PAYMENT/LUMPSUM	  AMOUNT	  (LS_AMT)	  	  AND	  REPONDENTS’	  EXISITING	  SOCIAL	  SECURITY	  MONTHLY	  	  BENEFIT	  LEVEL	  WITH	  
A	  DECREMENT	  OF	  A	  VARYING	  AMOUNT	  (SS_VARAMT).	  ]	  
	  
Q.6.1.	  [TRADEOFF	  –	  INTRO].	  	  Introduction	  to	  annuity	  tradeoff	  questions	  
	  
In	  the	  next	  few	  questions,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  a	  number	  of	  choices	  about	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
	  
Please	  assume	  that	  all	  amounts	  shown	  are	  after	  tax	  (i.e.,	  you	  don’t	  owe	  any	  tax	  on	  any	  of	  the	  amounts	  we	  will	  show	  
you).	  
	  
Think	  of	  any	  dollar	  amount	  mentioned	  in	  this	  survey	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  Social	  Security	  
will	  adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  inflation).	  
	  
[WAIT_WARNING]	  	  Wait	  Warning	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  The	  page	  after	  this	  may	  take	  several	  seconds	  to	  load.	  Please	  click	  the	  next	  button	  now,	  and	  do	  not	  click	  your	  
browser's	  back	  button	  while	  the	  page	  is	  loading.	  Thank	  you.	  
	  
[Note	  to	  programmer:	  
	  
There	  are	  two	  nested	  loops	  in	  this	  section.	  
	  
1. The	  outer	  loop	  has	  3	  iterations	  and	  loops	  over	  the	  version	  of	  the	  tradeoff	  question	  that	  is	  asked	  (either	  CV-­‐Minus,	  
EV-­‐Plus,	  or	  EV-­‐minus).	  	  The	  outerloop	  is	  indexed	  by	  the	  variable	  i.	  
	  
2. The	  inner	  loop	  has	  4	  iterations	  and	  loops	  over	  the	  amount	  of	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment	  offered:	  LS.	  	  The	  inner	  loop	  is	  
indexed	  by	  the	  variable	  j.	  
	  
Initialization	  of	  SS_VARAMT	  
Set	  SS_VARAMT=100	  
	  
Initialization	  of	  LS_AMT	  
If	  LS_STARTVALUE	  ==1	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_LOW	  
Elseif	  LS_STARTVALUE	  ==3	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_HIGH	  
Else	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_MED	  
Endif	  
	  
	  
Start	  of	  the	  nested	  loops	  that	  ask	  other	  versions	  of	  the	  tradeoff	  questions	  
	  
	  
For	  i=1	  to	  3	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  START	  OF	  THE	  OUTER	  LOOP	  FOR	  OTHER	  TRADEOFF	  QUESTIONS	  */	  
	  
	  
[Show	  if	  i>1]	  
Q.6.2:	  [Roadmap	  other	  versions]	  Roadmap	  to	  other	  tradeoff	  questions.	  
Now	  we	  would	  like	  to	  show	  a	  different	  series	  of	  questions	  about	  choices	  about	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  
	  
As	  before,	  please	  assume	  that	  all	  amounts	  shown	  are	  after	  tax	  (i.e.,	  you	  don’t	  owe	  any	  tax	  on	  any	  of	  the	  amounts	  we	  will	  
show	  you).	  
	  
As	  before,	  think	  of	  any	  dollar	  amount	  mentioned	  in	  this	  survey	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  Social	  
Security	  will	  adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  inflation).	  
	  
	  
Q.6.3:	  [OtherTradeoff]:	  	  OTHER	  VERSIONS	  OF	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  QUESTION	  
	  
Set	  ROW=1	  
	  
For	  j=1	  to	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  START	  OF	  THE	  INNER	  LOOP	  FOR	  OTHER	  TRADEOFF	  QUESTIONS	  */	  
	  
[If	  j	  =	  1,	  Display:	  ]	  
In	  this	  question,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  two	  money	  amounts.	  	  
[Else,	  Display:]	  
Now	  we	  ask	  you	  the	  same	  question	  but	  with	  a	  different	  amount	  for	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment.	  
[Endif]	  
	  
Please	  click	  on	  the	  option	  that	  you	  would	  prefer.	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[SHOW	  IF	  MARRIED==1:]	  Benefits	  paid	  to	  your	  [SPOUSE]	  will	  stay	  the	  same	  for	  either	  choice.	  
	  
Suppose	  Social	  Security	  gave	  you	  a	  choice	  between:	  
	  
[If	  CVM_ORDER==i]	  	  	  	  	  /*	  THIS	  GIVES	  THE	  CV-­‐MINUS	  VERSION	  */	  
	  
[Note	  to	  programmer:	  The	  way	  the	  ROW	  variable	  is	  updated	  depends	  on	  how	  each	  option	  is	  numbered]	  
	  
[If	  LS_FIRST=0,	  Display:	  ]	  
	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  
Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month.	  	  
or	  	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  and	  making	  a	  one-­‐time	  
payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  
year	  from	  now”]	  to	  Social	  Security.	  	  
	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  and	  making	  a	  one-­‐time	  
payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  
year	  from	  now”]	  to	  Social	  Security.	  	  
or	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  
Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month.	  	  
	  
[Endif]	  
[Endif]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  End	  of	  CV-­‐Minus	  version	  */	  
	  
	  
	  
[If	  EVP_ORDER==i]	  	  	  	  	  /*	  THIS	  GIVES	  THE	  EV-­‐PLUS	  VERSION	  */	  
	  
[Note	  to	  programmer:	  The	  way	  the	  ROW	  variable	  is	  updated	  depends	  on	  how	  each	  option	  is	  numbered]	  
	  
[If	  LS_FIRST=0,	  Display:]	  
	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month.	  
or	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  
Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month	  and	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  	  
	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  
Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month	  and	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  	  
or	  	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month.	  
	  
[Endif]	  
[Endif]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  End	  of	  EV-­‐Plus	  Version	  */	  
	  
	  
	  
[If	  EVM_ORDER==i]	  	  	  	  	  /*	  THIS	  GIVES	  THE	  EV-­‐MINUS	  VERSION	  */	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[Note	  to	  programmers:	  The	  way	  the	  ROW	  variable	  is	  updated	  depends	  on	  how	  each	  option	  is	  numbered]	  
	  
[If	  LS_FIRST=0,	  Display:	  ]	  
	  
[If	  BEN_EST	  ≤ 	  SS_VARAMT,	  Display:	  ]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  no	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  -­‐	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month.	  
[Endif]	  
or	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  
Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month	  and	  making	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  Social	  Security.	  	  
	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  
Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month	  and	  making	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  Social	  Security.	  	  	  
or	  	  
[If	  BEN_EST	  ≤ 	  SS_VARAMT,	  Display:	  ]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  no	  Social	  Security	  benefits.	  	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  -­‐	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month.	  
[Endif]	  
	  
[Endif]	  
[Endif]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  End	  of	  EV-­‐Minus	  version	  */	  
	  
	  
	  
[If	  Respondent	  selects	  option	  1]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*so	  making	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment	  (for	  CV-­‐minus	  and	  EV-­‐minus)	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  or	  	  NOT	  receiving	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment	  (for	  EV-­‐plus)	  */	  
	   [Set	  ROW=ROW+2^(4-­‐j)]	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  Note:	  this	  will	  increase	  the	  size	  of	  one-­‐time	  payment	  in	  the	  next	  iteration,	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  so	  it	  makes	  option	  1	  less	  attractive	  */	  
[Endif]	  
	  
[If	  the	  respondent	  does	  not	  check	  either	  option,	  prompt	  once	  using	  the	  standard	  ALP	  language	  in	  situations	  like	  
these	  (something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “Are	  you	  sure	  you	  do	  not	  want	  to	  choose	  between	  these	  two	  options.”).	  	  If	  the	  
respondent	  still	  does	  not	  answer,	  set	  j=5	  so	  that	  we	  skip	  out	  of	  the	  inner	  loop	  to	  the	  next	  iteration	  of	  the	  outer	  
loop]	  
	  
j=j+1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  END	  OF	  THE	  INNERLOOP	  FOR	  OTHER	  TRADEOFF	  QUESTIONS	  */	  	  
EndFor	  	  
i=i+1	  
EndFor	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  END	  OF	  THE	  OUTERLOOP	  FOR	  OTHER	  TRADEOFF	  QUESTIONS	  */	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SECTION	  7:	  	  NO-­‐POLITICAL-­‐RISK	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  QUESTION	  
	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  SECTION	  REPLICATES	  ONE	  OF	  THE	  COMPENSATION	  VARIATION	  MEASURES	  (CV-­‐PLUS)	  BUT	  ASSUMING	  THAT	  
THERE	  IS	  NO	  POLITICAL	  RISK.	  IT	  IS	  ASKED	  OF	  ALL	  RESPONDENTS	  AT	  THE	  END	  OF	  WAVE	  2.]	  	  	  
	  
Q.7.1.	  [NOPOLRISK	  –	  INTRO].	  	  Introduction	  to	  annuity	  tradeoff	  question	  without	  political	  risk	  
	  
The	  next	  few	  questions	  are	  similar	  to	  the	  questions	  we	  have	  asked	  before	  about	  choices	  about	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  
but	  with	  one	  difference:	  
	  <b>	  From	  now	  on,	  please	  assume	  that	  you	  are	  absolutely	  certain	  to	  receive	  all	  income	  promised	  as	  future	  Social	  
Security	  benefits	  or	  as	  a	  future	  one-­‐time	  payment.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  please	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  absolutely	  certain	  that	  
Social	  Security	  will	  make	  payments	  as	  promised,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  chance	  at	  all	  of	  any	  benefit	  changes	  in	  the	  future	  
other	  than	  the	  trade-­‐offs	  discussed	  in	  the	  question	  below.	  </b>	  
	  
As	  before,	  please	  assume	  that	  all	  amounts	  shown	  are	  after	  tax	  (i.e.,	  you	  don’t	  owe	  any	  tax	  on	  any	  of	  the	  amounts	  we	  
will	  show	  you).	  
	  
As	  before,	  think	  of	  any	  dollar	  amount	  mentioned	  in	  this	  survey	  in	  terms	  of	  what	  a	  dollar	  buys	  you	  today	  (because	  
Social	  Security	  will	  adjust	  future	  dollar	  amounts	  for	  inflation).	  
	  
	  
	  
[NOTE	  TO	  PROGRAMMER:	  	  
Initialization	  of	  SS_VARAMT	  
	  
Set	  SS_VARAMT=100	  
	  
Initialization	  of	  LS_AMT	  
If	  LS_STARTVALUE	  ==1	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_LOW	  
Elseif	  LS_STARTVALUE	  ==3	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_HIGH	  
Else	  
Set	  the	  16x5	  matrix	  LS_AMT=LS_MED	  
Endif	  ]	  
	  
	  
	  
Q.7.2:	  [NOPOLRISK]:	  	  NO-­‐POLITICAL-­‐RISK	  VERSION	  OF	  CV-­‐PLUS	  TRADE-­‐OFF	  QUESTION	  
Set	  ROW=1	  
For	  j=1	  to	  4	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  START	  OF	  THE	  NOPOLRISK	  LOOP	  */	  
[If	  j	  =	  1,	  Display:	  ]	  
In	  this	  question,	  we	  are	  going	  to	  ask	  you	  to	  compare	  and	  make	  a	  choice	  between	  two	  money	  amounts.	  	  
	  [Else,	  Display:]	  
Now	  we	  ask	  you	  the	  same	  question	  but	  with	  a	  different	  amount	  for	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment.	  
[Endif]	  
	  
Reminder:	  <b>	  Please	  assume	  that	  you	  are	  absolutely	  certain	  to	  receive	  all	  income	  promised	  as	  future	  Social	  Security	  
benefits	  or	  as	  a	  future	  one-­‐time	  payment.	  	  In	  other	  words,	  please	  assume	  that	  it	  is	  absolutely	  certain	  that	  Social	  Security	  
will	  make	  payments	  as	  promised,	  and	  that	  there	  is	  no	  chance	  at	  all	  of	  any	  benefit	  changes	  in	  the	  future	  other	  than	  the	  
trade-­‐offs	  discussed	  in	  the	  question	  below.	  <end	  b>	  
	  
Please	  click	  on	  the	  option	  that	  you	  would	  prefer.	  	  
[SHOW	  IF	  MARRIED==1:]	  Benefits	  paid	  to	  your	  [SPOUSE]	  will	  stay	  the	  same	  for	  either	  choice.	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Suppose	  Social	  Security	  gave	  you	  a	  choice	  between:	  
	  
[If	  LS_FIRST=0,	  Display:	  ]	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  
of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month.	  	  
or	  	  
[If	  BEN_EST	  ≤ 	  SS_VARAMT,	  Display:	  ]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  no	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  but	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  -­‐	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  and	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  
payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  
year	  from	  now”].	  
	   [Endif]	  
[Else	  Display:]	  
	  [If	  BEN_EST	  ≤ 	  SS_VARAMT,	  Display:	  ]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  no	  Social	  Security	  benefits	  but	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  
CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”].	  
	  [Else	  Display:]	  
(2)	  !	  Receiving	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  -­‐	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  and	  receiving	  a	  one-­‐time	  
payment	  of	  $[LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  
year	  from	  now”].	  	  
[Endif]	  
or	  
(1)	  !	  Receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  
of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month.	  	  
[Endif]	  
	  
 [If	  Respondent	  selects	  option	  1	  (so	  NOT	  the	  one-­‐time	  payment)]	  
	   [Set	  ROW=ROW+2^(4-­‐j)]	  	  	  	  /*	  Note:	  this	  will	  increase	  the	  offered	  one-­‐time	  payment	  in	  the	  next	  iteration	  */	  
[Endif]	  
	  
[If	  the	  respondent	  does	  not	  check	  either	  option,	  prompt	  once	  using	  the	  standard	  ALP	  language	  in	  situations	  like	  these	  
(something	  along	  the	  lines	  of	  “Are	  just	  sure	  you	  do	  not	  want	  to	  choose	  between	  these	  two	  options.”).	  	  If	  the	  respondent	  
still	  does	  not	  answer,	  set	  j=5	  so	  that	  we	  skip	  out	  of	  the	  inner	  loop	  to	  the	  next	  iteration	  of	  the	  outer	  loop]	  
	  
j=j+1	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  /*	  END	  OF	  THE	  NOPOLRISK	  LOOP	  */	  	  
EndFor	  	  
__________________________________________________________________________	  
Liquidity	  Constraints	  	  
	  
[ASK	  Q	  7.3.1	  –	  Q	  7.3.4	  IF	  lowest	  value	  of	  lumpsum	  amount	  in	  CV	  MINUS	  respondent	  was	  unwilling	  to	  pay	  <100000]	  
Q	  7.3.1	  [CanPayLS]	  Could	  respondent	  pay	  the	  lumpsum	  in	  CV-­‐Minus	  	  
[Generate	  a	  variable	  CVM_MIN	  that	  is	  equal	  to	  the	  lowest	  value	  of	  the	  lumpsum	  amount	  in	  the	  CV-­‐MINUS	  question	  that	  the	  
respondent	  was	  unwilling	  to	  pay.	  	  So,	  CVM_MIN	  is	  the	  minimum	  of	  the	  sequence	  of	  [LS_AMT[ROW,j]]	  displayed	  in	  CVMINUS	  
restricted	  to	  those	  j	  where	  the	  respondent	  chose	  option	  (2).]	  
	  
Previously,	  you	  told	  us	  you	  would	  rather	  receive	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  
Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST]	  per	  month	  than	  make	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  
“at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  receive	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  
month.	  
	  
Please	  indicate	  your	  reason	  for	  this	  choice:	  
(1) I	  cannot	  come	  up	  with	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “by	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “within	  one	  
year	  from	  now”].	  
(2) 	  I	  could	  come	  up	  with	  $[CVM_MIN]	  but	  I	  do	  not	  want	  to	  use	  the	  money	  this	  way.	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[ASK	  IF	  Could	  respondent	  pay	  the	  lumpsum	  in	  CV-­‐Minus	  =	  I	  cannot	  come	  up	  with	  $^FLCVM_MIN	  ^FLCanPayLS3]	  
[Ask	  if	  CanPayLS=1	  :]	  
Q	  7.3.2	  [PayIfHadMoney]	  Would	  R	  pay	  the	  LS	  if	  R	  had	  the	  money?	  
	  
Suppose	  you	  had	  an	  additional	  	  $[CVM_MIN]	  in	  savings	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  
year	  from	  now”],	  do	  you	  think	  you	  would	  make	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  
CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  receive	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  
(instead	  of	  receiving	  your	  [If	  SS_STATUS==1,	  insert	  “current”;	  if	  SS_STATUS==2,	  insert	  “expected”]	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  
$[BEN_EST]	  per	  month)?	  
	  
(1) Yes	  
(2) No	  
	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  Would	  R	  pay	  the	  LS	  if	  R	  had	  the	  money	  =	  No	  ]	  
[Ask	  if	  PayIfHadMoney	  =2	  :]	  
[The	  following	  questions	  are	  displayed	  as	  a	  table]	  
	  
Q.7.3.3:	  [	  WhyNotHypo]	  	  Why	  not	  pay	  LS	  even	  if	  R	  had	  the	  money	  
	  
Why	  do	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  make	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  
insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  receive	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  even	  if	  you	  had	  at	  
least	  $[CVM_MIN]	  in	  savings?	  
	  
Why do you choose not to make	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  
insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  receive	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  even	  if	  you	  had	  an	  
additional	  $[CVM_MIN]	  in	  savings? 
 
Please	  choose	  the	  main	  reason:	  
(1) I don’t expect to live long enough for this to be a good deal 
(2) I believe I can invest the money better on my own 
(3) I would prefer to spend more money now rather than having more to spend later 
(4) I would prefer to use the money to help pay for an upcoming large expense 
(5) I would prefer to save the money for an emergency 
(6) I would prefer to leave the money to my family 
(7) I don’t trust that the government will make good on the deal 
(8) Other:_______________   [provide open-ended text box] 
	  
	  
Else	  	  
	  
[The	  following	  questions	  are	  displayed	  as	  a	  table]	  
[Ask	  if	  CanPayLS=2	  :]	  
Q	  7.3.4	  [WhyNotActual]	  Why	  not	  pay	  LS	  even	  if	  R	  had	  the	  money	  
	  
Why	  do	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  make	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  
insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  receive	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  even	  though	  you	  can	  
come	  up	  with	  $[CVM_MIN]?	  
	  
Why	  do	  you	  choose	  not	  to	  make	  a	  one-­‐time	  payment	  of	  $[CVM_MIN]	  [If	  CLAIM_AGE>AGE+1,	  insert	  “at	  age	  CLAIM_AGE”;	  else	  
insert	  “one	  year	  from	  now”]	  to	  receive	  a	  Social	  Security	  benefit	  of	  	  $[BEN_EST	  +	  SS_VARAMT]	  per	  month	  even	  though	  you	  can	  
come	  up	  with	  $[CVM_MIN]?	  
	  
Please	  choose	  the	  main	  reason:	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(1) I	  don’t	  expect	  to	  live	  long	  enough	  for	  this	  to	  be	  a	  good	  deal	  
(2) I	  believe	  I	  can	  invest	  the	  money	  better	  on	  my	  own	  
(3) I	  would	  prefer	  to	  spend	  more	  money	  now	  rather	  than	  having	  more	  to	  spend	  later	  
(4) I	  would	  prefer	  to	  use	  the	  money	  to	  help	  pay	  for	  an	  upcoming	  large	  expense	  
(5) I	  would	  prefer	  to	  save	  the	  money	  for	  an	  emergency	  
(6) I	  would	  prefer	  to	  leave	  the	  money	  to	  my	  family	  
(7) I	  don’t	  trust	  that	  the	  government	  will	  make	  good	  on	  the	  deal	  
(8) Other:_______________	  	  	  [provide	  open-­‐ended	  text	  box]	  
	  
	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  CALCULATED	  AGE	  <	  65]	  
Q.7.4.1:	  [P028]	  	  Die	  Before	  75	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  percent	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  die	  before	  age	  75?	  Please	  move	  the	  slider	  below	  to	  indicate	  what	  you	  think	  will	  be	  the	  
chance	  that	  you	  will	  die	  before	  age	  75,	  where	  0	  means	  "absolutely	  no	  chance"	  and	  100	  means	  "absolutely	  certain".	  	  
	  
[ASK	  IF	  CALCULATED	  AGE	  <	  90]	  
Q.7.4.2:	  [	  P029]	  	  Die	  Before	  [85,	  90,	  95,	  100]	  
	  
What	  is	  the	  percent	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  die	  before	  age	  [85/90/95/100]?	  Please	  move	  the	  slider	  below	  to	  indicate	  what	  you	  
think	  will	  be	  the	  chance	  that	  you	  will	  die	  before	  age	  [85/90/95/100],	  where	  0	  means	  "absolutely	  no	  chance"	  and	  100	  means	  
"absolutely	  certain".	  	  
	  
_____________________________________________________________________________	  
	  
	  
SECTION	  8.	  	  CLOSING	  OF	  WAVE	  2	  
	  
	  
	  
[NOTE:	  THIS	  IS	  ASKED	  OF	  ALL	  RESPONDENTS	  AT	  THE	  END	  OF	  WAVE	  2.]	  
	  
Q	  8.1:	  [CS_001]	  	  HOW	  PLEASANT	  INTERVIEW	  
Could	  you	  tell	  us	  how	  interesting	  or	  uninteresting	  you	  found	  the	  questions	  in	  this	  interview?	  
	  
(1) Very	  interesting	  
(2) Interesting	  
(3) Neither	  interesting	  nor	  uninteresting	  
(4) Uninteresting	  
(5) Very	  uninteresting	  
	  
Q	  8.2:	  [CS_003]	  	  Comments	  
Do	  you	  have	  any	  other	  comments	  on	  the	  interview?	  Please	  type	  these	  in	  the	  box	  below.	  
[Insert	  Open	  box]	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Online Appendix C: Can a Kinked Utility Function Rationalize the Results? 
 
In this online appendix, we examine whether our results can be rationalized using a 
kinked utility function, i.e., by a utility specification that is typically used to explain endowment 
or status quo effects.  As explained in more detail below, while we find that a kinked utility 
function (with marginal utility falling discontinuously for units of the good above the reference 
point) could explain the observed choices in the CV version, such a kinked utility function 
cannot explain the observed choices for the EV version.  In short, a kinked utility function cannot 
simultaneously explain our findings for the CV and the EV choices. 
To see this, recall the four types of choices we offered respondents, as described by the 
table in the text: 
 
Four Variants of the Annuity Valuation Tradeoff Question 
 “Sell” Version  “Buy” Version 
Choice A Choice B  Choice A Choice B 
Compensating 
Variation (CV) 
[SSB-X] + LS [SSB]  [SSB+X] – LS [SSB] 
Equivalent  
Variation (EV) 
[SSB] + LS [SSB+X]  [SSB] – LS [SSB-X] 
Note: SSB stands for current/expected monthly Social Security benefits, X is the amount by which monthly Social Security 
benefits would change and LS is a one-time, lump-sum payment. Positive amounts are received by the individual while negative 
amounts indicate a payment by the individuals. Amounts between square brackets are paid monthly for as long as the individual 
lives, whereas LS is a one-time payment. The individual is asked to elect Choice A or Choice B. 
 
Given that SSB is the current or expected amount of Social Security Benefits, it would be the 
natural reference point, and we denote it by Ref in the table below. We used X=$100 and found LS ≈ 
$13,000 in the sell version and LS ≈ $3,000 in the buy versions.  Hence, our findings can be summarized 
by: 
 
Findings for the Annuity Valuation Tradeoff Question 
 “Sell” Version  “Buy” Version 
Choice A Choice B  Choice A Choice B 
Compensating 
Variation (CV) 
[Ref-100] + 13,000 [Ref]  [Ref+100] – 3,000 [Ref] 
Equivalent  
Variation (EV) 
[Ref] + 13,000 [Ref+100]  [Ref] – 3,000 [Ref-100] 
Note: Ref stands for the reference point current/expected monthly Social Security benefits. Positive amounts are received by the 
individual while negative amounts indicate a payment by the individuals. Amounts between square brackets are paid monthly for 
as long as the individual lives, whereas amounts outside square brackets are a one-time payment. The individual is asked to elect 
Choice A or Choice B. 
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Suppose that the individual’s utility from Social Security benefits (Y) takes the standard kinked 
form used to explain endowment effects:  
 
U(Y) = α Y – β (Y-Ref) 1(Y>Ref), 
 
where α denotes the marginal utility of Social Security benefits below the reference level and β denotes 
the decrease in marginal utility of Social Security that occurs at the reference point.  In other words, β=0 
implies there is no kink, and 0<β<α denotes the case where marginal utility falls discontinuously at the 
kink but remains positive. Finally, 1(.) denotes the indicator function, i.e., 1(.) equals one if the 
expression between parentheses is true and zero otherwise. 
If we make the standard assumption that U(.) is money metric, then the choices for the CV 
version can be rationalized by solving: 
 
CV-Sell: U(Ref-100) + 13,000=U(Ref)    "    α (Ref-100)               + 13000 = α Ref    "     α = 130 
CV-Buy: U(Ref+100) -   3,000=U(Ref)    "    α (Ref+100) - 100 β  -   3000 = α Ref    "     β = 100 
 
In short, the CV choices can indeed be rationalized by a standard kinked utility function, where 
the marginal utility of Social Security benefits is 130 below the kink point, but falls to 130-100=30 after 
the kink point.  
However, this same utility function cannot rationalize the EV choices: 
  
EV-Sell: U(Ref) + 13000 = U(Ref+100) " α Ref + 13000 = α (Ref+100) - 100β " 13000 = 100(α-β) 
EV-Buy: U(Ref) -   3000 = U(Ref-100)  " α Ref -    3000 =  α (Ref-100)             "   3000 = 100α  
 
Clearly, using the values α = 130 and β = 100 that we obtained in the CV case above cannot rationalize 
the EV choices.  In short, the observed choices for CV and EV are not simultaneously consistent with a 
single kinked utility function. Moreover, the EV choices can be rationalized only by α = 30 and β = -100.  
The negative value of β implies that the marginal utility increases as we pass the reference point; below 
the reference point, the marginal utility is 30 whereas it is 30-(-100)=130 above the reference point.  In 
short, the EV choices cannot be rationalized by a standard kinked utility function where marginal utility 
falls discontinuously as the reference point is passed.  
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